This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog only.
We truly dislike decisions that find that claims of failure to report adverse events to the FDA are non-preempted, parallel violation failure to warn claims. Failure to report claims are not parallel. Federal law does not require warnings to plaintiff or her doctors. State law does not require warnings to the FDA. In the absence of a state-law duty to make reports to a government agency, a failure to report claim is an improper private attempt to enforce the FDCA. It is a claim that should not survive either express or implied preemption.
But, some courts do allow it, such as Bull v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 2018 WL 3397544 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 12, 2018). Now, we think the Bull court is overstating when it says “most courts” to have considered a failure to report claim have found it to be a parallel claim. We refer you to our PMA Preemption scorecard which clearly shows this is an issue on which courts are split. Nor is the reasoning of the opinion anything new. Defendant had a duty under state law to warn physicians and a duty under federal law to comply with adverse event reporting requirements and those two requirements aren’t in conflict with each other. Id. at *8. But just because two roads don’t intersect doesn’t mean they are parallel.
And, because Pennsylvania doesn’t recognize a state law failure to report claim, any such claim exists solely as a result of the FDCA and therefore should also be impliedly preempted. Again, having concluded there are parallel duties, Bull also concludes no implied preemption. The court found that plaintiff alleged a valid state law failure to warn claim that was based on a failure to comply with its federal duty to report adverse events to the FDA. Id. at *9.
We don’t like those conclusions, but it’s also not the first time we’ve seen them. Where we usually take solace is that more often than not a finding that a failure to report claim is not preempted is followed by a finding that it is also not adequately pleaded. We refer you back again to the PMA Preemption scorecard for the many, many decisions reaching that conclusion. The primary reason the claim fails TwIqbal – failure to sufficiently plead causation.
Unfortunately, the court in Bull gave plaintiff a pass on pleading physician-specific warning causation. The complaint “does not even allege that [plaintiff’s] doctors consulted the [FDA adverse event] database, or any other source of . . . adverse event reports, when making their treatment decisions.” Id. But the court found that unnecessary. Instead, all that was required was an allegation that prior to the implantation of the device in plaintiff, defendant failed to disclose adverse events that if disclosed may have led her doctor’s not to use the device. Id.
That shouldn’t be enough. Even Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), which allowed a failure to report claim, acknowledged that causation is a particularly problematic hurdle for plaintiffs:
Because they predicate their claim on [defendant’s] reporting duty to the FDA, as they must to avoid express preemption, [plaintiffs] face a causation hurdle that would not otherwise exist. To prevail, they will ultimately have to prove that if [defendant] had properly reported the adverse events to the FDA as required under federal law, that information would have reached [the prescribing] doctors in time to prevent [plaintiffs’] injuries.
Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234-35 (concurring opinion). Therefore, the causal chain requires both that the FDA would do something differently (such as make the adverse events public), and that that hypothetical action by the FDA would have caused the prescriber, in turn, to change his/her prescribing decision in some way that would have prevented the claimed injuries. Plaintiff’s allegations in Bull, as set forth in the opinion, are much too vague to support a plausible causation claim.
And the analysis shouldn’t have stopped there. The opinion actually sets forth sufficient facts that were pleaded to support reaching just the opposite conclusion on causation.
First, would the FDA would have done something differently? Plaintiff had the device implanted in 2010 and began experiencing problems with it in 2015. Bull at *5. Per the facts alleged, in 2009 the FDA conducted an inspection of defendant’s manufacturing facility. Id. at *2. The report of that inspection included information about Medical Device Reports (MDRs) that were either untimely or not submitted to the FDA. Id. at *3. It also included an analysis of MDRs both at the company and within the FDA’s database. Id. at *2-3. So, what the facts establish is that the FDA became aware of these adverse events a year before plaintiff received the device and at no time prior to plaintiff’s surgery did the FDA require defendant to take any further action to warn physicians beyond the existing labeling and warnings. So there is no causal nexus between the alleged failure to report and plaintiff’s injury.
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff relies on a 2011 FDA Safety Officer Report and a 2012 483 Inspection, those took place after plaintiff was implanted with the device and if they involve allegedly unreported events after 2010 – they can have no bearing on causation. To establish causation plaintiff should be required to prove (and plead) that had the adverse events been properly reported to the FDA, the information would have reached plaintiff’s physician in time to prevent the alleged injuries.
Second, would plaintiff’s doctors have done something differently? Well, because the FDA didn’t take action the answer is there is nothing to trigger plaintiff’s doctors doing anything different either. But, there is also the added fact that in this case after the events were reported and the FDA did require some additional warnings and even after the FDA recalled the device – plaintiff’s doctors did not explant the device. Id. at *5. While we are only privy to what’s reported in the complaint, we think the second link in the causal chain is likely broken as well.
We have a hard time imagining this case getting beyond summary judgment on causation based on what we see as the regulatory history from the opinion. We’ve talked in greater detail about this causation hurdle in failure to report cases here. So, while defendant lost at this stage, we are optimistic about a win in the future.