One of the issues that the federal Civil Rules Committee’s discovery subcommittee considered, but that eventually fell by the wayside, on the way to the 2015 discovery rules amendments, were proposals to convert to a “requestor pays” discovery system.  That would be a very significant change, and one of the criticisms that the other side leveled at such a system was that only rich people (or at least only rich plaintiff lawyers) could afford to bring suit, given the prospect of having to pay for expensive discovery that current system now gives plaintiffs for free.

Well, not for free.  Nothing is free.  The current “producer pays” discovery system gives plaintiffs a windfall by allowing them to demand production of millions of dollars’ worth of documents – and as importantly, electronically stored information (“ESI”) − and to impose those costs almost entirely on defendants.  As any economist will tell you, any system that provides access to something for free or at greatly below-market cost, be it health care, “dumped” imports, or discovery, creates greater demand for whatever the below-cost item is than would exist otherwise.

It’s worse in the legal system, because the other side’s heightened demand for “free” discovery has the concomitant effect of increasing the nuisance (that is to say, settlement) value of all litigation in which such demands are made – since one’s opponent is stuck with the bill.

All our side got out of the 2015 rules amendments cycle on requestor pays is a provision more clearly recognizing the authority of courts to shift discovery requests.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B).  As we’ve mentioned, a couple of courts have done this during prescription drug/device MDL litigation.  See In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, 317 F.R.D. 562 (D. Ariz. 2016); In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 5817262 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2016).  Both of those cases involved what the courts viewed as excessive and unnecessary MDL discovery targeted at the defendants’ overseas activities.

Now we’ve found a third case – it took a little longer because it didn’t involve prescription medical products – that also invoked the new cost-shifting provisions in a very familiar (and frustrating) situation.  McClurg v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 2016 WL 7178745 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2016), wasn’t an MDL, but it could have been, except for a limited geographic scope.  Many hundreds of plaintiffs were all seeking recovery for alleged radiation-induced injuries from the same two defendants.

A situation depressingly familiar to any defense counsel in mass tort litigation developed.  Although plaintiffs are nominally responsible under the rules for collecting (and paying for the collection of) their own medical and related records in response to discovery requests, they botched the job so badly that the defendants – in whose interests it was to have these records – had to step in and do it themselves on their own dime.  Plaintiffs did produce “a list of known health care providers and a signed authorization for the release of medical records.”  Id. at *1.  “Because Plaintiffs did not timely and fully produce all of their records, Defendants contracted with a third-party vendor . . . to collect records directly from Plaintiffs’ health care providers and employers.”  Id.  Also, “the parties in this matter could not agree to a reasonable scope of record collection and allocation of costs.”  Id. at *4.

So things stood until bellwether plaintiffs were selected (interestingly, by random selection, id. at *2).  All of a sudden the plaintiffs became very interested in the additional records that the defendants had been collecting at their own expense.  So they served discovery requests seeking those records – only for the bellwether plaintiffs – for free.  Id. (“Plaintiffs served document requests seeking ‘all documents and records’ that Defendants had collected regarding each of the 16 Bellwether Plaintiffs”).  Somewhat ironically, they also claimed that the defendants had engaged in excessive records gathering, and therefore also demanded access to the defendant’s records database (also set up at defendants’ sole cost) so they could select which records they wanted.  Id. (“Plaintiffs assert that they, too, wish to access [defendants’] secure portal free of charge, in order to decide which records they want”).

The two McClurg defendants’ response was “hell, no; not without you sharing the cost equally – that is shouldering one-third of the expense along with the defendants each sharing a third.  Id. (subject to a credit for whatever records plaintiffs had actually collected and turned over).

The McClurg court shifted costs, not 33% but 18%, to plaintiffs under Rule 26(c)(1)(B).  2016 WL 7178745, at *3.  Cost-shifting was necessary so that the plaintiffs did not become free riders:

The Court finds . . . that good cause exists to order some amount of cost-sharing before Plaintiffs may obtain the records collected by Defendants here.  Plaintiffs would ordinarily have been, and pursuant to the Court’s order were, responsible for gathering and producing their own records.  But while Plaintiffs appear to have produced some records as new complaints were filed, they did not do so in a complete and timely manner.  Indeed, Plaintiffs apparently produced records for a few of the Bellwether Plaintiffs just one or two days before their scheduled depositions.

Id.  That “Plaintiffs [were] seek[ing] access to the portal establish and maintained at Defendants’ expense” further justified a cost allocation order.  Id.

Although it was “unfortunate” that the parties never sought court intervention after failing to reach a records production protocol, id. at *4, giving plaintiffs free access to records collected and maintained at the defendants’ expense was unfair.  Id. (“it would be unfair to allow Plaintiffs to gain the benefit of Defendants’ early record collection and creation of the portal, which helped move the case forward, without contributing a fair share of the overall costs of such collection”).  Crediting plaintiffs’ complaints about excessive collection, McClurg reduced the percentage to 18%.  Id. (eliminating records collected concerning plaintiffs that the defendants knew could not be in the bellwether pool).  Plaintiffs also received a credit for the comparatively small amount of timely produced records they had collected.  Id.

Since the same failure by plaintiffs to collect their own records competently is endemic to prescription medical product MDLs, the cost-shifting in McClurg is of significant interest to us.

In fact, the results in all three of these cases – Bard IVC, Benicar, and McClurg – are also of interest to us because they provide pointers to where the requestor pays debate might reasonably go.  We certainly don’t agree with the other side’s largely bogus argument that across-the-board requestor pays discovery might shut the courthouse doors on the “poor” plaintiffs in the litigation-funded, advertising-driven mass tort industry.  In such litigation, there “does not appear to be a significant financial disparity in the parties’ ability to finance these putative litigations.  Thus, what this Court and other courts similarly situated are faced with is ‘Goliath versus Goliath.’”  Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

However, since the federal rules are supposed to be transubstantive, we will accept for the sake of argument that some deserving plaintiffs in some types of litigation might be excluded by a blanket requestor pays regime.  As an alternative, we think that the rules should include a presumption that the requestor pays for certain types of unduly burdensome, or otherwise unfair, discovery.  While such discovery might nonetheless be “proportionate,” were it to uncover something significant, these types of discovery are expensive and not particularly likely to produce evidence usable at trial.

Here are some examples of discovery that we have encountered that we think deserve to be presumptively discoverable only at the requestor’s expense – there are undoubtedly more:

  • Discovery into a defendant’s overseas activities, particularly if the documents are not in English (Bard IVC and Benicar both involved this kind of discovery);
  • Discovery into information independently gathered by the defendant for purposes of the litigation, excepting witness statements, and other items specified by the rules as peculiarly relevant (that’s McClurg);
  • Discovery into products manufactured by defendants other than those used by plaintiffs;
  • Discovery into product risks other than those suffered by plaintiffs;
  • Discovery into information in the possession of third parties, including government agencies;
  • Discovery into time periods where recovery is barred by relevant statutes of limitations;
  • Discovery into post-litigation information, after the alleged conduct has ceased;
  • Subjects of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions where the entity faced with deposition has no available percipient witnesses, and any witness would only have reviewed the same documents available to the deposing party;
  • ESI discovery into information located on inactive legacy/obsolete computer systems; and
  • Other similarly burdensome discovery, not of a type likely to produce significant evidentiary benefit, as determined by research commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center.

None of this kind of information is ordinarily essential to the hypothetical impecunious plaintiffs who would otherwise be shut out of court by having to pay for what are almost always expensive wild goose chases.

And if one of these categories turns out to be of particular importance in a given lawsuit, the requestor pays directive is only presumptive.  The party requesting the discovery would be able to go to the judge – either before or after the discovery takes place − and explain why a category of discovery, presumptively disfavored under the new regime, should be exempted from the requestor pays rule on the facts of the case in question.  Likewise, if the requestor is able to overcome the presumption beforehand, and the supposedly important discovery turns out to be a wild goose chase anyway, then the producer should be entitled to file a motion to shift those costs back to the requestor.

Implementing across-the-board requestor pays is a long shot right now, and such a dramatic change in the system could well have unintended and unforeseeable litigation consequences.  We think our proposal is not only a way to discourage types of discovery that are peculiarly prone to abuse, but might also be a way of trying out requestor pays on a smaller scale to see whether it is indeed a desirable change to the system generally.

If anybody out there is interested in this idea, have at it. Unlike discovery, our blogging is free to all readers.

Charges of discovery abuse get thrown around frequently in product liability litigation.  We have not done a scientific survey, but we guess that such charges are levied against the manufacturer defendants more often than against individual plaintiffs.  For one thing, seeking burdensome discovery, and then discovery on discovery, has been in the product liability plaintiff game plan for a long time.  There also tends to be more discovery that a defendant could produce—and, therefore, be accused on wrongfully withholding—than a plaintiff could produce.  There is also the practical consideration that large manufacturers tend to have the financial wherewithal to pay fees when ordered and contingency plaintiffs do not—although the lawyers who front the money for those plaintiffs and make the decisions about how to proceed in discovery typically do.  While there are occasions where courts require plaintiffs and their lawyers to pay substantial defense costs because of bad conduct in discovery or in the litigation more broadly, an argument about how to calculate fees to be awarded for discovery abuse is something that we generally hope to avoid.  It is not quite up there with arguing about the maximum acceptable ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that can be awarded, but it still makes us a little uncomfortable.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. __ (2017), slip op., involves a very large award of fees based on the district court’s conclusion that the manufacturer defendant in a product liability case had intentionally withheld important internal testing documents.  The plaintiffs did not learn about the documents until after they had settled, when a reference appeared in a newspaper article about another similar case.  Because the case had resolved, the late application to shift costs and fees appealed to the court’s inherent authority.  Using that authority, the court not only determined that the defendant had engaged in bad faith discovery for years, but that it should pay the plaintiff $2.7 million for all costs and fees since the initial “dishonest discovery response.” Slip op. at 3.  It specifically determined that egregious conduct by a party negates the typical requirement that fees be limited to those caused by the sanctionable conduct. Id. As a back-up in case the Court of Appeals reduced the award, the court determined that the costs and fees excluding what plaintiffs estimated they incurred in pursuing other defendants and in proving medical damages, would be $2 million. Id. at 4.  (We find the whole concept of the fees incurred in the context of a presumably contingency fee representation somewhat bizarre.  Did the plaintiffs’ lawyers actually charge more than $2.7 million in costs and fees to their clients when the proceeds of the settlement(s) were divided up?)  The Court of Appeals affirmed the full amount and the Supreme Court granted cert.

The Haeger Court started by distinguishing between sanctions that compensate and sanctions that punish.  The latter can only be awarded if the trial court provides the “procedural guarantees applicable in criminal cases, such as a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.” Id.at 6 (citation omitted).  (As an aside, we are not sure that each state requires such a standard of proof when punitive damages are offered, so maybe this Court would be strict in its evaluation of punitive damages.)  “When (as in this case) those criminal-type protections are missing, a court’s shifting of fees is limited to reimbursing the victim.” Id. Damages to reimburse must have been caused by the sanctionable conduct, not merely come after it started.

The court’s fundamental job is to determine whether a given legal fee—say, for taking a deposition or drafting a motion—would or would not have been incurred in the absence of the sanctioned conduct. The award is then the sum total of the fees that, except for the misbehavior, would not have occurred.

Id. at 7-8 (citation omitted).  The court has some leeway in making large sanction award as long as the touchstone is causation.  A plaintiff can be hit for all costs of a defending case initiated in “complete bad faith,” such as we have seen relatively recently. Id. at 8.  Sanctions can also be based on the court’s assessment of whether failure to disclose “evidence fatal to its position” affected the timing (but not amount) of settlement. Id. at 8-9.

In Haeger, the trial court did not apply a but-for causation test to its damages calculation, so it will have to do it over with the right standard (unless it determines that there was some sort of waiver).  While we do not know what the amount of the sanction will be on remand, we do have an inkling that the damages imposed for discovery misconduct will tend to be less if the Haeger standards are followed in other cases.  In a case where a fundamental lie by the plaintiff—claiming to have used the defendant’s product, claiming legal authority to initiate a suit, claiming no knowledge of the injury or its cause until shortly before bringing suit—caused a case to be brought or stick around, some bold judges can still impose significant sanctions following Haeger’s principles.

 

Today’s post is on a short decision from the Court of Appeals of Florida, but it is important. In drug and device litigation, defendants are almost always required to produce the adverse event reports related to the product at issue based on the argument that they go to notice. Beyond notice we take strong issue with their admissibility. Take a look at our AER cheat sheet.  And with so many courts excluding them from evidence, extensive discovery of adverse events is something defendants should push back on. As part of that push back, defendants should never overlook raising the burden of redacting from any adverse event report any information that identifies either the voluntary reporter (physicians, consumers) or the person who used the drug or device (if not one and the same). If you’ve made that argument, you may have had a court question whether redaction is really necessary. The answer is an unequivocal yes.

The FDA requires manufacturers to maintain the confidentiality of this information.

The names and any information that would identify the voluntary reporter or any other person associated with an adverse event involving a human drug, biologic, or medical device product shall not be disclosed by the Food and Drug Administration or by a manufacturer in possession of such reports in response to a request, demand, or order. Information that would identify the voluntary reporter or persons identified in the report includes, but is not limited to, the name, address, institution, or any other information that would lead to the identities of the reporter or persons identified in a report.

21 C.F.R. §20.63(f) (emphasis added). So, whether plaintiffs request them or the court orders their production, the manufacturer is obligated to redact adverse event reports before producing them. So, from a practical standpoint, time must be built into any schedule to allow for this redaction to take place. Further, if plaintiffs’ adverse event request is overly broad, you might have grounds to ask for cost-shifting or at least cost-sharing. May help to refocus plaintiffs on what they really want/need.

Continue Reading Protecting Foreign Adverse Events

Is the lesson learned by at least one plaintiff’s counsel in the In re Yasmin & Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig. We already know mass tort MDLs are a breeding ground for lax plaintiff-side representation. A handful of plaintiffs’ attorneys lead the charge, while the rest file their cases, and then lie in the weeds waiting for settlement. And in a system designed not to pay much attention to the individual cases, at least until the litigation is significantly advanced, missing due dates in an individual case also doesn’t garner much attention. That is until it does.

Today’s case isn’t about preemption, or expert opinions, or off-label use, or even about pleadings standards. What it is about is an individual plaintiff’s counsel being held accountable for not paying attention to MDL orders and for simply doing nothing. We’re just going to tell this one like it is, because we couldn’t even make up facts this absurd.

The individual case is Dzik v. Bayer Corp., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 684 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017). Plaintiff filed her suit alleging that she suffered a blood clot from her use of Yasmin, a birth control pill. Id. at *2. Discovery, however, revealed that plaintiff had not filled a Yasmin prescription for 10 months before her alleged injury. Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that plaintiff had been given samples shortly before her injury. In May 2014, defense counsel requested plaintiff produced additional medical records or even an affidavit from the prescribing doctor to substantiate use at the time of injury. Id. That requested was ignored for 15 months.

During those many months, defendant began settling the pending cases. As for non-settling plaintiffs the court entered an order (sometime in the summer of 2015) splitting them into two groups – those likely to settle and those likely not to. Pursuant to the order, if a plaintiff thought her case was likely to settle with a little more negotiation, plaintiff should so notify defendant and if defendant agreed, the case was stayed for 60-90 days to facilitate settlement. Id. at *3. For all other cases, defendant had to notify plaintiff that her case was in the non-settling group and if plaintiff didn’t timely object to that classification, plaintiff had 120 days to serve a Plaintiff Fact Sheet and certain pharmacy and medical records, and a report from an expert on causation. Id. If a plaintiff failed to comply, defendant could move for dismissal and dismissal with prejudice was automatic for any plaintiff who did not respond to the motion to dismiss within 14 days.

Continue Reading You Can Hide But You Can’t Run

This is the time of year for Best and Worst lists.  Our own lists of the best and worst drug and device law decisions of 2016 will be coming out soon.  Meanwhile, we have no doubt that the worst moments in our own day-to-day practice consist in litigating about litigation.  That is, whether on offense or defense, it is mind-numbing to fight over, not the merits of the case, but whether some party is complying with the rules of civil procedure.

We said “offense or defense,” but who are we kidding?  Discovery in our cases is wildly asymmetrical.  Plaintiffs grudgingly sign health record authorizations, while our clients are forced to disgorge millions of documents, at an expense many times over what most defendants in other civil litigations who have already been found liable (of course, our clients have thus far not been found liable for anything) end up paying in total. Producing electronically stored information (ESI) is virtually impossible to get fully right, but plaintiffs ask for, and all too frequently get, a requirement that corporate defendants furnish certificates of completion.  Such certificates are not required by any rules.  Somehow, overreaching plaintiffs have managed to persuade some courts to take something as silly and unrealistic as the discovery rules and make them even worse.   Pretty soon, court hearings devolve into plaintiff lawyers ruefully marching to the lectern to complain about alleged gaps in discovery and demand sanctions.  Forget about the fact that this litany of carping is on behalf of an inventory of plaintiffs whose mostly meritless claims go gleefully untested until the defendant waves a white flag and submits to a fairy tale otherwise known as a settlement grid.  Apropos of the season, we say humbug.

It is a pleasant surprise when a court calls an end to the discovery gotcha game.  That happened last week in Small v. Amgen, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-476-FtM-PAM-MRM (Dec. 14,  2016).  We have written on the Small case before.  See here, for example.  The issue teed up most recently in the Small case was the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for an alleged failure to comply with the court’s omnibus discovery order.  The Small court held that “[f]or all its sound and fury … Plaintiffs’ Motion fails – utterly – to identify any actual violation” of the court’s prior orders.   That magisterial “utterly” conveys a sense of weariness and frustration.  Yes, we know the feeling.

Continue Reading Good Things Come in Small Packages: M.D. Fla. Rejects Plaintiff’s Discovery Gotcha Gamesmanship

Many years ago, we represented a client in a quandary.  (We know, we know: that’s pretty much always the case.)  The product had been sold for many decades, the early history was important in marshalling a defense, and there were no employees around who were percipient witnesses.  What was the solution?  We made an employee an expert on the history of the product.  Voila!  The good part of that approach is that the witness would be free to talk about product issues predating his involvement (or, indeed, his birth).  The bad part was that much of the preparation work with the now-expert might no longer be shielded by the attorney-client privilege.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) addresses that odd creature of the expert witness who was not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony.  Think of, as in the instance mentioned above, a company employee whose job is mostly not devoted to rendering expert testimony.  Or think of treating physicians.  Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that an expert witness must provide an expert report “if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.”  By contrast, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) provides that for witnesses who are not required to provide a written report – i.e., those not included in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) – the proffering party need only disclose the subject matter of testimony and “a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.”  We all know that treating physicians do not need to provide expert reports.  We couldn’t make them do it.  We probably could make employee/experts do a report, but under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), we don’t need to do that.  But to what extent does the attorney-client privilege shield our prep work with that employee/expert under that rule?

Continue Reading Attorney-Client Privilege Held Not to Apply to Nonreporting Employee/Expert

People supplement a lot of things. You can supplement your diet with a multivitamin. You can supplement your income with a part-time side job. On the DDL Blog, we are always supplementing our scorecards and cheat sheets. Generally speaking, supplement is a pretty common word and has a fairly universally accepted definition. A supplement is an add-on. Something you do to make something more complete. Does the food you eat contain vitamins and minerals? Sure. But that multivitamin adds to it. It’s a boost.

In litigation too, we do a lot of supplementing. In fact, we are required to do so. Federal Rule 26(e) requires a party to supplement its discovery responses if it “learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect.” This duty to supplement extends to expert reports as well. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2). But what does it mean to “supplement” an expert report? And when does supplementing to make a correction or completion go too far?

Plaintiffs got the answer to that question in U.S. ex. rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156826 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016). Plaintiff-Relators brought a False Claims Act and Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute case against defendant alleging it illegally marketed Thalomid and Revlimid off-label and paid kick-backs to physicians for prescribing off-label. Id. at *6. The court set a deadline for the expert reports and relators timely served a report from their damages expert. Shortly thereafter, however, relators sought leave to supplement that expert report based on late produced Medicare data. Id. at *6-8. Relators wanted to time to analyze the data and supplement the report with that analysis. Relators also represented that while the supplement would be based on new data, the opinions were not expected to differ significantly. Id. at *8. The court granted the leave requested. Defendant was likewise given an opportunity to amend its expert reports in rebuttal and relators’ expert was deposed after his supplemental report was served. Id. at *11.

Continue Reading Plaintiffs Learn Supplementing Isn’t a Second Bite at the Apple

A lot of companies rely on retired and otherwise former employees for information in litigation – including product liability litigation. Particularly where a product (such as a drug that’s now gone generic) has a long history, they are often the best source of knowledge about what happened years ago.  In dealing with ex-employees, however, defendants must keep in mind that, for purposes of the attorney/client privilege, discussions with ex-employees are subject to being treated much differently (and less protectively) than corporate communications with current employees.

The recent case, Newman v. Highland School District No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016), although not involving prescription medical products, or even product liability, is a cautionary tale.  The defendant in Newman was a governmental entity, a school district.  The plaintiff alleged that he suffered a brain injury playing high school football, and that the injury occurred because the plaintiff was allegedly allowed to play in a game the day after suffering a concussion in practice.

The plaintiff in Newman didn’t sue until some three years after the injury. Id. at 1189-90.  By then, most of the coaching staff had turned over, and the individuals with the best knowledge of what had happened were employed elsewhere.  The school district’s litigation counsel contacted the ex-coaches and when they were deposed, claimed to represent them.  Id. at 1190.  Plaintiff challenged that representation as a conflict of interest and “sought discovery concerning communications between [the defendant] and the former coaches.”  Id.  The defendant resisted discovery with a claim of attorney/client privilege, and plaintiff opposed.  The defendant lost, and appealed denial of its motion for a protective order.  Id.

Continue Reading A Reminder To Be Careful With Ex-Employees And Confidential Information

Bexis recently attended the “Emerging Issues in Mass-Tort MDLs Conference” sponsored by Duke Law School (those of us from Philly remember Duke as part of “Black Saturday” back in 1979).  Several panels discussed various issues relating to MDLs including using early, issue-specific fact sheets, which Bexis advocated be considered amended pleadings subject to Rule 8 and TwIqbal, as a winnowing tool against the hordes of meritless plaintiffs that persist for years in MDLs involving prescription medical products.  Another discussion, about Lone Pine orders, produced (among other things) a great deal of disagreement as to what exactly a “Lone Pine order” actually requires.

By the end of it all, Bexis was moved to make a modest proposal. A lot of the problem – both with the use of plaintiff questionnaires/fact sheets and with Lone Pine orders – is definitional.  There is no set standard for either of these supplemental discovery procedures.  What’s really needed is the type of clarity that can only be brought about by an actual rule of civil procedure.  Thus, Bexis proposed (and proposes here) creation of a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing “optional discovery methods” that allow judges to use defined procedures for party questionnaires/fact sheets (not necessarily plaintiffs in all cases) and Lone Pine orders would set standards, as well as several other discovery techniques that we think should be defined and allowed by a formal rule.

The other techniques Bexis would include in a new rule are: (1) authorizations for release and production of medical and other relevant records in the hands of third-parties; (2) informal interviews with treating physicians; (3) predictive coding in ediscovery; and (4) provision of blood or tissue sampling for genetic testing.  The first two are traditional discovery techniques that suffer (like Lone Pine and questionnaires) from wildly divergent standards and could benefit from the uniformity imposed by a rule – as well as a leveling of the plaintiff/defendant playing field.  The latter two are innovative discovery techniques that are driven by technological advances.  Predictive coding (as we discussed in the links above) could both cheapen and sharpen electronic discovery.  Genetic testing, reliant on DNA and other molecular sequencing techniques that have become dramatically cheaper and more accurate over the past decade, will become more and more necessary in toxic exposure cases of all kinds as causation of more and more medical conditions, such as mesothelioma and other cancers, is determined to vary by individualized genetic differences (also discussed in our prior link).

As illustrious as the attendees of the (invitation only) Duke Conference are, that is not the forum for actually amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That honor goes to Discovery Subcommittee of the Federal Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.  Having successfully completed its project on scope and sanctions that resulted in the amendments that became final in December, 2015, that Subcommittee might be looking for something else to do.  Maybe it could see fit to take up some or all of Bexis’ modest proposal.

For the second time within a month, an MDL court has rejected wide-ranging and potentially abusive discovery on the basis that the requests were out of proportion to the needs of the case. This is a welcome development.  We have written multiple times about the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amendments elevating proportionality to a marquee spot in Rule 26(b) and placing the “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” standard on the ashbin of history (at least in federal court).  We have lamented (particularly here) that multiple district courts continue to apply that now-obsolete standard, relying on case authority that predates the amended Rule 26(b) by nearly 30 years.

We particularly appreciated the recent order in the Bard IVC Filter MDL, where the MDL judge also happens to chair the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules.  That court thus took the opportunity to remind his colleagues about the applicable rules and also to emphasize that discovery requests must be proportional to their burden, even when there are hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs. See In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, ___ F.R.D. ___, 2016 WL 4943393 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016).

Last week, the district judge in the Benicar MDL demonstrated that he too knows the rules. In that proceeding, the plaintiffs moved to compel the depositions of employees of the defendant drug manufacturer’s European affiliate and to compel production of documents from Europe. See In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-2606, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137839, at **196-97 (D.N.J. October 4, 2016).  The court denied both motions, and before the court explained why, it observed that “it is helpful to summarize the discovery to date.” Id. at *198.

Continue Reading Another Champion for Proportionality in Discovery