Photo of Bexis

You’ll have to excuse us a bit today.  This post is about product liability – specifically Pennsylvania product liability.  However, it is not really focused on prescription medical products.  But what can we say?  We were provoked.

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“The dark side of the Force is a pathway to many abilities some consider to be unnatural.”   – Darth Sidious (a/k/a Sheev Palpatine).

Money and the dark side share many of the same attributes.

The first footnote of a new law review article, Wertheimer & Rahdert, “The Force Awakens:  Tincher, Section 402A, & the Third Restatement in Pennsylvania,” 27 Widener Com. L.R. 157 (2018), reveals that “[t]he preparation of this article was supported in part by a research grant from the Pennsylvania Association for Justice.”  Id. at 157 n.1.  So we were not surprised in the least that “Force Awakens” read like a plaintiff litigation expert’s opinion on Pennsylvania product liability law.  The scholarship was bought and paid for, after all.

Another conclusion we reached by the end of that article was more surprising.

The Pennsylvania Association for Justice wuz robbed.  Whatever they paid, they didn’t get what they paid for.

To explain. “Force Awakens” was an obvious response to our own Bexis’ 2017 91-page opus, J. Beck, “Rebooting Pennsylvania Product Liability Law: Tincher v. Omega Flex & the End of Azzarello Super-Strict Liability,” 26(2) Widener L.J. 91 (2017).  As the PAJ engagement no doubt required, Bexis article and the propositions it contains come in for criticism.  “Rebooting,” 26(2) Widener L.J. at 204-05.  Heck, “Force Awakens” was even published in the same law review (albeit with an intervening name change) as Bexis’ article.  The point-counterpoint can hardly be more obvious.

Except Bexis didn’t get any research grants.

The first way that “Force Awakens” doesn’t stack up is simply size.  Size matters if an article is going to cover all the bases.  If the 91 pages of Bexis’ article were kilos, it would weigh in as a heavyweight.  This 57-page counter-punch is, comparatively, a featherweight.

Of course, in scholarship, length is something, but not everything.

So what else?  We think “Force Awakens” wastes precious pages discussing non-Pennsylvania law.  Granted that, given Tincher’s discussion of California precedent, see “Rebooting,” 26(2) Widener L.J. at 144-45, 163-64, 169-70, reference to California law makes sense, but the extended discussion of New Jersey law, “Force Awakens,” 27 Widener Com. L.R. at 164-65, seems odd and tangential, at best.

But most of “Force Awakens” was predictable – intended to provide something that plaintiffs could cite for arguments that Tincher didn’t change much, and (probably more importantly) in support of the embattled post-Tincher suggested jury instructions critiqued in “Rebooting.”  Thus, much of “Force Awakens” is an apologia for the SSJI and (like an expert report) reflects the position of those who purchased the scholarship:

  • “The Tincher court chose to maintain strict liability, and once again it crystallized that choice by reaffirming Section 402A, while at the same time refusing to adopt the directives of the Third Restatement.”  27 Widener Com. L.R. at 193.
  • “[P]roduct liability in Pennsylvania remains a form of strict liability.”  Id. at 194.
  • “Under Tincher the ‘blackletter’ principles of section 402A clearly remain the baseline for Pennsylvania product liability law.”  Id. at 196-97.
  • “[W]here a plaintiff succeeds in proving that a product’s dangers exceed ascertainable consumer expectations, social cost-benefit balancing of risks and utilities is not required.”  Id. at 198.
  • “Pennsylvania courts can and should utilize Barker’s fairly detailed discussion of the relevant evidentiary considerations as a guide.”  Id. at 200.
  • Tincher’s explication of risk-utility analysis carefully avoids dependence on proof of a reasonable or feasible alternative design.”  Id. at 201.
  • “The [SSJI] Subcommittee sought to change instructions that were directly in conflict with Tincher, but to leave in place all other instructions. . . . This approach strikes us as essentially correct.”  Id. at 204.
  • “[T]hirteen of fifteen distinct charges or parts of [the PDI] charges employ the phrase “unreasonably dangerous” at least once”; “its ubiquity in the proposed PDI instructions strikes us as revealing overkill.”  Id. at 204 n.165.
  • “[W]e believe that the fundamental doctrinal assumption on which these [defense side] criticisms rest is incorrect.”  Id. at 206.
  • “By reaffirming Pennsylvania’s commitment to . . . Section 402A, [Tincher] clearly signaled that product liability is and should remain . . . a doctrine firmly founded on strict liability.”  Id.
  • “Because Tincher reaffirmed the strict liability character of product liability, it remains necessary to keep product liability separate from negligence.”  Id. at 206-07.
  • “As the [SSJI] properly recognized, courts must continue to draw that dividing line in their jury instructions.”  Id. at 207.
  • “For purposes of product liability under Section 402A, a product contains relevant dangers if it ‘lacks any element that is necessary to make it safe’ for an intended or foreseeable use, or if it ‘contains a condition that makes it unsafe’ for such use.”  Id. at 208.
  • “[W]e agree with the [SSJI] Subcommittee that it would be both premature and inconsistent with Tincher’s overarching perspective to draft new warning instructions based on dicta in the opinion regarding that subject.”  Id. at 208-09.
  • “The critics’ argument that the standard jury instructions should embrace a ‘state of the art’ defense is in our opinion entirely incorrect. . . .  This is a due care defense, pure and simple, and it sounds in negligence.”  Id. at 210.
  • “The Subcommittee used Barker’s revised list on the ground that it enabled more streamlined and efficient instructions.  As a practical matter we agree with this assessment. More importantly, we think the charge that the Subcommittee ignored the relevance of the Wade factors is incorrect.”  Id. at 211.

Overall, we found “Force Awakens” recitation of these (and other) pro-plaintiff talking points quite superficial.  To take just one example, the state-of-the-art discussion utterly ignores prior Pennsylvania appellate authority recognizing that such a defense exists as to risk/utility analysis, Hicks v. Dana Cos., 984 A.2d 943, 966 (Pa. Super. 2009), and never comes to grips with the black letter of the consumer expectation test requiring plaintiffs to prove that relevant product risks are “unknowable.  Bexis covered all that in some detail.  See “Rebooting,” 26(2) Widener L.J. at 164-72 (discussing state of the art issues).

Also inexplicably absent from “Force Awakens” is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s treatment of the “unreasonably dangerous” of Restatement §402A in Tincher.  “[T]he notion of ‘defective condition unreasonably dangerous’ is the normative principle of the strict liability cause of action.”  Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 400 (Pa. 2014).

[I]n a jurisdiction following the Second Restatement formulation of strict liability in tort, the critical inquiry in affixing liability is whether a product is “defective”; in the context of a strict liability claim, whether a product is defective depends upon whether that product is “unreasonably dangerous.”

Id. at 380.  The “normative” nature of the unreasonably dangerous element is nowhere found in “Force Awakens” (the word never appears), and its status as “the critical inquiry” is buried in a footnote, 27 Widener Com. L.R. at 183 n.94, while the article describes other issues as “critical.”  Id. at 183 (“defective condition”), 193 (same), 194 (failure to satisfy defect tests).  Unreasonably dangerous as “overkill”?  We don’t think so.

Assuming that “Force Awakens” is used as intended to counter defense-side arguments about Tincher, we’ve found that, on a close read, the article includes some useful concessions, should defendants need to reply:

  • “Trial courts clearly may no longer rely on the jury instructions that had emanated from Azzarello.”  27 Widener Com. L.R. at 193.
  • “The fact that a product may be dangerous . . . does not automatically mean that it is also defective.”  Id. at 195.
  • “The Tincher court acknowledged that Third Restatement materials sometimes may be helpful.”  Id. at 197.
  • Tincher recognized a negligence strand that contributed to product liability law’s formation and continues to play a role in its development.”  Id. at 206.
  • “[T]he ‘unreasonably dangerous’ language of Section 402A need not be excised in its entirety from product liability jury instructions,” id. at 207 − precisely what the pro-plaintiff SSJI did.
  • “[T]he general [SSJI] statement that ‘[a] product is defective’ if it lacks a necessary safety feature or contains an unsafe condition qualifies as an overstatement.”  Id. at 208.
  • Tincher “reaffirmed the default position that plaintiffs typically bear the burden of persuasion in civil matters.”  Id. at 212.
  • “The [SSJI] Subcommittee’s minimalist approach, while comporting with Tincher’s appeals to modesty and caution, ends up offering little by way of guidance on a range of potentially vexing product liability issues.”  Id. at 212-13.

We think that last quote is a particularly important point of departure. The SSJI subcommittee has always been slow, particularly when the law shifts in favor of defendants.  It took over 40 years, for example, for the Pennsylvania SSJIs to incorporate learned intermediary rule instructions.  As “Force Awakens” concedes, after Tincher the subcommittee’s tendency hardened to the point of Azzarello-based ossification “offering little by way of guidance.”  Id. at 213.

We on the defense side take the opposite view − recognizing the need of the bench and bar to fill in some of these post-Tincher blanks.  In sharp contrast to the retrograde approach endorsed by “Force Awakens,” the defense side’s jury instructions are being expanded and updated.  The 2018 second edition, which has just been released to the public, not only incorporates the most recent post-Tincher precedent – including the Superior Court’s 2018 holding that giving an Azzarello strict liability instruction is now “a paradigm example of fundamental error,” Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 399 (Pa. Super. 2018) – but also has expanded beyond strictly Tincher issues to include instructions on causation (3 different situations), component parts, and post-sale duty to warn.  Suggested instructions are just that, suggestions; only the defense believes in more, not less.

Finally, our mention of post-Tincher precedent in the preceding paragraph is at the heart of why we believe that PAJ didn’t get value for whatever it paid.  Tincher was decided in late 2014.  “Force Awakens” came out halfway through 2018 – 3 ½ years later.  Bexis’ “Rebooting” article collected and reviewed every post-Tincher decision right up until that article couldn’t be edited any longer.  “Force Awakens” is just the opposite.  Remarkably, it doesn’t cite a single post-Tincher Pennsylvania decision.  Not one.  That omission, we’re pleased (but surprised) to say, leaves our opponents without any precedential support – just a law review article ex cathedra.

If we had to speculate on the reason why “Force Awakens” went radio silent on Pennsylvania precedent, we would again analogize to a litigation expert report. The available data – here post-Tincher precedent – was not supportive of the positions that the authors were being paid to advocate.  So they did what other paid experts do:  ignore it.

So, where the other side goes silent, that’s a signal for us to pour it on.  Here’s our support for our contention that almost all post-Tincher decisions disagree with the positions being asserted in “Force Awakens.”

Rejecting argument that Tincher was a narrow decision that did not change anything

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 401-02 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Tincher II”)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Plaxe v. Fiegura, 2018 WL 2010025, at *6 (E.D. Pa. April 27, 2018)

After Tincher an Azzarello-“any element”/”guarantor” jury charge is reversible error

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 399-400 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Tincher II”)

After Tincher courts need not be bound by Azzarello-era decisions

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Cloud v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 3835602, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2017)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 3752908, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2016)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *7 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Tincher requires that the product be “unreasonably dangerous”

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 401-02 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Tincher II”)

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Amato v. Bell & Gossett, Clark-Reliance Corp., 116 A.3d 607, 620 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 150 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2016)

Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp.3d 660, 696 (M.D. Pa. 2017)

Roudabush v. Rondo, Inc., 2017 WL 3912370, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

DeJesus v. Knight Industries & Associates, Inc., 2016 WL 4702113, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 3752908, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2016)

Stellar v. Allied Signal, Inc., 98 F. Supp.3d 790, 807 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

Nathan v. Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., 92 F. Supp.3d 264, 272 (M.D. Pa. 2015)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 7769223, at *3 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 7776601 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2015)

Mattocks v. AVI Food Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 13701408, at *8 (Pa. C.P. Mercer Co. April 14, 2015)

Dunlap v. American Lafrance, LLC, 2016 WL 9340617, at *2 & n.4 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. April 4, 2016)

Explicitly applying Wade factors/cost-benefit balancing

Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp.3d 660, 695 (M.D. Pa. 2017)

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 610 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, 2017 WL 752396, at *8 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 1159735 (W.D. Pa. March 29, 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 3752908, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2016)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 1019534, at *13-14 & n.16 (W.D. Pa. March 15, 2016)

Lewis v. Lycoming, 2015 WL 3444220, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015)

Capece v. Hess Maschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. KG, 2015 WL 1291798, at *3 n.2, 7 (M.D. Pa. March 20, 2015)

Meyers v. LVD Acquisitions, LLC, 2016 WL 8652790, at *2 (Pa. C.P. Mifflin Co. Sept. 23, 2016), aff’d mem., 2017 WL 1163056 (Pa. Super. March 28, 2017)

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 676409, at *2 (C.P. Dauphin Co. Feb. 18, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 154 A.3d 341 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Mattocks v. AVI Food Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 13701408, at *9 (Pa. C.P. Mercer Co. April 14, 2015)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238603, at *5 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. Nov. 3, 2015), aff’d, 163 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *4 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Summary judgment for lack of viable alternative design in risk/utility case

Dunlap v. American Lafrance, LLC, 2016 WL 9340617, at *3 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. April 4, 2016)

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 676409, at *4 (C.P. Dauphin Co. Feb. 18, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 154 A.3d 341 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Tincher does not shift risk/utility burden of proof

Capece v. Hess Maschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. KG, 2015 WL 1291798, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Pa. March 20, 2015)

Meyers v. LVD Acquisitions, LLC, 2016 WL 8652790, at *1 (Pa. C.P. Mifflin Co. Sept. 23, 2016), aff’d mem., 2017 WL 1163056 (Pa. Super. March 28, 2017)

Dunlap v. American Lafrance, LLC, 2016 WL 9340617, at *2 n.4 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. April 4, 2016)

Tincher rejects blanket exclusion of “negligence concepts” in strict liability

Roverano v. John Crane, 177 A.3d 892, 907 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 997 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Webb v. Volvo Cars, LLC, 148 A.3d 473, 482-83 (Pa. Super. 2016)

Amato v. Bell & Gossett, Clark-Reliance Corp., 116 A.3d 607, 620 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 150 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2016)

Mercurio v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 2018 WL 2465181, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2018)

Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Co., 2017 WL 4284417, at *6 (Mag. M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017)

Cloud v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 3835602, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2017)

DeJesus v. Knight Industries & Associates, Inc., 2016 WL 4702113, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 3752908, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2016)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 1019534, at *13 n.15 (W.D. Pa. March 15, 2016)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 7769223, at *7 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 7776601 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2015)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *3-4 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Risk/utility test is similar to, and derived from, negligence

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 997 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Webb v. Volvo Cars, LLC, 148 A.3d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. 2016)

Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Co., 2017 WL 4284417, at *6 (Mag. M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017)

Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp.3d 660, 696 (M.D. Pa. 2017)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, 2017 WL 752396, at *7 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 1159735 (W.D. Pa. March 29, 2017)

Cloud v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 3835602, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2017)

DeJesus v. Knight Industries & Associates, Inc., 2016 WL 4702113, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 7769223, at *5 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 7776601 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2015)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *3-4 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238604, at *8 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. April 17, 2015)

Risk/utility test requires expert testimony

Hatcher v. SCM Group, Inc., 167 F. Supp.3d 719, 724-25 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Meyers v. LVD Acquisitions, LLC, 2016 WL 8652790, at *2 (Pa. C.P. Mifflin Co. Sept. 23, 2016), aff’d mem., 2017 WL 1163056 (Pa. Super. March 28, 2017)

Dunlap v. American Lafrance, LLC, 2016 WL 9340617, at *3 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. April 4, 2016) (risks of alternative design)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238604, at *4 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. April 17, 2015)

Tincher requires jury instruction on “unreasonably dangerous”

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 401-02 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Tincher II”)

Amato v. Bell & Gossett, Clark-Reliance Corp., 116 A.3d 607, 620-21 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 150 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2016)

Rejecting Azzarello guarantor/any element jury instruction

Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 399-400 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Tincher II”)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238603, at *3-4 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. Nov. 3, 2015), aff’d, 163 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Consumer expectation test held inappropriate

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 611 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (known risk)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (complexity)

DeJesus v. Knight Industries & Associates, Inc., 2016 WL 4702113, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016)

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 7769223, at *5 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 7776601 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2015)

Capece v. Hess Maschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. KG, 2015 WL 1291798 (M.D. Pa. March 20, 2015) (conceded inappropriate to mechanical equipment – concrete block maker)

Meyers v. LVD Acquisitions, LLC, 2016 WL 8652790 (Pa. C.P. Mifflin Co. Sept. 23, 2016), aff’d mem., 2017 WL 1163056 (Pa. Super. March 28, 2017) (known risk)

Mattocks v. AVI Food Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 13701408, at *9 (Pa. C.P. Mercer Co. April 14, 2015) (obvious risk)

Consumer expectation test based on objective, reasonable consumer (not plaintiff)

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 348-49 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 610 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Yazdani v. BMW of North America, LLC, 188 F. Supp.3d 486, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 450-52 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

DeJesus v. Knight Industries & Associates, Inc., 2016 WL 4702113, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016)

Bailey v. B.S. Quarries, Inc., 2016 WL 1271381, at *15 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2016), appeal dismissed, 674 F. Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2017)

Lewis v. Lycoming, 2015 WL 3444220, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015)

Meyers v. LVD Acquisitions, LLC, 2016 WL 8652790, at *2 (Pa. C.P. Mifflin Co. Sept. 23, 2016), aff’d mem., 2017 WL 1163056 (Pa. Super. March 28, 2017)

Strict liability only applies to a manufacturer’s own products

Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp.3d 660, 712 (M.D. Pa. 2017)

McLaud v. Industrial Resources, Inc., 2016 WL 7048987, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2016), aff’d, 715 F. Appx. 115 (3d Cir. 2017)

Schwartz v. Abex Corp., 106 F. Supp.3d 626, 653-54 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

Tincher principles apply to warning claims

Amato v. Bell & Gossett, Clark-Reliance Corp., 116 A.3d 607, 620 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 150 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2016)

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 609-10 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Bailey v. B.S. Quarries, Inc., 2016 WL 1271381, at *15 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2016), appeal dismissed, 674 F. Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2017)

Trask v. Olin Corp., 2016 WL 1255302, at *9 n.20 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2016)

Williams v. U-Haul International, Inc., 2015 WL 171846, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015) (subsequently vacated in part on other grounds having to do with negligence, 2015 WL 790142)

Horst v. Union Carbide Corp., 2016 WL 1670272, at *16 (Pa. C.P. Lackawanna Co. April 27, 2016)

Product must be “unreasonably dangerous” without a warning

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 612, 614-15 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 453-54 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Hatcher v. SCM Group, Inc., 167 F. Supp.3d 719, 725, 727 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Inman v. General Electric Co., 2016 WL 5106939, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2016)

Post-sale duty to warn continues to require defect at sale

Trask v. Olin Corp., 2016 WL 1255302, at *9 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2016)

Evidence of product user’s negligent conduct admissible as relevant to risk/utility

Punch v. Dollar Tree Stores, 2017 WL 752396, at *11 (Mag. W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 1159735 (W.D. Pa. March 29, 2017)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *4 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Evidence of third-party’s negligent conduct admissible as relevant to risk/utility

Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Co., 2017 WL 4284417, at *5-6 (Mag. M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017)

Evidence of product user’s knowledge admissible as relevant to consumer expectation

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 611-12 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Evidence of product warnings relevant to consumer expectation

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 610-11 (W.D. Pa. 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Evidence of product user’s negligent conduct admissible as relevant to causation

Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Co., 2017 WL 4284417, at *5 (Mag. M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017)

Wright v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., 175 F. Supp.3d 439, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

Evidence of a product’s compliance with industry standards is relevant/admissible

Webb v. Volvo Cars, LLC, 148 A.3d 473, 482-83 (Pa. Super. 2016) (maybe, but issue was not properly preserved)

Mercurio v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 2018 WL 2465181, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2018)

Cloud v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 3835602, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2017)

Rapchak v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 2016 WL 3752908, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2016)

Dunlap v. American Lafrance, LLC, 2016 WL 9340617, at *3 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. April 4, 2016)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238603, at *2 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. Nov. 3, 2015), aff’d, 163 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2017)

Sliker v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 6735548, at *6-7 (C.P. Clarion Co. Oct. 19, 2015)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238604, at *8-9 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. April 17, 2015)

Evidence of compliance with government standards is relevant/admissible

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238603, at *2 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. Nov. 3, 2015), aff’d, 163 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2017) (OSHA)

Renninger v. A&R Machine Shop, 2015 WL 13238604, at *8-9 (Pa. C.P. Clarion Co. April 17, 2015)

Evidence of technological infeasibility under current state of the art is relevant/admissible

Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp.3d 596, 611 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (on summary judgment)

And finally, to provide at least something that is specific to prescription medical products:

Existing exclusion of prescription medical products from strict liability applies after Tincher

Bell v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2018 WL 928237, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2018)

Krammes v. Zimmer, Inc., 2015 WL 4509021, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2015)

In re Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant Products Liability Litigation, 2015 WL 3669933, at *35 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2015)

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Is there any contrary Pennsylvania product liability precedent?  Well, we’re a defense-side blog and we don’t do the other side’s research for them.  That’s what plaintiffs’ side presumably paid for with the “research grant” that produced “Force Awakens” – and they didn’t get it.  PAJ should demand its money back.