Parties often file motions in limine on fairly case-specific issues, building on the history of discovery and motions practice in the case. Applying a ruling on in limines from one case to another can be a dicey proposition as potentially significant differences in the facts, law, claims and defenses asserted, and other rulings can usually be identified. Plus, many pre-trial decisions on evidence do not last once doors get opening and evidence can be cumulative, among other reasons why judges’ minds change. Still, we do posts on rulings on motions in limine that we guess might have some relevance to other cases our readers have. When we do, we can be hamstrung by the limited information in these opinions on the facts, allegations, and other rulings, such as rulings on motions for summary judgment that would typically be rendered before the in limines are decided.
In In re Depakote, No. 15-CV-702-NJR-SCW, 2017 WL 2126837, *2 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2017), we have rulings on a grab bag of motions in limine after the court issued partial summary judgment for the drug manufacturing defendant based on “preemption of label changes related to development delay” after fetal exposure of the medication. If this summary judgment ruling sounds familiar, then you might need a hobby. You also might have read any number of our posts on the Rheinfrank case and the ultimate affirmance of its preemption decision and defense verdict by the Sixth Circuit. Like here, here and here. As we said of the appellate decision, “The court held, ‘[g]iven, then, that as of 2008 the FDA did not believe the state of the data supported a developmental delay warning, it stands to reason that as of 2003, with even less data to go on, the FDA would similarly have rejected a developmental delay warning.’ Thus, Rheinfrank joins those courts that have drawn a preemptive line barring all plaintiffs who used a drug prior to an FDA insufficient evidence decision concerning the risk at issue.” We also wondered how the case got to a jury given trial court’s preemption decision and the requirements of Ohio law. We have similar wonderment at the instant case, which involved 2006 fetal exposure. The decision is sparse on facts, but it is hard to imagine a viable product liability claim for the plaintiff’s injury when plaintiff cannot prove that the label in place when the drug was prescribed to the mother should have said something different about the risk of the injury in question. Some sort of warnings claim seems to be pending, along with a claim for punitive damages.
With that background, we turn to the subset of the 28 total motions in limine that we think matter most. First, consistent with the preemption ruling and the applicable regulation, plaintiff could not preclude the manufacturer from explaining that a proposed change to the label through the CBE regulation is still subject to FDA’s decision to accept, reject, or modify the proposed change. 2017 WL 2126837, *2. What the CBE regulation has to do with plaintiff’s surviving warnings claim or whether it could have used (e.g., based on new evidence of safety) is unclear. Second, plaintiff’s red herring argument about whether FDA is required to do its own post-marketing studies did not preclude the defendant from presenting evidence that it followed labeling regulations. Third, while the court allowed some speculative evidence from the plaintiff’s mother in connection with the inquiry on proximate cause for failure to warn—which should not happen unless a different developmental delay warning has been articulated—this opened the door to some amount of evidence on what she knew and how she behaved. Id. at **2-3.
As to the defendant’s motions, the post-conception labeling and regulatory communications were excluded and defendant agreed not to raise pre-conception discussions with FDA about labeling changes that were not yet approved. Id. at *3. (With the limited information presented in the opinion, we cannot say if there was evidence that FDA rejected or discouraged whatever labeling change plaintiff was allowed to urge in the case.) The court also excluded a 2009 FDA alert about the risk of birth defects with the drug, although plaintiff was allowed to discuss any pre-conception studies that went into the alert. Id. at *4. Limiting warnings evidence to what existed before the prescription at issue makes sense, but it also makes sense that there needs to be a claim based on what the warnings should have said instead at that point. Along those lines, plaintiff was not allowed to argue that the drug should have been contraindicated for use in pregnancy because plaintiff offered no expert who disclosed such an opinion. Id. (And such an opinion would have had some preemption problems, we think.) Plaintiff was allowed, however, to offer evidence about foreign labels for the drug in place before plaintiff’s conception, holding that the manufacturer’s knowledge of these labels was relevant to its duty to warn. Id. at **7-8. Breaking somewhat from its previously firm line on the irrelevance of the post-conception evidence to the warnings claim, the court did not foreclose the possibility that some post-conception marketing materials could be relevant if “they contain pre-2006 facts.” Id. at *6. Again, we would think the pre-2006 facts would need to relate to whatever about the 2006 warnings for developmental delay that plaintiff was allowed to claim should have been different.
There was one last ruling that bears some discussion. The defendant had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and paid a very, very large fine related to allegations of off-label promotion for use of the drug for schizophrenia and elderly dementia, which were not labeled indications. Id. at *9. The plaintiff’s mother did not use the drug for these conditions and there was no evidence to “connect these activities with the 2006 Depakote teratogenicity warning.” Id. So, there was far too much prejudice compared to the probative value to let the jury hear about the plea or fines. However, plaintiff was allowed to “introduce evidence regarding the off-label marketing and sales efforts . . . regarding bipolar disorder,” which was an indication added during 2006 (based on our quick look). Id. The court saw this evidence as supporting plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. It seems to us that a plaintiff’s punitive damages evidence is not relevant unless it tends to show that the underlying conduct giving rise to liability was done with the requisite intent. It does not sound like there is any connection between an alleged, non-preempted issue with the 2006 warnings for developmental delay and any off-label promotion issue, but maybe that link was just not spelled out in the opinion.