We haven’t written much about res ipsa loquitur on the blog, and today’s case doesn’t really qualify as a drug or device case per se, but it’s an interesting opinion and we thought it was worth sharing.  The case is Hubbard v. Mellion, No. 108461, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 45 (May 17, 2013), and it’s an appellate decision reversing summary judgment in favor of a physician in a medical negligence case, on the basis of the appellate court’s finding that the lower court should have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  The case arose when plaintiff Hubbard underwent spinal surgery (involving various –otomies and –ectomies) to repair a herniated lumbar disc.  During the procedure, the surgeon used a device known as a pituitary rongeur, which is a forceps-type instrument that’s used to remove part of the disc. Unfortunately, during Ms. Hubbard’s surgery, the tip broke off of one arm of the rongeur, and became lodged in her disc space.  Hubbard, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS at * 6.  The surgeon tried to retrieve the tip but was unable to. Id.  Ms. Hubbard claimed that she experienced continual pain as a result of having the fragment in her spine, and eventually underwent another surgery to remove it.  Id. She later filed a negligence action in which she named the surgeon and the hospital, as well as the manufacturer of the rongeur, alleging that the latter was negligent for supplying a device that was in a dangerous and defective condition.  However, as we’ve seen plaintiffs do in other medical device cases, plaintiff later decided to pursue the surgeon alone, and backed away from her defect theory.  Really far away.  Did a 180, in fact.  Not only did plaintiff dismiss the manufacturer, her expert metallurgist authored a report in which he “ruled out the possibility that the rongeur failed due to a manufacturer’s defect, ruled out the possibility that the rongeur failed because it had been improperly maintained, and ruled out the possibility that the rongeur had failed due to normal wear and tear.” Id. at *11.  The plaintiff’s expert’s sole causation opinion was that the rongeur tip had broken off due to user error – specifically, because the surgeon had applied too much force when using the instrument.  Id. at *12.

The surgeon moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s experts – a metallurgist, a neurosurgeon, and a quality management team leader from the rongeur manufacturer (id. at *11-12) – were not qualified to opine on the standard of care for a surgeon performing this type of procedure.  Id. at * 14-15.  The trial court agreed, and held that although these experts established that operator error had caused the rongeur to break, plaintiff had not shown that this error was outside the established standard of care.  Id. at *15.  On appeal, plaintiff argued that she was not required to present expert testimony on the standard of care because there were two exceptions to the requirement that applied in this case:  the “common knowledge” exception and/or the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturId. at *20.

Continue Reading Res Ipsa Loquitur, or Maybe Not

This post is from the Reed Smith side of the blog only – the Dechert lawyers were not involved.

The Iowa Court of Appeals has affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of both branded and generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, looking at Mensing’s effect on both in the process.  In Huck v. Trimark Physicians Group,

Huggins v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL 1191058 (D. Minn. March 25, 2013), is another opinion that puts the “pain” in “pain pump litigation.”  It’s also another example of a court putting the cart before the horse, a theme raised in Eric’s post yesterday.  The opinion addresses three motions:  Plaintiff’s motion to transfer the

In a departure from blog tradition (and possibly etiquette), I’m going to break the fourth wall and speak in the first-person singular for a moment. After much encouragement from my colleagues and several not-so-subtle hints from Bexis directed at having to post yet another guest post from me, today I become an official member of the DDL