Every week Bexis circulates an email with new, bloggable cases, but sometimes there are more new decisions than blogging days, and cases get passed over.
Here are three (relatively) recent examples
Gonzalez v. International Medical Devices, Inc., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2025 WL 2054361 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2025), arose from the plaintiff’s apparent
When you write a few hundred or more posts for a legal blog devoted to the somewhat niche subject of drug and device product liability law, you look for themes or hooks to keep both the writer and presumptive readers engaged. The themes may be fairly obvious based on the date of the post, the
Franco v. Chobani, LLC, 2025 WL 1530996 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2025) is a relatively rare preemption win in a court controlled by occasionally iffy Seventh Circuit law. It is also a food case, not a drug or device case. There is a lot of food-specific discussion (about different molecular structures of “sugar”). That
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
Not a drug or a device case, the recent personal jurisdiction ruling in In re: Hair Relaxer Marketing Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, 2025 WL 1331791 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2025), caught our attention because typically the Seventh Circuit is not a
The Ninth Circuit filed its anticipated en banc opinion on personal jurisdiction last week, and the result is the broadening of Internet-based personal jurisdiction in an age of ubiquitous online commerce. The district court in Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., No. 22-15815, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9410 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025), had ruled that
In golf, a mulligan is when a golfer hits a second shot if they’re not satisfied with their first shot. We’ve used the term before to refer to the second chances given to plaintiffs to re-plead their claims. So, we decided to look up the origin of the term and found conflicting stories. The most
Without detouring into a larger discussion on the impacts of humans on the environment and our fellow animals, we can say that we are big fans of the other extant great apes. Our puppy’s fascination with nature documentaries has helped pique that interest of late. Our gingery cousin the orangutan, the largest primarily arboreal mammal
We are trying hard not to fall into the current fashion of catastrophizing everything. But the SCOTUS opinion in Mallory might have been the worst recent High Court ruling for corporate defendants. This blog has spilled a lot of tears and ink on Mallory (including here, here, and here, and several other
Beyond the Supreme Court’s rolling out the red carpet to forum shopping plaintiffs, the decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023), was further disturbing to us in that Mallory suggested that a state could deem, through a “consent statute,” grounds for “consent” to general personal jurisdiction that were much less than the “at home” standard previously required for such broad jurisdiction. Id. at 145-46 (“attach[ing] jurisdictional consequences to what some might dismiss as mere formalities” such as completing a registration form and recognizing jurisdiction from “actions . . . that may seem like technicalities”). Those other examples, however, all involved limited “special” jurisdiction issues, not the far broader expanse of general personal jurisdiction.
Continue Reading Post Mallory Limits to Deeming Personal Jurisdiction
It’s been a little less than a year since the Supreme Court’s rolling out the red carpet to forum-shopping plaintiffs in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023). Mallory was, in places 5-4, and elsewhere 4-1-4, and everywhere extremely fact specific – to the point of including a defendant-specific image of its Pennsylvania contacts that, as far as we can tell, wasn’t even in the record, but rather was found on the Internet. 600 U.S. at 142-43. The result – beyond the Dormant Commerce Clause flag waving in Justice Alito’s concurrence (discussed here) – was to punch this plaintiff’s one-time ticket against the Norfolk Southern Railway. “To decide this case, we need not speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would suffice to establish consent to suit.” Id. at 136.
Continue Reading Mallory in the States – A Year After the Deluge
