This guest post comes courtesy of Jonathan Hoffman, a Senior Partner at MB Law Group LLP, in Portland, Oregon. Jon, a long-time member of the Product Liability Advisory Council (“PLAC”), originally circulated a version of this post to PLAC members. Bexis, also a long-time PLAC member, saw it, thought blog readers would be interested, and successfully importuned Jon to submit a longer version here. Access to these kinds of alerts are one reason, among many, why we encourage drug and medical device manufactures confronted with product liability litigation to join PLAC.
As always our guest bloggers deserve 100% of the credit (and any blame) for their posts. Onward to the Hague Convention.
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Although most drug and medical device litigation is purely among domestic individuals and defendants, many manufacturers of these products are based outside the United States or are domestic subsidiaries of overseas companies. In recent years, the US Supreme Court has trimmed many excessive impositions of personal jurisdiction in suits brought against foreign and other non-local defendants, most recently, in BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405, 2017 WL 2322834 (U.S. May 30, 2017).
[editor’s note − see our BNSF post here]
However, it may have become easier for plaintiffs to invite foreign manufacturers to the party here in the US based on the Court’s recent liberal interpretation of the Hague Service Convention, 20 U. S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638 (1965), which governs service of process on foreign entities. Until now, effecting service upon a defendant based in another country has been an inconvenience, if not an outright impediment. Many US courts held that the only proper means of service under the Convention was to serve the complaint upon the “central authority” of that country, requesting that central authority to then serve the complaint upon the defendant in the manner under which service is customarily performed under that country’s laws. The Convention also provided that the Convention “shall not interfere with—(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” Many US courts concluded that this provision, Article 10(a) of the Convention did not authorize service of process by mail because it only referred to the right to “send” documents, not to “serve” them.
But the Supreme Court disagreed late last month. Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, No. 16-254, 2017 WL 2216933 (U.S. May 22, 2017), arose from a seemingly simple dispute between the manufacturer of playground equipment and a former employee. The employee was allegedly working for one of Water Splash’s competitors while still employed by Water Splash. Water Splash sued in Texas state court, but the former employee lived in Canada. Water Splash served her by mail, in accordance with Texas law. She did not appear. The trial court entered a default judgment. She then moved to set aside the judgment, but the court denied her motion.
The Supreme Court held that, as long as service by mail is performed in compliance with the forum’s law, Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention permits such service by mail on foreign defendants unless the country in which service was made has objected to this type of service. Article 10(a) provides that the Convention will not interfere with “the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,” but does not expressly refer to “service.” For decades, the lower courts had split over whether this provision extends to service of process or is limited to service of other documents and pleadings. Compare, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F. 2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that sending summons and complaint to defendant in foreign country does not constitute valid service under Hague Convention) with Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F. 3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the meaning of “send” in Article 10(a) includes “serve.”).
The question whether the Hague Convention permits service by mail has now been answered. The answer is a qualified “yes,” as long as such service complies with the forum’s service requirements and that the country where the defendant is located did not object to Article 10(a). This broader acceptance of international service via mail may, by lowering procedural barriers to entry, have the unfortunate effect of haling more foreign manufacturers or foreign parent companies into US Courts.
Water Splash does not eliminate all opportunities for defendants to avoid claims brought against foreign manufacturers, however. A variety of other remedies are still available to a foreign defendant. Most notably, Plaintiffs may mistakenly try to extend this ruling to effect mail service on a defendant in a country that has not ratified the Convention, or that has objected to such service. Or, the plaintiff may fail to effect mail service in compliance with forum law. The Hague Convention does not render such service sufficient.
Moreover, even if a US Court upholds service against a foreign defendant under the US’s liberal interpretation of the Hague Service Convention, a judgment might be unenforceable in the courts of the foreign defendant’s domicile. Foreign courts may refuse to enforce a judgment entered in the US by deciding that the American court lacked personal jurisdiction over the local defendant. Or, in some signatory countries (most notably Japan), that did not object to the Hague Service Convention, courts may not enforce a foreign judgment where service did not comport with the Hague Service Convention by including a copy of the summons and complaint in Japanese.
More traditional errors, too, can still render mail service on foreign companies ineffective to sustain a lawsuit in the US. For example, a plaintiff serving a foreign entity may underestimate the time required to serve that entity, even if the service is performed by mail. If the complaint is not properly served within the time provided by the forum state’s state statute of limitations and whatever state-law tolling provision allows for relation back of service, the claim can be dismissed. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980); Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Agusta Aviation Corp., 813 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1987).
But in significant cases, where the stakes are high and the plaintiffs’ counsel is more competent, the Water Splash decision suggests that more foreign manufacturers may have to learn to swim in American waters.