Bexis has lots of opinions on what’s wrong with mass-tort (especially drug/device) MDLs.  Heck, Bexis has even proposed amendments to the MDL statutes to correct the many severe problems that exist.  Now, Congress has before it possible statutory changes (not holding our breath) and Civil Rules Committee is looking into the same problems.  Maybe something

We’ve always been against the concept of class action tolling:  that merely by filing a class action – the class action does not have to have any merit – a class action lawyer magically stops the running of the statute of limitations for everybody in the class.  To us, this gives Fed. R. Civ. P.


Our first stint in a law firm was on the transactional side.  Yes, it sounds crazy even to us, but we spent our first 18 months in the profession pulling all-nighters on triple-tier financings of leveraged buyouts, doing clueless due diligence in far-flung back-offices, drafting trust indentures, ‘slugging’ at the printers, and collecting acrylic cubes

We’ve seen the latest affirmance of largely identical verdicts in a consolidated MDL trial in Campbell v. Boston Scientific Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 732371 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018).  We’re not discussing Campbell’s merits today.  For present purposes, suffice it to say that the consolidation- and punitive damages-related rulings aren’t that

This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.

Looking back on the blog, the last time we posted about the Pelvic Mesh MDL was this summer when we lauded a remand judge for not allowing plaintiffs to expand their expert reports to include opinions already excluded by the MDL judge. At that

Risperdal, an antipsychotic drug prescribed to treat serious mental conditions – schizophrenia, manic depression, and autism – allegedly causes some male users to develop abnormal breast tissue growth. Particularly when compared to the consequences of the conditions Risperdal is indicated to treat, that seems like a relatively minor risk.  It isn’t fatal.  It isn’t a

Plaintiff lawyers must be mighty allergic to federal court.  They perform all sorts of maneuvers to avoid CAFA removal of mass actions.  For example, they will artificially subdivide their cases into groups of under 100.  And/or they will disclaim any intent to try the cases together.  Do these circumventions work?  Perhaps most important, since so

Regular readers of this blog know that we have a pretty jaded view of many MDLs. Obviously consolidation makes sense, at least on paper, in terms of efficiency and the best use of scarce court resources.  But, in practice, many MDLs promote a litigation “mob mentality,” in which the merits of individual cases are not important at the outset and, in the world of “settlement inventories” and “mass settlements,” may never draw the scrutiny of the judge or anyone else.   Though we continue to hope that “Lone Pine” orders will burgeon and raise the standards for plaintiffs seeking to fly under the radar and await settlement, many MDLs remain “safe havens” for plaintiffs who can’t satisfy the burden of proving their claims.

And a recent decision from the hip implant MDL does nothing to disturb this reality. In that MDL, a longstanding “Explant Preservation Order” requires preservation of hip implant devices removed from plaintiffs during explant surgeries.  The order requires plaintiffs to “make good faith efforts to ensure that [medical facilities] preserve” explanted devices and provides options for plaintiffs’ counsel to claim devices within 60 days of explant or, in the alternative, for the devices to be sent to the defendants.  It  requires all parties to handle explanted devices in accordance with a written protocol or consistent  with “methods and practices accepted by those in the field of inspection and testing of orthopedic devices,” to notify each other of devices in their possession before the date of the order, and to make devices available to each other after inspection and testing.   All of this, obviously, ensures that the critical evidence in this product liability MDL is preserved and handled in a fair and consistent manner.

In Marquis v. Biomet, Inc., et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28465 (N.D. Ind.  Mar. 1, 2017), the defendants moved for summary judgment against six plaintiffs.  Five of these plaintiffs had had their devices explanted before they filed suit, or after they filed suit but before their cases were transferred into the MDL, and did not know what happened to their devices after they were explanted.  The sixth plaintiff had several revision surgeries.  During the first, the femoral head of her hip implant was replaced, and she asked for the explanted femoral head.   She explained, “I figured I paid for it.  I wanted it.”  She kept the femoral head in her closet, didn’t disclose on her fact sheet that she had kept it, and didn’t tell anyone she had it until her deposition.  The devices explanted during her subsequent surgeries were not preserved.Continue Reading Hip Implant MDL Denies Summary Judgment on Claims of Plaintiffs Who Failed to Preserve Explanted Devices

It is has been a rough few weeks for forum-shopping litigation tourists. We wrote the other day on the Missouri Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, which held that Missouri’s courts do not have jurisdiction over out-of-state controversies involving out-of-state defendants.  It has long been the practice of many plaintiffs’ lawyers to group hundreds of claims together in Missouri state court because they prefer that venue and for the sake of their own convenience.  The Norfolk Southern Railway case should put an end to that.

Another bulwark against litigation tourism is the Class Action Fairness Act, which Congress enacted in 2005 to address abuses in aggregated litigation. Among other provisions, CAFA makes actions combining 100 or more plaintiffs removable to federal court as “mass actions.”  We have written a lot on mass actions, including multiple posts on removing mass actions to federal court even when plaintiffs’ counsel try to break their claims into multiple actions of less than 100 plaintiffs.  A not-too-old post on the topic is here, and you can link from there to numerous others.  The gist is that transparent gamesmanship should not prevent federal courts from retaining jurisdiction over hundreds of plaintiffs bringing coordinated claims, even when plaintiffs’ lawyers go through their usual machinations to avoid it.

That is what happened in Portnoff v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, No. 16-5955, 2017 WL 708745 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2017), and the district court’s order denying the plaintiff’s motion to remand is really interesting.  First some background:  Six plaintiffs’ law firms filed a “Petition to Consolidate and for Mass Tort Designation” in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas requesting consolidation of 87 pending pharmaceutical cases.  They withdrew the petition about two weeks later and filed a second petition in its place. Id. at **2-3.Continue Reading An Intelligent Treatment of “Mass Actions” in Pennsylvania