We’ve written about a lot of Risperdal summary judgment wins. No medical causation, no warnings causation (learned intermediaries aware of risks), no alternative design, no fraud. So, when we see an opinion that overturns a plaintiff’s verdict on the grounds of (1) impossibility preemption; (2) clear evidence preemption; and (3) no evidence of general causation,

Breaking news. This just in. Prescriber’s testimony linchpin in manufacturer’s victory over failure to warn claims. And the crowd gasped at this startling news. Actually, this news might be more the equivalent of an announcement that a 13 year-old boy made a snarky comment to his parents (current daily experience for this blogger). Not exactly

In the mass torts world in which we find ourselves, glimmers of jurisprudential light can seem few and far between. Two things we love are good warnings causation decisions and sneaky plaintiffs getting caught at their own games.  Today’s case has both.  In Thompson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 2017 WL 5135548 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23,

Risperdal, an antipsychotic drug prescribed to treat serious mental conditions – schizophrenia, manic depression, and autism – allegedly causes some male users to develop abnormal breast tissue growth. Particularly when compared to the consequences of the conditions Risperdal is indicated to treat, that seems like a relatively minor risk.  It isn’t fatal.  It isn’t a

Delve into the crime stories of Elmore Leonard, whether in the form of the books, movies, or television shows, and you are likely to spend considerable time in Michigan and Florida.  True, Justified was set in Kentucky.  But Marshall Givens was forced to leave the Sunshine State after shooting a suspect (“Let’s just keep it simple: he pulled first,  I shot him”), and the big criminal organization he often contended with hailed from Detroit.  Leonard, also known as the Dickens of Detroit, was a native of Michigan and later spent much time in Florida.  Those two locations furnish a nice contrast between city and swamp, both settings being utterly sweaty and corrupt.

There is nothing especially sweaty about what we do, and we’d like to think that corruption is far, far away, but if you delve into our litigation docket, you are likely to encounter a tug of war between Michigan and Pennsylvania.  We live in Pennsylvania.  Our courts and laws seem inordinately fond of drug and device law plaintiffs.  By contrast, Michigan has just about the best, most pro-defense laws on the books, and, consequently, Michigan plaintiffs look to hightail it out of there and file their cases in a more hospitable jurisdiction – like, say, ours.

Recently in the Philly mass tort Risperdal litigation, a local judge did the right thing and told Michigan plaintiffs that they were stuck with Michigan law.  In Re Risperdal Litigation, 2015 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 254 (Phila. CCP October 1, 2015).  The 13 plaintiffs were Michigan residents who claimed that they developed gynecomastia after taking Risperdal during adolescence.  The defendants filed summary judgment motions arguing that Michigan’s Products Liability Act applies and affords the defendants immunity on the plaintiffs’ claim for 1) negligence, 2) negligent design defect, 3) fraud, 4) strict liability – failure to warn, 5) strict liability – design defect, 6) breach of express warranty, 7) breach of implied warranty, 8) conspiracy, and 9) medical expense incurred by parents.  The plaintiffs disagreed.  They needed Pennsylvania law to apply, otherwise they would lose.

They lost.Continue Reading Philly Court Applies Michigan Law to Dismiss Risperdal Cases

The trial judge in the second Risperdal trial denied plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, upholding the jury’s determination that plaintiffs hadn’t proven that Risperdal caused plaintiffs’ gynecomastia (male breast growth).  Cirba v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015 WL 4081909 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. June 30, 2015).  Given the court’s summary of plaintiff’s weight and history of Risperdal use, the jury’s verdict seems pretty darn reasonable:

There was clear evidence that [plaintiff] had gained significant weight after he stopped taking the drug in 2007.  He is presently 6’1” and 272 pounds.  Since Defendant is clearly overweight, had not consumed Risperdal since 2007, had never complained of gynecomastia until 2013, and there were no photos prior to puberty to support his causation claim, the jury came to the reasonable conclusion that Risperdal did not cause his present condition.

Id. at 2.

Nonetheless, plaintiff tried to get the verdict overturned in several ways.

He argued that the court should have disallowed causation testimony by his nurse practitioner, who had prescribed him Risperdal and treated him for almost eight years, including a six-year period leading up to his first complaint of gynecomastia during which he took no Risperdal.  She testified that weight gain, not Risperdal, caused the growth in his chest.Continue Reading Court of Common Pleas Leaves Standing Janssen’s Victory in Second Risperdal Trial