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In a 341-page opinion, In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, 9:20-md-02924-RLR, slip op. (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2022), the MDL court held that all of the Zantac plaintiffs’ general causation experts (concerning five cancer types) failed to meet the admissibility standards of Fed. R. Evid. 702. Consequently the court granted the defendants’ motions

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In preparation for our OTC panel next week at ACI-NY, we have kept our eyes open for any OTC cases that raise interesting issues.  Today’s case, Rooney v. Procter & Gamble Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210218 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2022), involves a claim by the plaintiffs that a woman developed triple negative breast cancer as a result of using an antiperspirant that she asserts contained benzene.  

The assertion that benzene was in the antiperspirant rested on testing by Valisure, an analytical pharmacy.   Some of you have heard of a Valisure before, as its testing, and results allegedly showing contamination, have been relied upon by plaintiffs in other mass torts.  Valisure calls itself “the pharmacy that checks.”  Perhaps we are cynical, but we think of a different sort of checks when we see a purported independent outfit that seems to cooperate closely with plaintiff lawyers. Here, Valisure ran tests on batches of the antiperspirant and came up with concentrations of benzene significantly higher than levels recommended by OSHA.  Valisure filed a Citizen’s Petition with the FDA seeking a recall of antiperspirant batches containing too much benzene.  (Sound familiar?) The FDA had not responded to the Citizen’s Petition.  The defendant voluntarily implemented a recall of certain batches of the antiperspirant.  

Before the court was the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the Louisiana Products Liability Act by selling antiperspirants without issuing adequate warnings.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant was liable under theories of negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, and “fault,” and that the defendant violated the FDCA.  Some of those claims seem weird (some of what’s missing also seems weird, but it’s not our job to help plaintiffs author complaints – our criticisms are strictly destructive), but remember, we’re in Louisiana.  Not that we’re complaining.  The people are fun, the food is great, and did we mention that the Judge in this case dismissed the second amended complaint?  Continue Reading E.D. Louisiana Dismisses Antiperspirant/Benzene Claims

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In today’s case, Chapman v. AstraZeneca, a Delaware state court granted summary judgment to the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer after excluding the plaintiff’s causation expert under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 because the expert’s opinion was not “stated in terms of medical probability.”

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s proton pump inhibitor, a class of

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Confident prescribing physicians and implanting surgeons are the best “learned” intermediaries.  They’re experienced at what they do and aren’t intimidated by plaintiffs’ counsel and their threats of malpractice claims if they don’t testify the way plaintiffs want them to.  Confident learned intermediaries stand by their medical decisions.  Thus a confident learned intermediary’s testimony will defeat causation as a matter of law by stating that, notwithstanding a poor result, the treatment provided was standard of care, and even in hindsight they would not do anything different.  Because we encountered many stand up learned intermediary surgeons in the Bone Screw litigation, several of the relatively early decisions from the 1999-2001 timeframe are Bone Screw cases.

Continue Reading Confident Learned Intermediaries Defeat Warning Causation

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Under Fed. R. Evid. 9(b), “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  In our sphere, federal courts are quite variable in how they apply this standard when deciding 12(b)(6) motions.  In particular, MDLs seem to have an unfortunate habit of allowing general allegations to support

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The Ninth Circuit has certified a question to the California Supreme Court on the learned intermediary doctrine that immediately caught our attention:  In a failure-to-warn claim against a prescription medical product manufacturer, is the plaintiff required to show that a stronger warning would have altered the physician’s decision to prescribe the product?  Or can the