Not too long ago, our search keyed to Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019), picked up the following article in Trial Magazine: Abaray & Harman, “Navigating Preemption After Merck,” 56 Trial 20 (Jan. 2020). For anybody who doesn’t know, Trial is the house organ of the American
Search results for: avandia
Stygian Depths − The Bottom Ten Worst Prescription Drug/Medical Device Decisions of 2019
You know it’s coming. It’s unavoidable, but necessary. We don’t like it any more than you do, but it’s that time of year. Time to recapitulate the worst punishments that the denizens of the you-know-where tort Tartari have inflicted upon our clients and us in 2019. Every year we contemplate our Sisyphean labors facing the…
Guest Post – Paint It Black: The Ninth Circuit OKs RICO Liability For Failure To Warn About Drug Safety Risks
Today’s guest post, about a bottom-ten RICO third-party payor action from (no surprise) the Ninth Circuit, is by long-time friend of the blog (and blogger in his own right), Jonah M. Knobler, of Patterson Belknap. We named one similar case, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d…
On The Receiving End
We’ve used the phrase “one-two punch” before in the blog to describe a pair of legal decisions concerning the same product. Usually, our clients have been on the winning side, but that’s not always true, particularly in cases coming out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In November, the Pennsylvania appellate courts, in gynecomastia litigation, dealt defendants two…
Learned Intermediary Rule – Back to the Future
By now, the learned intermediary rule is so well established that new opinions addressing core learned intermediary issues, as opposed to applying the rule to specific fact patterns, are relatively uncommon. The last one of those we covered was the Seventh Circuit’s prediction that Wisconsin would adopt the learned intermediary rule, almost a year ago…
Standing Out
Last month we brought you word of an excellent result (preemption) in a ridiculous case − a class action claiming that the drops in eye-drops are too big. That decision was in accord with an earlier decision likewise dismissing such claims on preemption grounds. See Thompson v. Allergan USA, Inc., 993 F. Supp.2d 1007…
Seventh Circuit Curtails RICO Application to Third-Party Payor Off-Label Suits
If you want to insult and annoy someone, consider suing them under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. section 1964. That law is charmingly known as RICO, in an allusion to the big bad in the great 1931 gangster film Little Caesar, played by Edward G. Robinson at his most …
Sham Affidavits
We’re quite familiar with people who say one thing, when they think that’s in their interest, and later when circumstances change, say something quite different. For example, as the late, great Molly Ivins pointed out in “Molly Ivins Can’t Say That, Can She?”, back during the energy crisis of the mid-to-late 1970s, folks down in…
Smoke Screens & Side Shows
We confess, we can’t think of any good reason for admitting evidence concerning product risks that the plaintiff in a particular case never actually encountered – yet plaintiffs try it with a straight face all the time. It’s another example of plaintiffs throwing mud against the wall to see if it will stick; anything to…
Medicare Secondary Payer – A Lot Less Boring Now
We’ve previously written several posts (not recently) on Medicare secondary payer (“MSP”) issues – which we characterized as “boring.” The recent MSP decision, Humana Insurance Co. v. Paris Blank LLP, 2016 WL 2745297, 187 F. Supp.3d 676 (E.D. Va. 2016), is a lot less boring. That’s because of the defendant – a plaintiff-side law firm.
And the law firm lost.
What’s going on? To start with, in addition to the government itself, certain private entities, “Medicare Advantage Organizations” (“MAO”) (abbreviations are ubiquitous in this area) are allowed to bring suits to recover as MSPs (that was what one of our earlier posts was about). The MSP statute is quite broad as to who can be legally liable for not ensuring that Medicare is treated as a secondary payer:
any or all entities that are or were required or responsible (directly, as an insurer or self-insurer, as a third-party administrator, as an employer that sponsors or contributes to a group health plan, or large group health plan, or otherwise) to make payment with respect to the same item or service (or any portion thereof) under a primary plan.
42 U.S.C. §1395y(b)(2)(A)(iii). Recovery in an amount double the actual Medicare outlay is available in litigated cases. Id.
In our neck of the woods (PA & NJ, anyway), a MAO’s ability to sue as if it were the government is already established. In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices, & Products Liability Litigation, 685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012). (We note that our CA blogger would view this issue differently, see Parra v. PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2013)). So the fact that Humana held that an MAO had standing to sue, 2016 WL 2745297, at *4, would not have resulted in this post.
What interests us is the holding that a lawyer and his law firm – thankfully, a plaintiff law firm − can be an “entity” “responsible (directly . . . or otherwise)” for making a MSP payment. The allegations in Humana were not kind to the defendants. They represented a plaintiff in an auto accident. Supposedly, they received a one settlement check made out jointly to it and the plaintiff MAO, but “ultimately deposited the check without [the MAO’s] endorsement.” Id. at *2. Allegedly, certain other settlement checks “from several insurance companies” were also received and deposited, without joint the joint payor issue. Id. All told, the settlements totaled $475,600. Id.Continue Reading Medicare Secondary Payer – A Lot Less Boring Now