Last year’s list of the Ten Worst DDL cases was remarkable because all ten decisions came from appellate courts. Yikes. And it is not as if the bad appellate decisions were spread around. Two came from our home circuit, the Third. Two came from the reliably problematic Ninth Circuit. But the ‘winner’ was the Eleventh
Happy birthday, Christopher Plummer. The great Canadian actor turns 88 today, and seems as vibrant as ever. What a marvelous career Plummer has had. He is a preeminent Shakespearean actor. We saw him play Iago to James Earl Jones’s Othello on Broadway 35 years ago. Of course, most people remember Plummer as Captain Von Trapp…
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
Search for Medtronic on this blog and you’re going to find preemption cases. Lots of preemption cases. Mostly preemption victories for the defense. An overwhelming body of preemption law has been made by Medtronic. They’ve certainly led the charge. So, if we say today’s…
It’s a fairly well known double standard. If you ask your child why he or she did that rotten, terrible, awful thing and he or she responds “just because” – that’s never good enough. When a parent is faced with the question “why,” however, “because I said so” is a fairly standard, albeit a bit…
We’ve all had cases where plaintiffs try to use their prescribers and treaters as their experts on everything from failure to warn and causation to design defect and company conduct. Even on the medical aspects of the case, a treater needs to offer more than just an unsupported general conclusion in order to withstand scrutiny…
Back in October we posted about the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision McLaughlin v. Bayer Corp, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37516 (EDPA Mar. 22, 2016) saying that while we liked the ultimate result – tossing out most of plaintiffs’ claims – some pieces of the decision weren’t as strong as we would have liked. Well, McLaughlin’s back and it’s still not a slam dunk, but plaintiffs’ don’t have too much left of their cases either.
As a reminder, this is actually a decision in 5 cases each alleging injury from plaintiffs’ use of a Class III, PMA contraceptive device, Essure. McLaughlin v. Bayer Corp., 2017 WL 697047, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 21, 2017). Several of plaintiffs’ original causes of action were dismissed with prejudice, but they were given an opportunity to amend to try to salvage their claims for negligent training, negligent risk management, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent manufacture. Negligent misrepresentation and failure to warn premised on failure to report survived the first motion to dismiss.
The decision methodically goes through each cause of action.
Negligent Training: In its first decision, the court opined it was possible to state a parallel claim for negligent training, but since plaintiffs failed to specify how defendant’s training deviated from federal training requirements or how those deviations caused plaintiffs injuries, the claim had to be dismissed as insufficiently pled. Id. at *3. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged 6 such failures by defendant. As to 3, the court couldn’t find any federal directive that required defendant to do what plaintiffs alleged it failed to do. So, as to those 3 allegations, the claim was dismissed as expressly preempted. Id. at *4-5. As to the remaining 3 alleged violations, defendant challenged them on causation grounds but was unsuccessful. The court found the complaint sufficiently alleged that because defendant failed to properly train the doctors, the doctors in turn did not properly place the device causing it to migrate and cause plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at *5. The complaint, however, lacked any specific allegations about the actual doctors who performed plaintiffs’ surgeries. The court didn’t find that fatal at the pleadings stage – that was for discovery. Id. at *6. But if you look at what the 3 bases for the failure train claim are, they appear to all be things plaintiffs could have asked their doctors about before filing these lawsuits. Did the doctor successfully complete 5 preceptorings? Did the doctor read and understand the training manual? Did the doctor successfully complete the simulator training? If the answers to those 3 questions are yes in each case – this claim is over.
Kentucky –sure, it gets pretty sticky in the summer, and the bluegrass isn’t really blue, and Wildcats fans – well, they’re a breed of their own. But give us the bourbon, the chicken, and the Derby and we’ll be singing “My Old Kentucky Home” and “Coal Miner’s Daughter” with the rest of the Kentucky natives.…
It’s been two years since we applauded the downfall of Azzarello in Pennsylvania. Two years since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). Two years since we opined that we didn’t think Tincher changed Pennsylvania law applicable to prescription medical products much at all. After all, Hahn v. Richter, 673 A.2d 888 excluded prescription medical products entirely from Azzarello strict liability twenty years ago, so Tincher’s reworking of strict liability shouldn’t be of much consequence. And, our prediction has largely held true. We really haven’t mentioned Tincher much since here on the DDL blog, other than to point out the serious flaws in plaintiffs’ attempts to argue that Tincher somehow altered Pennsylvania’s negligence-only standard for prescription medical product litigation and that plaintiffs’ theory had been rejected by the first courts to consider it.
Now, two years later, we have to report that a Pennsylvania federal court used Tincher to allow a strict liability manufacturing defect claim to proceed in a medical device case – in what we view as a misconstruction of both Tincher specifically and Pennsylvania products liability law (especially post-Lance) generally.
The case is Wagner v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., slip op., No. 16-4209 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016). During the installation of a feeding tube, a piece of the tube came off in plaintiff’s stomach and she had to undergo several procedures to have to have it removed. Wagner, slip op. at 2-3. Plaintiff’s complaint brings claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Defendant moved to dismiss the latter two claims. Id. at 1. Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of the breach of warranty claim. Id. at 13. As for strict liability, the court dismissed strict liability design defect and failure to warn on the ground that neither is allowed under Pennsylvania law for prescription medical products. Id. at 6 n.3. But the court was unwilling to find the same was true as to plaintiff’s strict liability manufacturing defect claim.
Drug and device cases regularly involve plaintiffs who have suffered serious injuries, the type that engender sympathy, even from defense attorneys. It’s understandable that a plaintiff who suffered such trauma would turn to the courts for redress. But bad experiences do not make a viable drug or device claim. Drugs and devices have inherent risks, so the law requires more than injury due to those risks for a viable products liability claim. Generally, the injury must result from a defect of some sort, such as a design, manufacturing or warning defect. If a plaintiff doesn’t allege such a defect, the court must dismiss the claim, no matter how traumatic the plaintiff’s injury.
Smith v. Pride Mobility Products Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149955 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016), illustrates this. The plaintiff was wheelchair-bound and claimed that, while attending a Renaissance Fair, the power to her wheelchair gave out as she was trying to climb a steep hill. Ultimately, the wheelchair went into a free-wheel fall at a sharp angle down the hill, throwing plaintiff from the wheelchair to the ground. Plaintiff claimed serious injury to her neck and knee, permanent disability to one of her toes, whiplash and serious psychological and emotional distress resulting from the event and her injuries.
These allegations no doubt suggest great trauma for the plaintiff. But do they state a claim? The initial consideration for a court is not the severity of the injuries or the trauma that led to them but whether the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a viable products liability claim. Here, the Smith court did its job. It reviewed plaintiff’s allegations dispassionately and determined that plaintiff had not made the type of allegations necessary to state a manufacturing defect claim:
In order to allege a strict products liability claim under a manufacturing-defect theory, a plaintiff “must identify/explain how the [product] either deviated from [the company’s] intended result/design or how the [product] deviated from other seemingly identical” models of the product.
Here, Plaintiff states that the wheelchair started “freewheeling down [a] hill” after Plaintiff placed the wheelchair in reverse on a hill and that the wheelchair “was either defective or . . . deliberately designed to” freewheel in such a manner. The complaint does not state how the wheelchair that Plaintiff purchased is different from the design of the wheelchair that Defendant intended or from other identical models of the wheelchair. Rather, “Plaintiff make[s] only conclusory allegations” that the product is defective, which is insufficient to allege a manufacturing defect claim.
Id. at *25-26 (citations omitted).
A couple of weeks ago we reported on our visit to the Women’s Health Litigation Conference. One of the conference panels discussed the most interesting ongoing litigations involving women’s health products. Essure, a permanent contraception implant, was among those products. The standard claim is that the Essure implant can cause women to suffer pelvic pain, blood clots, and various other injuries. A plaintiff lawyer at the conference recounted (from a certain point of view) the Essure development and medical stories, concluding that Essure would be a “slam dunk … if not for the fact that it is a PMA product.”
Aye, there’s the rub. Essure is, indeed, a medical device that went through, and passed, the FDA’s rigorous Pre-Market Approval process. PMA approval means that almost all product liability theories are preempted by federal law. If state law, including jury verdicts, would impose any requirement different from, or in addition to, the FDCA, then such state law must yield. Consequently, tort claims against PMA products are difficult to sustain. Still, difficult is not the same as impossible. Plaintiff lawyers have tried all sorts of clever ways to circumvent PMA preemption. But clever is not the same as correct. Good for courts that can tell the difference.
Such a court issued the opinion in Norman v. Bayer Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96993 (D. Conn. July 26, 2016). As is typical, the complaint in that case covered the product liability waterfront, with claims for strict liability, negligent failure to warn, negligent training, negligent manufacturing, negligent misrepresentation, negligence per se, and breach of warranty. As is typical, the complaint devoted most of its girth to the generic development and medical stories alluded to above. In the 29 pages of the Norman complaint, “only four short paragraphs” related to the plaintiff and her experience with the product.