Regular blog readers may recall that, every year, we eagerly await a Monday and Tuesday right around February 14th.  This has nothing to do with Valentine’s Day (though we like a dozen roses and a box of chocolates as much as the next person.)  No, at this time every year (for the past eighteen or so) we cross our fingers that there is no blizzard, beg everyone in our work life to cover any emergencies, and head to New York for the Westminster Kennel Club Dog Show.  This year was the 141st annual show, and, as always, it was a mecca for all things dog.  As we ate breakfast in our hotel, we were visited by Mobius, a red Doberman so tall he had to lean down to attempt to taste our complimentary make-it-ourselves waffle.  To board the shuttle from the Hotel Pennsylvania (worthy of its own post) to Piers 92 and 94 for the daytime breed judging, we had to step over “Sky,” a 140-pound Greater Swiss Mountain Dog sprawled in the aisle of the bus, calmly oblivious to accidental bumps and kicks and happily kissing anyone who asked.  We live for this stuff, even if our chosen favorite almost never wins.

For the atmosphere is rarified. A few years ago, the show stopped being “champions only” and admitted “class dogs” – dogs still working their way through point-earning breed classes to achieve their championships – for the first time.  But, save for the infrequent upset, the group competition (the televised portion, in which the single winner of each breed competes against the winners from the other breeds in its “group” – sporting, herding, toy, etc.) is dominated by the very top-winning show dogs in the country.  Last year, we fell in love with a gorgeous German Shepherd Dog named Rumor.  She was a heavy favorite to win it all (“Best in Show”), but was upset by C.J. the German Shorthaired Pointer and settled for Reserve Best – second place.  And she retired, to raise beautiful puppies and live the life of a cherished house pet.

But, alas, said puppies did not get made on the first attempt. And, come January, Rumor’s owner/handler decided to give her one more shot at the big one.  So she “came back out,” showed at ten shows in January, and took one more run at the Garden.  And, this time, after upsetting the favorite, Preston the Puli, to take the Herding Group, she won it all.  It was very, very cool to witness.  And we already can’t wait ‘til next year.

And there was a blog-worthy lesson to be gleaned from it all (at least if you stretch a little): if you haven’t achieved everything you want, think about taking another shot.  And H.R. 985, a bill that passed the House Judiciary Committee this week, would pick up where CAFA left off (and then some) to correct still-rampant abuse of the system by class action and MDL plaintiff lawyers, to the detriment of our clients, the judicial system as a whole, and all too often, to the plaintiffs the lawyers ostensibly represent.

Under “Purposes,” the bill states: “The purposes of this act are to – (1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members and multidistrict litigation plaintiffs with legitimate claims; (2) diminish abuses in class action and mass tort litigation that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal system; and (3) restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by ensuring Federal court consideration of interstate controversies of national importance consistent with diversity jurisdiction principles.”  Worthy goals all, if a trifle ambitious. The bill’s key points read like a set of nesting boxes – just when you think you’ve opened the last, there is another present inside.  Here are some highlights:

Class Actions

  • Injury allegations: this provision requires a court to deny certification unless “the party seeking to maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representative.” This is ascertainability something for which we’ve advocated, and also something that our side tried unsuccessfully to get fixed through the Federal Rules Committee. Thus, the judiciary had its chance to fix this. Nothing happened, so now Congress is poised to step in. About time.
  • Conflicts of interest: this provision requires class counsel to state, in the body of the complaint, “whether any proposed class representative or named plaintiff in the complaint is a relative of, is a present or former employee of, is a present or former client of (other than with respect to the class action) or has any contractual relationship with . . . class counsel” and shall “describe the circumstances under which each class representative or named plaintiff agreed to be included in the complaint and shall identify any other class action in which any proposed class representative or named plaintiff has a similar role.”
  • Attorneys’ fees: “[N]o attorneys’ fees may be . . . paid . . . until the distribution of any monetary recovery to class members has been completed,” and “[u]nless otherwise specified by Federal statute, . . . the portion of any attorneys’ fee award to class counsel . . . shall be limited to a reasonable percentage of any payments directly distributed to and received by class members [and in] no event shall the attorneys’ fee award exceed the total amount of money distributed to and received by all class members.” We particularly like this because it would effectively put an end to cy pres, against which we’ve railed for years. By limiting the denominator for fee awards to “payments directly distributed to and received by class members” it prevents cy pres sums from being used to inflate fee awards.

There are other provisions, requiring stringent accounting provisions for settlement funds forbidding certification of issue classes unless all relevant Rule 23 prerequisites are satisfied (another thing our side tried first to fix through a change to Rule 23), and most significantly providing for severance of misjoined plaintiffs for purposes of jurisdictional determinations. This legislative elimination of fraudulent misjoinder is a key point, since it addresses the multi-plaintiff complaints we love to hate.

We note that since the “effective date” of this act provides for its application to all “pending” civil actions, cases currently in state court can be removed (or removed again) under the provision negating misjoinder as a means of preventing diversity-based removal to federal court.

Finally, in an issue close to our hearts as we daily encounter plaintiffs unwittingly victimized by so-called “litigation funders,” the bill provides, “In any class action, class counsel shall promptly disclose in writing to the court and all other parties the identity of any person or entity, other than a class member or class counsel of record, who has a contingent right to receive compensation from any settlement, judgment, or other relief obtained in the action.” A sunshine law for third-party funding is something else for which we’ve advocated.

Multidistrict Litigation:

  • Proof of exposure and injury: We were thrilled to see a “Lone Pine”-esque provision build into the MDL portion of the bill. It provides, in pertinent part, “In any coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings . . . , counsel for a plaintiff asserting a claim seeking redress for personal injury [in the MDL] shall make a submission sufficient to demonstrate that there is evidentiary support (including but not limited to medical records) for the factual contentions in the plaintiff’s complaint regarding the alleged injury, the exposure to the risk that allegedly caused the injury, and the alleged cause of the injury . . . within 45 days after the civil action is transferred to or directly filed in the proceedings. That deadline shall not be extended. Within 30 days after the submission deadline, the judge . . . shall [determine] whether the submission is sufficient and shall dismiss the action without prejudice if the submission is found to be insufficient.” Thirty days later, in the continued absence of a satisfactory submission, the action is to be dismissed with prejudice. Not long ago, we advocated for amending the MDL statute to require early factual disclosure, with dismissal as the sanction for not disclosing enough to satisfy Rule 8. This is the functional equivalent.
  • Trial Prohibition (“waiving Lexecon”): MDL judges “may not conduct any trial in any civil action transferred to or directly filed in the proceedings unless all parties to the civil action consent to trail of the specific case sought to be tried.” This provision would remove the threat of MDL trials as a tool to force defendants to settle. It is something else for which we have advocated.
  • Ensuring Proper Recovery for Plaintiffs: MDL plaintiffs “shall receive not less than 80 percent of any monetary recovery obtained in that action by settlement, judgment or otherwise.”

While most of the press coverage seems to focus on class actions, to us the removal and MDL provisions are at least as important. The vast bulk of our professional life is spent in the mass tort space – mostly MDLs these days, with the occasional class action thrown in. We have become accustomed (but never inured) to plaintiffs without injuries herded by counsel who are their friends or bosses into mass actions in which they don’t belong. On the other end of the spectrum, we encounter severely injured plaintiffs who will recover next to nothing because lawyers and litigation funders own most or all of the plaintiffs’ stakes in the inevitable settlements. And, at every turn, we sit across the table from tanned and affluent plaintiff attorneys who are the only ones apparently immune to the vagaries of the system and who are the sole beneficiaries of its inequities. H.R. 985, as drafted, attempts to address many of these issues. We do have questions. Who defines “the same type and scope of injury,” for example? And we have doubts: can a bill possibly survive the powerful plaintiff attorney lobby when it attempts to resurrect the integrity of mass litigation by hitting those attorneys squarely in their pocketbooks? But we heartily and excitedly support this bill, and we know that some of its provisions are way, way better than none. We will keep you posted.

We’re pretty familiar with most diversity-based removal techniques, so when we see something unusual, we sit up and take notice (as we did with removal before service) – then we blog about it.  Today’s case is Bahalim v. Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 WL 118418 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2017).  The unusual aspect of Bahalim is the target of the defendant’s successful fraudulent joinder argument.  As discussed in the opinion, the parties in Bahalim are completely diverse.  Id. at *1.  However, the case would ordinarily be stuck in state court due to the “forum defendant” rule – that even a diverse case isn’t removable where the plaintiff sues the defendant in the defendant’s home state court. Id. at *2.

[T]he forum defendant rule disallows federal removal premised on diversity in cases where the primary rationale for diversity jurisdiction − to protect defendants against presumed bias of local courts − is not a concern because at least one defendant is a citizen of the forum state.

Id. (quoting Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2013)).

The manufacturer defendant removed anyway, and asserted that the so-called “forum defendant” was fraudulently joined.  Predictably, the plaintiffs claimed that fraudulent joinder couldn’t be used to dismiss a forum defendant.  The defendant responded that it was proper to use fraudulent joinder against a forum defendant because the purposes of the forum defendant rule were not served where a sham forum defendant was sued to keep an out-of-state defendant in state court.

The Seventh Circuit had punted on this question in Morris, but had identified the relevant “policy interests for courts to balance.” Bahalim, 2017 WL 118418, at *3.  They are:

(1) the plaintiff’s right to select the forum and the general interest in confining federal jurisdiction to its appropriate limits, versus (2) the defendant’s statutory right of removal and guarding against abusive pleading practices.

Id.  As to the first, Bahalim held, “improperly joining a forum defendant also lessens a plaintiff’s choice of forum.”  Id.  Any “deference” to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum here was further “weakened” by their being litigation tourists looking for a friendly venue.  Id. (“neither Plaintiff is an Illinois citizen”).  As to the second, the court held that a fraudulently joined forum defendant wasn’t “properly joined” as the removal statute required:

[B]y its own terms, the forum defendant rule precludes removal only when there is a “properly joined and served” resident defendant.  Based on this statutory language, Defendant argues that a fraudulently joined forum defendant is an improperly joined defendant.  The Court agrees.

Id. (citations omitted).  Thus, “the general interest in confining federal jurisdiction to its appropriate statutory limits weighs in favor of Defendants.”  Id.

Continue Reading Unusual Removal Situation Yields Favorable Result

Court Finds Fraudulent Joinder by Relying on a Sales Rep’s Affidavit and Common Sense

Buckles v. Coombs, 2016 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 180784 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4 2017), is a decision that illustrates how a defendant’s proper introduction of facts via an affidavit and a court’s introduction of common sense into its decision process can come together to result in the denial of a plaintiff’s motion to remand an action to state court.

In Buckles, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured due to an allegedly defective cutting device used in her knee replacement. In her state-court complaint, she sued not only the diverse manufacturer, Howmedica, but its non-diverse sales rep. The defendants, having seen that move before, claimed fraudulent joinder of the sales rep and removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.

Plaintiff moved to remand the action back to state court. Plaintiff argued that the sales rep was, in fact, a proper defendant because he had been negligent in promoting, marketing, testing and warning about the device—and so on. She supported these arguments with nothing more than the allegations in her complaint, which were fairly broad and conclusory. That was her mistake.

The court made clear that the proper standard under which a court should determine whether a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined is like that applied to summary judgment motions, not the standard for motions to dismiss: “A district court’s process for resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is similar to that used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at * 5 (citing Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). And the defendants were relying on more than the general allegations in the complaint. They offered facts from the sales rep himself in an affidavit in which he specifically refuted the general allegations of the complaint:

As set forth in [the sales rep’s] affidavit, however: (1) he was present during [plaintiff’s] surgery “only to facilitate bringing the implants to the operating room and for no other purpose” (2) he did not call on [plaintiff’s] surgeon at any time prior to her surgery on August 21, 2012, or anytime thereafter (3) he did not “promote, advertise, represent, recommend or sell” the Cutting Guide used during [plaintiff’s] surgery; (4) he had no involvement in the preoperative imaging for [plaintiff’s] Cutting Guide and had no other involvement in the planning of her surgery; and (5) he has no medical training, but rather, relies on the materials and information provided to him by Howmedica in carrying out his job duties.

Id. at *8.

Continue Reading Court Finds Fraudulent Joinder by Relying on a Sales Rep’s Affidavit and Common Sense

What follows is a post authored by Jaclyn Setili, a Reed Smith associate.  She is discussing what we believe is the first extension of Mensing/Bartlett preemption to claims involving pharmacies – something we’ve previously proposed as theoretically possible, but had yet to see.  As always, our guest posters are entitled to 100% of the credit (and any blame) for their blogposts.

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As a Mitten native (that’s Michigan for the uninitiated), this guest blogger is regularly on the lookout for good news connected with her home state.  Typically this involves events of the sporting championship variety, but cause for celebration has been scarce of late on that front (see, e.g., Michigan football, an impressive early season dominance culminating in two close late season losses and a devastating defeat in the Orange Bowl; the Red Wings, currently sitting in last place in their division and slipping progressively further away from a Stanley Cup title since their last championship win in 2008; and the Lions, every year, forever). Even reports of Detroit’s flourishing restaurant scene and a slot in the New York Times’ 52 Places to Go in 2017 fail to inspire much collective awe from this guest blogger’s big-coastal-city friends and colleagues.

As it turns out, however, we need only look a few months back to the In re Lipitor MDL (which we have blogged about before, most recently here, and in which all but one of the cases have now been dismissed) for such news.  In In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 7368203 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2016), the district court ultimately granted plaintiffs’ motions to remand, but in the process became the first court ever (as far as we know) to apply impossibility preemption to bar warning claims against a pharmacist selling a branded drug.

The details: The two actions at issue were originally filed in Michigan state court; each plaintiff alleged that Lipitor caused her to develop Type II diabetes, and that the manufacturer failed to properly disclose the risks associated with the drug.  That defendant removed both cases to the Eastern District of Michigan based on diversity jurisdiction; from there the cases were transferred to the MDL court.  Plaintiffs named a local pharmacy in order to destroy diversity.  While the parties agreed that the pharmacy and at least one named plaintiff in each case were residents of Michigan, defendants claimed that the pharmacy was fraudulently joined and that the non-Michigan plaintiffs were fraudulently misjoined.  Plaintiffs moved to remand.

As we and the MDL court know all too well, to establish that a nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined, a removing party in the Fourth Circuit must show either:  (1) “outright fraud” in plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) that there is no possibility that plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.  2016 WL 7368203, at *1 (emphasis added).  That is always an uphill battle.  Here, defendants argued that there was no possibility that plaintiffs could state a claim against the pharmacy where plaintiffs allegedly purchased the drug under Michigan law for four reasons:  (a) their claims were preempted by federal law, (b) Michigan’s seller immunity statute bars pharmacy claims, (c) the pharmacy had no duty to warn plaintiffs, and (d) the learned intermediary theory further barred plaintiffs’ claims.

Of primary importance for our purposes is the court’s analysis of the first ground, preemption.  The court first noted plaintiffs’ admission that they “may not have a claim regarding labeling with respect to . . . a pharmacy.”  Id. at *2.  The court swiftly concluded that even if it were possible to state such a claim, it would be preempted by federal law because, under the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act, “a pharmacy has no authority to unilaterally change a drug’s label.”  Id.  Thus, any claims based on labeling were preempted under PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2571 (2011).  In other words, the court concluded that there was no possibility that plaintiffs could establish a cause of action against a pharmacist based on labeling.  That result is a first, and could be a big deal.

Continue Reading Guest Post – MDL Court: Preemption Leaves No “Glimmer of Hope” for Labeling Claims Against a Pharmacy

This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.

There are two key rulings in Addelson v. Sanofi S.A., 2016 WL 6216124 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2016). Neither is novel or complex. The court can’t exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant on claims made by an out-of-state plaintiff and said out-of-state plaintiff can’t be used to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction. Their significance lies more in the fact that they were issued by the Eastern District of Missouri.

Defendant Sanofi (the U.S. subsidiary) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Id. at *1. Plaintiff Addelson is a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. Plaintiff Braxton is a New Jersey resident. Plaintiffs both were prescribed and used the prescription medication taxotere in their home states. Id. Plaintiffs have no relationship with each other.

Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a single complaint on behalf of both women in state court in Saint Louis, Missouri – a known judicial hellhole favored by the plaintiffs’ bar. So, why join these two women? Plaintiff Addelson is a Missouri resident who suffered her alleged injury in Missouri which establishes personal jurisdiction for this incident over Sanofi. Plaintiff Braxton is a New Jersey resident which means there is no diversity between her and Sanofi which also means the case can’t be removed to federal court. Clearly a not-too-subtle attempt by plaintiffs to bring and keep this case in state court in St. Louis. Unfortunately, this is a tactic that has worked in Missouri. Missouri’s joinder rules have been broadly interpreted to often allow plaintiffs’ counsel to join together groups of plaintiffs from different states with nothing in common except use of the same product. So, 1 Missouri plaintiff gets you the connection to Missouri and 1 plaintiff from defendant’s home state defeats diversity and keeps you in state court.

Continue Reading Misjoined Plaintiffs Can’t Be Used to Forum Shop

This is a guest post, by Jaimee Farrer, an associate at Reed Smith.  We’re always looking for new twists that can help in efforts to remove cases to federal court, and the case Jaimee describes does that, relying on an MDL standing severance order to short circuit what might have been lengthy and complex joinder arguments.  As always, our guest posters should get full credit (and any blame) for their analyses.  With that said, take it away Jaimee.

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We’re used to seeing judges split the baby when it comes to ruling on Daubert motions, for example.  Courts frequently allow an expert to testify about some of his/her opinions while excluding his/her other opinions, thereby giving both sides a little of what they want.  But remand decisions are usually black and white with a clear winner and a clear loser.  Either a case gets to remain in federal court and the defendants are the happy victors or the case gets remanded to state court, leaving the defendants to sulk and bemoan their fate.  But in today’s opinion, In Re Benicar (Olmesartan) Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 4059650 (D.N.J. July 27, 2016), which comes courtesy of the Benicar MDL Court, both scenarios happened simultaneously . . . well at least sort of.

Seventy-nine plaintiffs joined in filing a Complaint in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, against five defendants, two Daiichi Sankyo affiliates and three Forest Laboratories affiliates.  2016 WL 4059650 at *1-2.  In their Complaint, the plaintiffs alleged generally that they were injured by drugs developed and marketed by the defendants. Id. at *1.  The defendants removed the action to the Eastern District of Missouri, claiming diversity jurisdiction. Id.  The defendants concurrently moved to stay the case pending MDL transfer, which was granted. Id.  Plaintiffs predictably moved to remand, arguing lack of complete diversity. Id.  There things stood for several months while MDL transfer occurred. Id. at 2.  After the transfer, the stay was lifted, allowing the District of New Jersey to rule on the plaintiffs’ remand motion. Id.

At this point, in a multi-plaintiff case, we usually see arguments about fraudulent joinder, fraudulent misjoinder, or alternatively about personal jurisdiction. See here and here, for examples.  Not this time.  In ruling on remand, the Court conducted a cursory analysis of the citizenship of the parties and determined that thirty-five of the seventy-nine plaintiffs were citizens of the same state where at least one of the defendants has its principal place of business or is incorporated. Id. at *2.  That’s usually bad news for defendants.

Continue Reading Guest Post – Benicar MDL Court: An Unconventional, but Relatively Simple, Remand Decision

Here’s some more inside baseball on grounds for removing cases from state to federal court.  In brief, the issue is this: does the “bad faith” standard added to the removal statute (28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1)) in 2011 approximate the fraudulent joinder standard so that fraudulent joinder becomes a form of “bad faith” not subject to the one-year limit otherwise imposed on removals by reason of diversity of citizenship?  Fraudulent joinder is also an exception the “voluntary/involuntary” rule.  E.g., Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999); Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 254 (11th Cir. 1988).

We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Emily Kimmelman, a Reed Smith 2016 summer associate, in compiling the research for this post.

In 2011 (effective January 6, 2012), Congress passed the Federal Courts Jurisdiction & Venue Clarification Act (the “JVCA”).  The JVCA did a number of things, which we discussed here (back then (in 2011), we were most interested in Congress having left intact the statutory language that allows removal before service).  What we’re discussing today is the JVCA’s creation of a “bad faith” exception in 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1).  Specifically, §1446(c)(1) provides for diversity jurisdiction removal, even after one year if “the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.”

Nothing is certain, except the controversy over how the bad faith exception interacts with the fraudulent joinder exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule.  Everybody knows the standard for fraudulent joinder.  It exists where “there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendants or seek a joint judgment.”  In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).

Continue Reading Fraudulent Joinder & Bad Faith – Explaining Another Removal Muddle

The last time we wrote about Flagg v. Stryker Corp., we thought it would be the last time we’d write about Flagg v. Stryker Corp. Pain and frustrated resignation oozed from Bexis’s keyboard as he wrote that a Fifth Circuit panel had ordered remand of the removed complaint, even though defendants had a solid basis for removal. Along with the manufacturers of the toe implant device that was the subject of the complaint, the Louisiana plaintiff had also sued his doctors for malpractice, and his doctors were also from Louisiana. The purpose, at least in part, seemed clear: to defeat diversity and keep the complaint in state court. But Louisiana law requires plaintiffs to exhaust the administrative procedures set out in the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”) before suing their doctors in court. And the plaintiff (admittedly) had not done so. So the non-diverse doctors were not proper defendants, and removal on the basis of diversity seemed appropriate. In fact, plaintiff never moved to remand, instead requesting a stay while he tried to complete the LMMA’s administrative procedures, a request that the district court denied.

On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit panel addressed diversity jurisdiction sua sponte and held that it didn’t exist. As we discussed in our last post on this case, the panel noted that the LMMA had procedural “outs,” its administrative process wasn’t always a prerequisite to filing suit, and that it was reasonable to conclude that plaintiff could still win its medical malpractice claims even though they may have been filed early. With that, and little more, the Fifth Circuit ordered remand. As we mentioned, we thought that was the end of it.

We were wrong.

Continue Reading All Was Not Lost: Fifth Circuit Issues En Banc Decision Reversing Panel’s Earlier Remand Ruling in Flagg v. Stryker Corp.

Last week, the Judge in the Biomet hip implant MDL denied a plaintiff’s motion for remand, upholding Biomet’s fraudulent joinder argument based on Maryland’s “sealed container doctrine.”  Laughlin v. Biomet, Inc., 2016 WL 626514 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2016).  The plaintiff made defect claims against not only Biomet, Inc., the manufacturer, but also the local distributor of the device.  The purpose was clear.  The local distributor, like the plaintiff, was a Maryland citizen, and so its presence as a defendant would defeat diversity and prevent removal to federal court.

But distributors in Maryland have a defense to product liability claims under Maryland’s sealed container doctrine if they received the product in a sealed container, did not know and could not reasonably have known of the defect, and did not manufacture, design or alter the product.  Id. at *2 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Roc. §5-405(b)).  So, when Biomet removed the case to federal court, it submitted a declaration from the distributor with testimony establishing all these elements of the sealed container doctrine.  Id. at *3.  And that was enough.

Continue Reading Biomet Hip Implant MDL Judge Upholds Fraudulent Joinder Removal Based on Sealed Container Doctrine

Back in September, we reported on Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 801 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015), which reversed a nearly ten-year trend in Louisiana product liability litigation recognizing diversity jurisdiction where plaintiffs improperly sued in-state medical malpractice defendants in violation of Louisiana’s medical review board pre-submission requirement.

Literally hundreds of cases have been removed on this basis, and the law seemed so settled in favor of the defense position that many plaintiffs (including in Flagg) had stopped fighting removal.  All of these cases were potentially subject to nullification for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Well, not so fast.  On November 5, 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted en banc review.  Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 805 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2015).  Here are copies of the defendant’s supplemental brief in support of en banc affirmance, and of the amicus brief filed by PLAC in support of the defendant’s position –  both filed earlier this month.

This kind of issue is rarely appealed, yet alone decided by an en banc court of appeals.  The result thus is likely to be very influential.  Here’s hoping an ultimately favorable outcome to this long-running dispute.