Here is the third and final part of our 50-state opus on precedent supporting the principle that plaintiffs asserting claims dependent on propositions that ordinary people aren’t expected to know must come forward with expert opinions for those propositions.  As mentioned previously, this project arose from something we read about in the Mirena litigation –

What follows is the second part of our extensive 50-state of cases precluding plaintiffs from proceeding with claims in the absence of admissible expert support.  Part One was last week.  In most states such rulings originated in medical malpractice and workers’ compensation actions, with the relevant principles broadening to encompass product liability and toxic torts. 

So said the Connecticut state appellate court last week.  It’s a pretty simple equation.  Like No shoes, no shirt, no service.  No pain, no gainNo risk, no reward.  In other words, you can’t get one without the other.  In Ferrari v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., — A.3d —, 2019 WL 2167849

A product is not defective simply because someone was harmed by it. That seems a simple enough point. Courts often acknowledge it, though sometimes in a perfunctory, mumbling fashion. What gives teeth to the mumbling is when state law requires the plaintiff to show a safer alternative product. If really pressed, many plaintiffs cannot articulate