Not quite a year ago, we prepared a 50-state survey on the status of claims that a foreign corporation’s compliance with a state’s corporate domestication statutes can be “consent” to general personal jurisdiction. This post went along with one of the DDL Blog’s cheat sheets called the “Post-BMS Personal Jurisdiction Cheat Sheet.”

Because Bexis recently filed an amicus brief on this subject in Pennsylvania, in connection with which he had occasion to update the law in this field, particularly as to Pennsylvania’s vexed situation.  Unlike almost every other state in the union, since Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (“Bauman”), Pennsylvania seems to be doubling down on general jurisdiction by consent.  Since everybody else is marching in the other direction, we’ve decided to incorporate a detailed critique of Pennsylvania developments into an updated version of our 50-state survey.  We also wish to recognize, again, Reed Smith attorney Kevin Hara, without whose efforts the original 50-state survey could not have been created.

We start with the century-old Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (“Pa. Fire”).  Although it has yet to address Pa. Fire directly, the Supreme Court requires that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).  In Bauman, the Supreme Court cautioned that “cases decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking should not attract heavy reliance today.” 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.18 (citation omitted). Thus:

Pennsylvania Fire cannot be divorced from the outdated jurisprudential assumptions of its era. The sweeping interpretation . . . [of] a routine registration statute and an accompanying power of attorney that Pennsylvania Fire credited as a general “consent” has yielded to the doctrinal refinement reflected in Goodyear and [Daimler] and the Court’s 21st century approach to general and specific jurisdiction.

Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 2016).  Pa. Fire “represent[s] a disfavored approach to general jurisdiction.” Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 82 (Wis. 2017).  “Pennsylvania Fire has yielded to the two-prong analysis for long-arm jurisdiction set forth in recent decades by the Supreme Court.” Magwitch, LLC v. Pusser’s West Indies, Ltd., 200 So.3d 216, 218 (Fla. App. 2016).

The basic problem with general jurisdiction by consent is that, under the International Shoe approach to personal jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that corporate defendants must be “at home” in order to support a state’s general jurisdiction – not just that they conduct “continuous and substantial” business – far less that they merely register to do business.

Our precedent . . . explains that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not permit a State to hale an out-of-state corporation before its courts when the corporation is not “at home” in the State and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.

BNSF Railway. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017); see Bauman, 571 U.S. at 127 (foreign corporate “affiliations with the State [must be] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)).

The unconstitutionality of a general personal jurisdiction by consent theory, which ignores the Supreme Court’s rigorous “at home” standard for general jurisdiction, is a fortiori from Bauman:

[T]he same global reach would presumably be available in every other State. . . . Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.

571 U.S. at 139 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  “A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”  Id. at 139 n.20.  “[I]n-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction.”  BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.

All 50 states and the District of Columbia have corporate registration laws.  E.g., T. Monestier, “Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, & the Fallacy of Consent,” 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343, 1363-64 n.109 (2015) (collecting all 50 states’ registration statutes).  Thus, if a registration statute could create general jurisdiction – based on “consent” or anything else – in derogation of constitutional standards, interstate corporations could be subjected to general jurisdiction everywhere they conducted business, even if that business is not “continuous and substantial,” and even if they actually conducted no business at all.  No dice.  In Bauman, the Supreme Court specifically rejected, as “unacceptably grasping,” legal theories that “approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.”  571 U.S. at 138 (quotation marks omitted).

Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has not viewed “consent” the way it did in Pa. Fire.  Instead, it dispensed with “the fiction of implied consent to service on the part of a foreign corporation” in favor of “ascertain[ing] what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to local suit.”  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202-03.  Broad notions of “implied” consent are now considered “purely fictional”:

We initially upheld these [corporate registration] laws under the Due Process Clause on grounds that they complied with Pennoyer’s rigid requirement of either “consent,” or “presence.”  As many observed, however, the consent and presence were purely fictional.  Our opinion in International Shoe cast those fictions aside.

Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (citations omitted).

The Court’s most extensive discussion of personal jurisdiction and consent during the International Shoe era is in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (“ICI”), and that discussion entirely omits corporate registration as a recognized form of “consent.”  Rather, the “variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent” recognized in ICI consisted of:

  • “[S]ubmi[ssion] to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance”
  • “[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance”
  • “[A] stipulation entered into by the defendant”
  • “[C]onsent [is] implicit in agreements to arbitrate”
  • “[C]onstructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court [inheres] in the voluntary use of certain state procedures”
  • “[W]aive[r] if not timely raised”
  • “[F]ail[ure] to comply with a pretrial discovery order.”

456 U.S. at 704-06 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Every one of these consent examples has something in common – consent is given on a case-specific basis.  Likewise, the Court discussed consent in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880-81 (2011), and again did not include corporate registration.  Id. at 880-81.  Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has not recognized any form of blanket consent to personal jurisdiction for anything at any time.

Corporate registration statutes are thus conspicuously absent from all recent Supreme Court consideration of personal jurisdiction by consent, and for good reason.  States may not “requir[e] the corporation, as a condition precedent to obtaining a permit to do business within the State, to surrender a right and privilege secured to it by the Constitution.”  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595, 607 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  That would impose an “unconstitutional condition” on the ability of foreign corporations to conduct interstate commerce.  Id. Rather, as the Supreme Court observed in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), for a corporation “to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served” at most “provide[s] a helpful but not a conclusive test” for jurisdiction.  Id. at 445.

Under the current framework for personal jurisdiction, “consent” by registering to do business as a foreign corporation no longer supports general jurisdiction.  “‘Extorted actual consent’ and ‘equally unwilling implied consent’ are not the stuff of due process.”  Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (citation omitted).  At most, corporate registration is one factor in considering specific “case-linked” personal jurisdiction under the framework discussed in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).

A large and growing body of law exists on the concept of jurisdiction by consent.  We have a constantly updated cheat sheet collecting the favorable cases here.  Even before Bauman was decided, 28 states already had precedent holding that general personal jurisdiction could not be predicated solely on compliance with the state’s corporate domestication statute.  The highest courts in California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have rejected such arguments, with eight of those occurring post-Bauman.  Thus, in the four years since the Supreme Court decided Bauman, all eight state high courts to address the issue have unanimously concluded that compliance with corporate registration statutes cannot, without (much) more, satisfy the strict standard for general personal jurisdiction, whether or not called “consent.”

We count only four states (Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania – with Pennsylvania being the most notorious), along with Puerto Rico, that currently still subscribe to the “fiction” of corporate registration as a form of “consent.”  All four of these states are in circuits that issued wayward general jurisdiction by consent decisions over two decades before Bauman.  See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Minnesota law).  The outcome is unclear in four other states (Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Wyoming).  Overall, the vast majority of states – 42 (plus DC and VI) – have precedent rejecting the proposition that a nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction simply by registering to conduct business.

Further, the trend away from general jurisdiction by consent has accelerated since Bauman.  Our cheat sheet, here, shows an increasing number of decisions across the country against subjecting a nonresident corporate defendant to a state’s general jurisdiction simply due to its registration to conduct business.  While the Supreme Court has yet to issue the final verdict, the legal tide is moving in the right direction with ever more courts rejecting this “back‐door thief” of a theory that would “rob [Bauman] of meaning.” Brown, 814 F.3d 640.

Alabama

The relevant Alabama statute, Ala. Code §10A-1-5.31, does not mention personal jurisdiction at all.  In Beasley v. Providence Hospital, 2018 WL 2994380 (S.D. Ala. June 13, 2018), the court decisively rejected general jurisdiction by consent:

The plaintiff argues that [defendant] is subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama because it is licensed to do business in Alabama and has a registered agent for service of process in Alabama. The plaintiff cites no authority even remotely supporting the proposition that such modest activity could support the exercise of general jurisdiction, and plainly it does not. A corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business will be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State only in exceptional cases. It would be difficult to imagine a less exceptional circumstance than the unremarkable commonplace of an entity registering to do business in a foreign state or appointing an agent for service of process there.

Id. at *3 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Another post-Bauman Alabama case likewise holds that being “registered to do business in Alabama . . . alone is insufficient for the court to exercise general jurisdiction.”  Roper v. CNU of Alabama, 2017 WL 3334876, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2017).  These decisions are more persuasive than the pre-Bauman decision in Johnston v. Foster-Wheeler Constructors, Inc., stating that corporate registration “suggests that Defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with Alabama.”  158 F.R.D. 496, 501-02 (M.D. Ala. 1994).  Johnston ultimately decided jurisdiction on a minimum contacts analysis involving more than registration.  Id.  The precedent in Alabama has moved in the right direction.

Alaska

Alaska’s registration statute provides no guidance on in this issue, and the cases are mostly unhelpful.  A relatively old decision, Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1965), indicated that a prior version of the registration statute did not “purport to define those activities which may subject a foreign corporation” to the jurisdiction of Alaska courts.  Id. at 424.  The language is dictum, and it’s old, but particularly given the overall trend of the law, corporate registration alone is not likely to suffice for general personal jurisdiction in Alaska.

Arizona

In Arizona, a post-Bauman intermediate appellate decision held:

[T]he statutes do not create general jurisdiction by implied consent. A corporation cannot fairly be deemed to have consented to waive its due process rights when, as here, the statutes give no notice that such a waiver is the price of registration. . . . We acknowledge that some recent decisions still hold that consent to service of process is consent to general personal jurisdiction. . . .  We are not persuaded by those decisions.

*          *          *          *

Because the modern doctrine of specific jurisdiction amply ensures that a state has jurisdiction when a corporation’s conduct allegedly causes harm in that state, there is no need to base personal jurisdiction solely upon a murky implication of consent to suit—for all purposes and in all cases—from the bare appointment of an agent for service. We therefore agree with those decisions holding that registration statutes do not imply consent to general jurisdiction.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lemaire, 395 P.3d 1116, 1119-20 (Ariz. App. 2017) (citations omitted).

Lemaire distinguished a prior decision, Bohreer v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 165 P.3d 186, 187-92 (Ariz. App. 2007), as based on an insurance statute.  395 P.3d at 1118.  Bohreer had “agree[d]” with now overruled (see Delaware) Sternberg decision.  165 P.3d at 192.  Arizona federal courts agree with Lemaire.  Humphries v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2018 WL 1510441, at *3 (D. Ariz. March 27, 2018) (“categorical assertion of general jurisdiction where the corporation complies with a state’s registration and appointment laws would essentially contradict [Bauman] and BNSF’s limitation of general jurisdiction”); Harter v. Ascension Health, 2018 WL 496911, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2018) (registration to do business merely a “relevant factor” for specific jurisdiction; not determinative of general jurisdiction).  Cf. EZScreenPrint LLC v. SmallDog Prints LLC, 2018 WL 3729745 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2018) (registration of domain name with Arizona company does not create general jurisdiction).  Arizona is now solidly behind the general consensus rejecting general jurisdiction by consent.

Arkansas

The Arkansas Code explicitly provides that “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”  Ark. Code Ann. §4-20-115.  See also Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 1983) (appointment of an agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction) (applying Arkansas law); Antoon v. Securus Technologies, Inc., 2017 WL 2124466, at *3 (W.D. Ark. May 15, 2017) (rejecting argument “that every single foreign corporation who lawfully conducts business within the state of Arkansas consents thereby to the exercise of general jurisdiction”); but see Basham v. American National County Mutual Insurance Co., 2015 WL 1034186, at *4 (W.D. Ark. March 10, 2015) (allowing general jurisdiction by consent under a less specific insurance statute under Knowlton (see Minnesota).  Except maybe as to insurance companies, Arkansas seems solid against general jurisdiction by consent.

California

The California Supreme Court’s now-reversed BMS decision also shot down, under Bauman, corporate registration as a basis for general personal jurisdiction (not at issue in the United States Supreme Court).  “[A] corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process, when required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to its California transactions.”  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 884 (Cal. 2016), reversed on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).  See also Thomson v. Anderson, 6 Cal. Rptr.3d 262, 269 (Cal. App. 2003) (rejecting corporate registration as a separate basis for personal jurisdiction); DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 683, 694 (Cal. App. 2002) (“designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business in California alone are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction”); Gray Line Tours v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (Cal. App. 1987) (“it cannot be said [defendant] consented to the exercise of jurisdiction for all purposes when it appointed” an agent for service of process); Am Trust v. UBS AG, 681 F. Appx. 587, 589 (9th Cir. 2017) (“consent to general personal jurisdiction” not created by registering to do business) (applying California law); In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, 2018 WL 827958, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (“under California law, it is not enough that [defendant] maintains a California agent for service of process and has registered to do business in California”); Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Hume Lake Christian Camps, Inc., 2018 WL 280025, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018) (no general jurisdiction despite registration to do business in California); L.A. Gem & Jewelry Design, Inc. v. Ecommerce Innovations, LLC, 2017 WL 1535084, at *5 (C.D. Cal. April 27, 2017) (“Designation of an agent for service of process in California, alone, is not enough to show general jurisdiction.”); Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix International, LLC, 198 F. Supp.3d 1127, 1136-37 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (no general personal jurisdiction despite defendant registered to do business in California); American Insurance Co. v. R&Q Reinsurance Co., 2016 WL 5930589, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (same); Angelini Metal Works Co. v. Hubbard Iron Doors, Inc., 2016 WL 6304476, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016) (same); Freeney v. Bank of America Corp., 2015 WL 12535021, at *41 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2015) (rejecting general jurisdiction based on registration or appointment of agent for service of process); Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 2015 WL 12658485, at *4 (S.D. Cal. April 8, 2015) (no general personal jurisdiction despite defendant registered to do business in California); Overhill Farms Inc. v. West Liberty Foods LLC, 2014 WL 4180920, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (“while it is relevant that Defendant may be registered to do business and has designated an agent for service of process in California, these acts alone are insufficient to support a finding of general jurisdiction”).  There is no doubt that California rejects general jurisdiction by consent.

Colorado

After Bauman, the Colorado Supreme Court held that, although a defendant foreign corporation “ha[d] a registered agent in Colorado,” corporate registration cannot support general jurisdiction where a defendant’s in-state contacts “pale in comparison to the significant contacts that were deemed ‘slim’ in [Bauman].”  Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 379 P.3d 1033, 1038-39 (Colo. 2016); accord Allied Carriers Exchange, Inc. v. All. Shippers, Inc., 1999 WL 35363796, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 1999) (“appointment of a registered agent . . . alone cannot reasonably be characterized as purposeful, continuous, and systematic” so as to create general jurisdiction).

Magill thus nullified the unfavorable pre-Bauman dictum in Packaging Store, Inc. v. Leung, 917 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. App. 1996).  Colorado is also solid.

Connecticut

The Second Circuit, in Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp.3d 390, 397 (D. Conn. May 14, 2014)), refused to “err in casually dismissing related federal due process concerns” raised by a plaintiff’s assertion of general jurisdiction based on the Connecticut corporate registration statute.  Such jurisdiction, if conferred by corporate registration statutes, created the same constitutional concerns decided by the Supreme Court in [Bauman]:

In any event, we can say that the analysis that now governs general jurisdiction over foreign corporations − the Supreme Court’s . . . more demanding “essentially at home” test . . . − suggests that federal due process rights likely constrain an interpretation that transforms a run‐of‐the‐mill registration and appointment statute into a corporate “consent” − perhaps unwitting − to the exercise of general jurisdiction by state courts.

Id. (footnote omitted).  The plaintiff’s arguments in Brown sought to entice courts to act as “back door thieves” and rob corporate defendants of the Due Process to which [Bauman] has mandated they be given:

If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in state agent – without an express consent to general jurisdiction – nonetheless sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and [Bauman]’s ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back‐door thief.

Id. at 640.

Pre-Bauman state court cases were split, compare Talenti v. Morgan & Brother Manhattan Storage Co., 968 A.2d 933, 941 (Conn. App. 2009) (finding consent); Lake Road Trust, LTD. v. ABB, Inc., 2011 WL 1734458, at *6 (Conn. Super. April 11, 2011) (same); with WorldCare Corp. v. World Insurance Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 341, 351-57 (D. Conn. 2011) (“[I]t seems counterintuitive to allow general jurisdiction to rest simply on mandatory registration requirements.  Even if registering corporations are fully apprised of the jurisdictional implications of registration, and manifest express consent to general jurisdiction, it threatens to place them in the impossible position of virtually universal jurisdiction.”) (following Wenche Siemer, see Texas).  In light of Brown, it would be unusual for Connecticut state courts to follow a contrary path.

Delaware

Prior to Bauman, Delaware – “home” to more corporations than any other state − had interpreted its corporate registration statute to impose general jurisdiction – solely on the basis of a foreign corporation’s registration to do business.  See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).  No longer. In Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016), Delaware’s highest court overruled Sternberg and recognized that predicating general jurisdiction on a foreign corporation’s registration to do business is incompatible with Bauman:

An incentive scheme where every state can claim general jurisdiction over every business that does any business within its borders for any claim would reduce the certainty of the law and subject businesses to capricious litigation treatment as a cost of operating on a national scale or entering any state’s market.  [Bauman] makes plain that it is inconsistent with principles of due process to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that is not “essentially at home” in a state for claims having no rational connection to the state. . . .  Hence, Delaware cannot exercise general jurisdiction over it consistent with principles of due process.

137 A.3d at 127-28 (footnote omitted).

Human experience shows that “grasping” behavior by one, can lead to grasping behavior by everyone, to the collective detriment of the common good.  It is one thing for every state to be able to exercise personal jurisdiction in situations when corporations face causes of action arising out of specific contacts in those states; it is another for every major corporation to be subject to the general jurisdiction of all fifty states.  Theoretically, under the [plaintiffs’] position, major Delaware public corporations with national markets could be sued . . . in any state in the nation because the corporations have had to register to do business in every state.  And in fact, many post-[Bauman] decisions involved situations where plaintiffs sought to subject a Delaware corporation to the general jurisdiction of a state that had no relation to the cause of action and was not the corporation‘s principal place of business.  [Bauman] rejected the notion that a corporation that does business in many states can be subject to general jurisdiction in all of them. Under a sensible goose-and-gander approach, Delaware should be prudent and proportionate in exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations.

Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted).

Cepec construed Delaware’s registration statute “as requiring a foreign corporation to allow service of process to be made upon it in a convenient way in proper cases, but not as a consent to general jurisdiction,” in accordance with Bauman and “common sense.”  Id. at 142-43 . See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D. Del. 2014) (“In light of the holding in [Bauman], the court finds that [defendant’s] compliance with Delaware’s registration statutes − mandatory for doing business within the state − cannot constitute consent to jurisdiction.”), aff’d on other grounds, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  Cepec thus eliminated the contrary jurisdictional decision in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp.3d 572, 583-84 (D. Del. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and places Delaware squarely in the majority rejecting general jurisdiction by consent.

District of Columbia

The current District of Columbia statute provides that “[t]he designation or maintenance in the District of a registered agent shall not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction.”  D.C. Code §29-104.02 (2013).  See Freedman v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 139 F. Supp.3d 271, 279-80 (D.D.C. 2015) (general jurisdiction based on registration and agent for service of process “explicitly foreclose[d]” by Bauman because it would subject defendant to jurisdiction in multiple fora; prior precedent no longer valid); Kuennen v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL 5873277, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 30, 2013) (a defendant’s “business certificate and appointed agent . . . are not independent support for general jurisdiction − the principles of due process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication statutes”) (applying District of Columbia law).  Under a prior statute, In re FTC Corp. Patterns Report Litigation, 432 F. Supp. 274, 286 (D.D.C. 1977), allowed mere service on a registered agent to invoke general jurisdiction, although modern terminology was not used.  Under the current D.C. statute, that can’t happen, and the District rejects general jurisdiction by consent.

Florida

Since Bauman, Florida district courts of appeals have twice rejected general jurisdiction by consent.  Woodruff-Sawyer & Co. v. Ghilotti, ___ So.3d ___, 2018 WL 4100386 (Fla. App. Aug. 29, 2018), held that general jurisdiction is “not appropriate” under Bauman “without more” than corporate registration and agent for service of process.  Id. at *4.  In Magwitch, LLC v. Pusser’s West Indies Ltd., 200 So. 3d 216 (Fla. App. 2016), the court was “not persuaded” that registration to business was a basis for general personal jurisdiction, holding that “Pennsylvania Fire has yielded to the two-prong analysis for long-arm jurisdiction set forth in recent decades by the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 218.  Accord Rizack v. Signature Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 5197917, at *3-4 (Fla. Cir. March 20, 2017) (“personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant cannot be found on the basis of a defendant’s registration to do business in the state and designation of a corporate agent alone”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Goldstein v Hawker Beechcraft Services, 2016 WL 3771165, at *7 (Fla. Cir. June 3, 2016) (that defendant “file[d] with the Florida Department of State for the privilege of conducting such business here,” even with other in-state contacts, insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction).

Likewise, federal courts both pre- and post-Bauman have repeatedly refused to rule that registration and appointment of an agent for service is a valid basis for general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  See, e.g., Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1319 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2018) (“we reject the exercise of general personal jurisdiction based on such implied consent”; “an overly broad interpretation of [a state] registration scheme as providing consent might be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in” Bauman) (applying Florida law); Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have rejected the argument that appointing a registered agent is sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a corporation”) (applying Florida law); Storms v. Haugland Energy Group, LLC, 2018 WL 4347603, at *7 (Mag. S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2018) (“that the Defendant has a Registered Agent does not create general personal jurisdiction”), adopted, 2018 WL 4347604 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018); Howe v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 2018 WL 2212982, at *4-5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2018) (“[T]he requirement to designate a registered agent is not intended to – and in any event under the Due Process Clause could not – subject a corporation to an action over which a state’s courts cannot properly exercise jurisdiction. Were it otherwise, the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing limits on personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations would be nearly meaningless.”); Hinkle v. Continental Motors, Inc., 2017 WL 3333120, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2017) (being “registered to do business here . . . alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction”); PHD@Western, LLC v. Rudolf Construction Partners, LLC, 2016 WL 5661637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2016) (“merely registering to do business in a state is not a sufficient basis to establish the minimum contacts necessary for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant”); Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 7655398, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2016) (consent through registration does not warrant “exercise of jurisdiction [because it fails to] . . . satisfy the Due Process Clause”); Evans v. Andy & Evan Industries, Inc., 2016 WL 8787062, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (registration to do business, even with other contacts, insufficient to support general jurisdiction); Royal Acquisitions 001, LLC v. Ansur America Insurance Co., 2015 WL 1437689, at *4 (S.D. Fla. March 27, 2015) (registration to do business and appointment of a registered agent “are not so continuous and systematic as to render Defendant essentially at home”); Recao v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 2014 WL 12595302, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2014) (rejecting both registration and agent for service as basis for general jurisdiction); Mio, LLC v. Valentino’s, Inc., 2013 WL 3364392, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (an “agent to accept service of process . . ., standing alone, does not meet the general jurisdiction requirement”); Keston v. FirstCollect, Inc., 523 F. Supp.2d 1348, 1354 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2007) (“presence of a corporate agent within the State, service on that agent, and a license to do business in the State are not enough to support my personal jurisdiction . . . where the cause of action is not related to these contacts”); In re Farmland Industries, Inc., 2007 WL 7694308, at *12 (M.D. Fla. March 30, 2007) (“agree[ing] with those cases holding that registering to do business and appointing a registered agent in the state of Florida, without more, does not subject a foreign corporation to the general personal jurisdiction of the state for any and all unrelated actions”); Sofrar, S.A. v. Graham Engineering Corp., 35 F. Supp.2d 919, 919 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant cannot be found on the basis of a defendant’s registration to do business in the state and designation of a corporate agent alone”).  Florida looks solid.

Georgia

Georgia’s registration statute, Ga. Code §14-2-1501, provides no indication that registration affects jurisdiction one way or another; nor are there relevant state cases. However, in Orafol Americas, Inc. v. DBi Services, LLC, 2017 WL 3473217 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2017), the court held:

Plaintiff notes that [defendant] is registered to do business in Georgia, and has a registered agent in the State.  Additionally, [defendant] has actually engaged in business in Georgia. . . .  But these contacts are woefully insufficient to render [defendant] “at home” in Georgia.  Every company that does any business in Georgia must register with the State and maintain a registered agent.  Just because a company does some small amount of business in Georgia does not mean that due process will allow that company to be sued in Georgia for acts that occurred outside the State.

Id. at *3.

Prior to Bauman, no relevant Georgia appellate authority existed, and two Georgia federal district courts had decided the issue inconsistently.  In Moore v. McKibbon Brothers, 41 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1998), corporate registration was simply one factor of a minimum contact analysis, rather than as consent to jurisdiction in and of itself.  Id. at 1354 (“courts that have considered the issue have rejected the notion that appointing a registered agent in and of itself satisfies the minimum contacts requirement”).  Contrarily, Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. Universal Const. Co., 571 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1983), upheld general jurisdiction based on registration to do business as consent, relying on Pennoyer-era decisions, and based largely on defendant’s failure to support its opposition to jurisdiction with any evidence.  Id. at 488.  Thus, while Georgia law used to be muddled, after Bauman, it appears headed in the right direction.

Hawai’i

Hawai’i’s registration statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. §414-437, is silent as to jurisdiction.  But another statute states, “appointment or maintenance of a registered agent in the State does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in the State.”  Haw. Rev. Stat. §425R-12.  The one on point decision by a Hawai’i court found that language-controlling.  In Bralich v. Sullivan, 2018 WL 1938297 (D. Haw. April 23, 2018), the court rejected corporate registration as a basis for general personal jurisdiction:

Plaintiff has pointed to no Hawaii statute, nor has the Court been able to locate one, requiring such consent as a condition of registering to do business in Hawaii. Indeed, Hawaii specifically provides that “[t]he appointment or maintenance of a registered agent in the State does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in the State.” As such, regardless of whether [defendants] ha[ve] a registered agent in Hawaii, the existence of such agent alone appears insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

Id. at *4 (quoting §425R) (footnote omitted).  So Hawai’i looks favorable.

Idaho

Idaho’s statute provides that “designation or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”  Idaho Code §30-21-414.  A federal district court similarly ruled that the presence of a registered agent alone is insufficient for general jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation.  Strickland v. Bae Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems, LP, 2013 WL 2554671 (D. Idaho June 10, 2013) (“the fact that both corporations have registered agents in Idaho, standing alone, is not enough to establish general jurisdiction over the corporations”).  We should be all right in Idaho.

Illinois

Following Bauman, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440 (Ill. 2017), denied that mere corporate registration creates general jurisdiction:

[T]hat a foreign corporation registered to do business in Illinois is subject to the same duties as a domestic one in no way suggests that the foreign corporation has consented to general jurisdiction. . . . [T]hat a foreign corporation has registered to do business under the Act does not mean that the corporation has thereby consented to general jurisdiction over all causes of action, including those that are completely unrelated to the corporation’s activities in Illinois.

Id. at 447-48.  We discussed Aspen, here.  Accord Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc., 105 N.E.3d 984, 993 (Ill. App. 2018) (“Nor does the fact that [defendant] has a registered agent for service of process in Illinois show that it consented to jurisdiction in this State”); Jeffs v. Ford Motor Co., 2018 WL 3466965, at *3 (Ill. App. July 12, 2018) (“any argument that registering under the Act and maintaining an agent amounts to consent or waiver of jurisdiction fails under Aspen”); Alderson v. Southern Co., 747 N.E.2d 926, 944 (Ill. App. 2001) (“designation of an Illinois registered agent is not an independently determinative factor” in jurisdictional analysis).

Illinois federal courts, particularly since Bauman, have held that consent by registration is not a proper exercise of general jurisdiction.  See Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 2018 WL 1784126, at *4 (N.D. Ill. April 13, 2018) (“Nor does the presence in the forum State of an agent authorized to receive corporate correspondence” allow general personal jurisdiction); Perry v. JMT Capital Management, LLC, 2018 WL 1635855, at *3 (N.D. Ill. April 5, 2018) (“That defendant is authorized to conduct business in Illinois and maintains a registered agent in the State is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction.”); MG Design Assocs. Corp. v. CoStar Realty Information, Inc., 267 F. Supp.3d 1000, 1014-15 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“registering to do business is not enough to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation”); Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp.3d 909, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (registration to do business insufficient to support general jurisdiction); Congdon v. Cheapcaribbean.com, Inc., 2017 WL 5069960, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2017) (“it has long been held that registering to do business in a state, ‘standing alone,’ cannot satisfy due process required to assert personal jurisdiction”); Muenstermann v. United States, 2017 WL 1408037, at *2 (S.D. Ill. April 20, 2017) (corporate registration/agent for service of process “do not constitute the type of continuance and systematic affiliations” required to support general jurisdiction; pre-Bauman contrary precedent is no longer applicable); Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp.3d 734, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“under Illinois law, the appointment of a registered agent is not determinative in the personal jurisdiction analysis”), aff’d, 852 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2017); Perez v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 2016 WL 7049153, at *6-9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016) (“registering to do business or maintaining a registered agent is not enough to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation”); Johnson v. Barrier, 2016 WL 3520157 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2016) (dismissing action; defendant’s consent to jurisdiction in previous cases not judicial estoppel); Demaria v. Nissan, Inc., 2016 WL 374145, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2016) (registration does not render corporation “at home” under Bauman); Dimitrov v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2015 WL 9304490, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2015) (applying “lessons of Daimler”; no general jurisdiction over foreign corporation simply because it was registered to do business in Illinois); Surita v. AM General LLC, 2015 WL 12826471, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2015) (plaintiff’s “desire for this Court to exercise ‘all-purpose jurisdiction’ over [defendant] based on the presence of its registered agent in Illinois and [its] registration to do business in Illinois is unavailing, especially in light of” Bauman); Rozumek v. Union Carbide Corp., 2015 WL 12831301, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 1, 2015) (registration to do business does not create general jurisdiction under Bauman); Rozumek v. General Electric Co., 2015 WL 12829795, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 1, 2015) (same); Shrum v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 6888446, at *2, *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014) (“maintenance of an agent for the service of process does not rise to the level of ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts”); Sullivan v. Sony Music Entertainment, 2014 WL 5473142, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2014) (corporate registration could not satisfy Bauman general jurisdiction standard); Rawlins v. Select Specialty Hospital, 2014 WL 1647182, at *5 (N.D. Ill. April 23, 2014) (“the mere presence of one individual in Illinois to accept process does not rise to the level of ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts needed for the court to exercise general jurisdiction”).  Before Bauman, see: ACUITY v. Roadtec, Inc., 2013 WL 6632631, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013) (registration to do business does not create general jurisdiction); Bray v. Fresenius Medical Care Aktiengesellschaft Inc., 2007 WL 7366260, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2007) (corporate registration “does not demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts to merit general personal jurisdiction”).  Illinois is rock solid in its rejection of general jurisdiction by consent.

Indiana

Indiana courts, even prior to Bauman, rejected general jurisdiction based only on a foreign corporation’s consent by registering to do business.  Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing consent-by-registration and holding that “ordinarily, registration, standing alone, will not satisfy due process”) (applying Indiana law); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F. Supp.2d 883, 895 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (following Wilson).  Since Bauman, that trend has only accelerated.  United States Bank National Ass’n v. Bank of America, N.A., 2016 WL 5118298, at *7-8 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016) (defendant “had not waived its right to object to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in Indiana and designating an agent for service of process in Indiana”) (applying Indiana law); Garcia v. LQ Properties, Inc., 2016 WL 3384644, at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 20, 2016) (registration to do business, even with other contacts, insufficient to support general jurisdiction); United States Bank National Ass’n v. Bank of America, N.A., 2015 WL 5971126, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2015) (“Merely registering to do business in Indiana, though a necessary precursor to engaging in business activities in the state, does not establish personal jurisdiction over a corporation.”); NExTT Solutions, LLC v. XOS Technologies, Inc., 71 F. Supp.3d 857, 864-66 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (registration to do business, even with additional in-state contacts, “failed to make a prima facie showing that general jurisdiction can be asserted”; otherwise “the ‘at home’ requirement . . . would be virtually meaningless”). We have no problems in Indiana.

Iowa

A post-Bauman Iowa federal district court allowed general jurisdiction via consent.  Spanier v. American Pop Corn Co., 2016 WL 1465400 (N.D. Iowa April 14, 2016).  The court considered itself bound by the adverse, pre-Bauman Knowlton decision (see Minnesota). 2016 WL 1465400, at *4 (consent by registration was a valid “means of exercising general jurisdiction” under Knowlton, which held “that consent by registration is a sufficient condition for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, which does not require a due process analysis”).  See also Daughetee v. CHR Hansen, Inc., 2011 WL 1113868, at *7 (N.D. Iowa March 25, 2011) (following Knowlton).  Right now, Iowa is in the pro-consent minority.

Kansas

Kansas is seriously murky.  In a pre-Bauman decision the Supreme Court of Kansas held that registration is sufficient to establish general jurisdiction by consent.  Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 171, 177 (Kan. 2006).  Merriman found the Delaware decision in Sternberg “persuasive,” id. at 176, but since then the Delaware Supreme Court overruled Sternberg in light of Bauman, (see Delaware).  Along those lines, a recent Kansas intermediate appellate court ruled that registration alone is insufficient for general jurisdiction.  Kearns v. New York Community Bank, 400 P.3d 182 (table), 2017 WL 1148418, at *6 (Kan. App. March 24, 2017).  Federal courts, post-Bauman, are split.  In In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation, the court recognized that “a state has no legitimate interest in hosting litigation between two out-of-state parties that does not arise from either parties’ activities in the state.” 2016 WL 2866166, at *6 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016).  However, Syngenta ultimately based its jurisdictional ruling on the Dormant Commerce Clause rather than Due Process.  Id. at *5-6.  Conversely, other Kansas district courts continue to allow general jurisdiction by consent.  AK Steel Corp. v. PAC Operating Ltd. Partnership, 2017 WL 3314294, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2017) (Kansas will continue to follow Pa. Fire unless expressly overruled); Snyder Insurance Services. v. Sohn, 2016 WL 6996265, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 2016) (defendant “consented to general personal jurisdiction by its registration to do business in Kansas”); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation, 2016 WL 1047996, at *1-3 (D. Kan. March 11, 2016) (court “not prepared” to conclude that Bauman impliedly overruled Pa. Fire).

Kentucky

The issue of consent-based jurisdiction through registration to do business or designation of an agent is uncertain in Kentucky, because the statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14A.4-010, provides no guidance, and no relevant cases have addressed this topic.  This absence of precedent may arise from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s limitation the Commonwealth’s Long-Arm statute (which does not extend to maximum constitutional due process limits) so that “even when the defendant’s conduct and activities fall within one of the enumerated [Kentucky-related] categories, the plaintiff’s claim still must ‘arise’ from that conduct or activity.”  Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Ky. 2011), a standard that seems to permit only specific jurisdiction.  Due to utter lack of precedent, we’re leaving Kentucky in the uncertain category.

Louisiana

Louisiana state and federal courts, both before and after Bauman, have rejected general jurisdiction on a consent by registration basis.  In Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 717 F. Appx. 394 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying Louisiana law), the court rejected the plaintiff’s “outdated view[s] of general jurisdiction,” holding instead that “Louisiana law . . . does not require a foreign entity to consent to jurisdiction as a condition of doing business in the state.”  Id. at 398.  See also Mark Doyle Construction, LLC v. TriHM Foundation, LLC, 2018 WL 3763014, at *8 (W.D. La. Aug. 8, 2018) (“without more, the appointment of an agent for service of process and the registration to do business within the state, does not satisfy the criteria to exercise general jurisdiction”); Firefighters’ Retirement System v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 2017 WL 3381227, at *4 n.41 (M.D. La. Aug. 4, 2017) (“being registered as a foreign corporation with the Louisiana Secretary of State’s office is not enough to establish general personal jurisdiction”); Nationwide Signs, LLC v. National Signs, LLC, 2017 WL 2911577, at *3 (E.D. La. July 7, 2017) (“the presence of a registered agent and registered business office is insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction”); Mercury Rents, Inc. v. Crenshaw Enterprises Ltd., 2017 WL 2382483, at *1-2 (W.D. La. May 30, 2017) (“registering to do business in a forum State does not establish general jurisdiction”); J.A.H. Enterprises, Inc. v. BLH Equipment, LLC, 2016 WL 7015688, at *4 (Mag. M.D. La. Oct. 24, 2016) (“Maintaining a license in a state does not necessarily mean that the state has general jurisdiction over the licensed individual.”), adopted, 2016 WL 7031288 (M.D. La. Nov. 30, 2016); Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 2016 WL 4939113, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (“that an entity is registered to do business in a forum State and maintains an agent for service of process in a forum State is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”); Sciortino v. CMG Capital Management Group., Inc., 2016 WL 4799099, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (state registration to sell securities does not support general jurisdiction); Firefighters’ Retirement System v. Royal Bank of Scotland, PLC, 2016 WL 1254366, at *5 (M.D. La. March 29, 2016) (“Fifth Circuit precedent has consistently held that being qualified to do business in a state and the appointment of a registered agent for service alone cannot support the exercise of general jurisdiction. Such precedent is further strengthened post-[Bauman].”); Long v. Patton Hospitality Management, LLC, 2016 WL 760780, at *4-6 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2016) (contacts including registering to do business and maintaining a registered agent for service insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction); Louisiana Limestone & Logistics, LLC v. Granite Group, 2014 WL 1217956, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 28, 2014) (“[Plaintiff] contends that this Court may exercise general jurisdiction over [defendant] because [defendant] registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State. . . .   However, [plaintiff’s] position is not consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent holding that the presence of the registered agent and registered business office alone is insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.”); Crochet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 489204, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 13, 2012) (no jurisdiction where a defendant’s “only contacts with Louisiana are its registration with the Louisiana Secretary of State to do business and its appointment of an agent for service of process”); DNH, LLC v. In-N-Out Burgers, 381 F .Supp.2d 559, 565 (E.D. La. 2005) (“Qualifying to do business in a state and appointing an agent for service of process there do not . . . sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction”); Lyons v. Swift Transportation Co., 2001 WL 1153001, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2001) (“regardless of the existence of an agent for service of process, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must nevertheless comport with the principles of due process”); Jones v. Family Inns of America, 1989 WL 57130, at *1 (E.D. La. May 23, 1989) (“[a]s the defendant’s sole contact with the State of Louisiana is an appointed agent for service of process, the defendant’s contact does not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe”).  See also Taylor v. Arellano, 928 So.2d 55, 58-60 (La. App. 2005) (nonresident corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction based on designation of agent for service, because there was not sufficient contact to satisfy due process, and narrowly construing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd. Partnership, 634 So.2d 1186, 1187 (La. 1994), which contained dicta that could be read as supportive of general jurisdiction through consent).  We should do all right in Louisiana.

Maine

Maine’s registration statute provides that “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this State of a clerk or registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction” in Maine courts.  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §115 (2013).  In Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Maine law), the defendant’s being licensed to do business in Maine and having an agent for service of process were neither “actually doing business” nor “continuous and substantial” business activity that would allow general personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 89.  Down East looks solid.

Maryland

Maryland’s statutory framework eliminates consent through registration as a basis for general jurisdiction.  See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns §7-101 (“[w]ith respect to any cause of action on which a foreign corporation would not otherwise be subject to suit in this State, compliance with [the registration statute]” neither renders a foreign corporation “subject to suit” nor is considered “consent by it to be sued” in Maryland.).  Well before Bauman, the Maryland Court of Appeals accordingly rejected general jurisdiction for merely registering to do business and appointing a service agent.  See Republic Properties Corp. v. Mission West Properties, LP, 895 A.2d 1006, 1022 (Md. 2006) (“service of process, in Maryland, upon a resident agent appointed by a foreign corporation will subject the corporation to State court jurisdiction if, in addition to the fact, and validity, of that service, it is shown that the corporation has sufficient contact with the State to make it constitutionally subject to suit here”); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 540 A.2d 482, 487 (Md. 1988) (presence of the agent for service “would not alone be sufficient to subject [defendant] to suit here”).  Other courts applying Maryland law, of course, agree.  Advanced Datacomm Testing Corp. v. PDIO, Inc., 2009 WL 2477559, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2009) (Due Process precludes basing general jurisdiction on nothing more than registration/agent for service of process); Tyler v. Gaines Motor Lines, Inc., 245 F. Supp.2d 730, 732 (D. Md. 2003) (“reject[ing] the notion that appointing a registered agent is sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a corporation”).  Maryland looks good.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts registration statute is silent on the issue of consent to jurisdiction over registration for appointment of an agent.  Mass. Gen. L. 156D §15.01.  Federal precedent recognizes that where a “defendant has registered as a foreign corporation to do business in Massachusetts and has named a registered agent for service of process . . . such activities, standing alone, are not enough to confer general personal jurisdiction.”  Fiske v. Sandvik Mining & Construction USA, LLC, 540 F. Supp.2d 250, 256 (D. Mass. 2008) (following Sandstrom (see Maine).  They do, however, “add some modest weight to the jurisdictional analysis.  Id.; accord Grice v. VIM Holdings Group, LLC, 2017 WL 6210891, at *4, 10 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2017) (no general jurisdiction; finding registration relevant to specific jurisdiction post-Bauman); Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 2014 WL 4927041, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Registration . . . cannot satisfy general jurisdiction’s requirement of systematic and continuous activity.”), rev’d on other grounds, 804 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2015) (specific jurisdiction).  There exists, however, a pre-Bauman Massachusetts state trial decision, citing Pa. Firer, and other Pennoyer-era cases, with extensive dicta suggesting that consent by registration was a valid exercise of general jurisdiction.  Galvin v. Jaffe, 2009 WL 884605, at *6-11 (Mass. Super. Jan. 26, 2009) (while defendant was individual corporate officer; consent-by-registration of corporate entities as a basis for general jurisdiction also discussed).  Despite that discordant note, Massachusetts seems favorable.

Michigan

The Michigan Supreme Court held decades ago that:

[P]rovisions of the [corporate registration] statutes . . . may not be construed as conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State with reference to causes of action not arising in Michigan, the parties to which are non-residents of the State.  The admission of defendant to carry on business in this State, evidenced by the certificate of authority granted to it, gave to it the status of a domestic corporation engaged in the same business, but did not extend its liability to be sued in a Michigan court to a transitory cause of action arising elsewhere, the plaintiff being a non-resident.

Renfroe v. Nichols Wire & Aluminum Co., 83 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Mich. 1957).  Michigan federal courts have followed.  Johnson v. Sandvik Inc., 2017 WL 3263465, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2017) (no general jurisdiction; “that [defendant] is registered to do business in Michigan has no direct connection to plaintiffs’ claims”), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 3593376 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2017); Asphalt v. Bagela Baumaschinen GmbH & Co. KG, 2017 WL 1177455, at *4 & n.1 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2017) (“numerous courts have determined that parties do not consent to general jurisdiction by registering to do business in the state of Michigan, without more”); Magna Powertrain De Mexico S.A. De C.V. v. Momentive Performance Materials USA LLC, 192 F. Supp.3d 824, 830 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2016) (“Michigan courts have rejected the idea that the registration statutes allow an inference of consent to general personal jurisdiction”); Family Wireless #1, LLC v. Automotive Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL 5142350, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2015) (in-state registration, even with other contacts, is “far from sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Defendant).  Michigan is solid.

Minnesota

Minnesota is one of the few states in which appointment of an agent has been enough to constitute consent to general jurisdiction.  The appellate cases so holding are pre-Bauman, and have not been reconsidered since.  See Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. American Appraisal Assoc., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Minn. 1991) (“[o]nce the defendant has appointed an agent for service of process . . . personal jurisdiction pursuant to the consent of the defendant does not invoke constitutional or long arm statutory analysis”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (“appointment of an agent for service of process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state”) (applying Minnesota law).  Neither case conducted a Due Process analysis.

Ally Bank v. Lenox Financial Mortgage Corp., 2017 WL 830391 (D. Minn. March 2, 2017), upheld consent through a registration as valid form of general jurisdiction, following Knowlton, and distinguishing Bauman as “address[ing] the limits of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, not the limits of a defendant’s capacity to consent to personal jurisdiction.”  Id. at *3.  For other Minnesota post-Bauman applications of jurisdiction by consent under Knowlton, see: Ritchie Capital Management, Ltd. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2017 WL 4990520, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2017); Bandemer v Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 10185684, at *3 (Minn. Dist. May 25, 2017); Edmondson v. BNSF Railway Co., 2015 WL 10528453, at *3-4 (Minn. Dist. May 12, 2015).  Cf. McGill v. Conwed Corp., 2017 WL 4534827, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2017) (no general jurisdiction where corporate registration was revoked).  So far, Minnesota is solid the other way.

Mississippi

Mississippi’s registration statute specifically excludes consent by registration, providing that “appointment or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”  Miss. Code Ann. §79-35-15 (2013).  This, “[a]lone, [defendant’s] business registration in Mississippi does not establish that it is ‘at home’ in Mississippi.” Mullen v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 136 F. Supp.3d 740, 744 (S.D. Miss. 2015). Accord Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp.3d 676, 683 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (that defendant “is qualified and registered to do business in the State of Mississippi . . . [is] insufficient to establish that [it] is susceptible to general jurisdiction”); Handshoe v. Yount, 2015 WL 7572344, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 24, 2015) (“registering . . . in Mississippi and appointing a designated corporate agent” not enough for general jurisdiction); Robinson v. Knight Protective Service, Inc., 2014 WL 1326096, at *4 (S.D. Miss. March 31, 2014) (quoting and following Norfolk Southern); Continental First Federal, Inc. v. Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 2009 WL 2032401, at *9-10 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2009) (“registering to do business and appointing an in-state agent for service of process do not alone establish general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident”) (applying Mississippi law); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Burlington Northern, 2005 WL 1363210, at *2-3 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2005) (“reject[ing] the notion that merely registering to do business and appointing an in-state agent for service of process automatically confer general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant”).  Mississippi looks alright on this issue.

Missouri

Before Bauman, the lower courts in Missouri had been a general jurisdiction by consent hotbed.  No more.  Guided by Cepec (see Delaware), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected general jurisdiction based on corporate registration in State ex. rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2017).  “[A] broad inference of consent based on registration would allow national corporations to be sued in every state, rendering [Bauman] pointless.”  Id. at 51.

[Plaintiff’s] arguments blur the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. . . .  The prior suits against [defendant] were suits based on specific jurisdiction because they concerned injuries that occurred in Missouri or arose out of [defendant’s] activities in Missouri. . . .  Nonetheless, the minimum contacts that suffice to provide specific jurisdiction . . . do not also confer general jurisdiction over a particular company for a non-Missouri-related lawsuit.

Id. at 47.  We discussed Dolan in more detail, here.  Accord State ex rel. Bayer Corp. v. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227, 232-33 (Mo. 2017) (reiterating that general jurisdiction based on corporate registration “would result in universal personal jurisdiction for corporations complying with registration statutes in many states and would be inconsistent with the holding” of [Bauman]”).

Numerous post-Bauman lower state and federal courts have now reached the same result.  See Perficient, Inc. v. Continuant, Inc., 546 S.W.3d 610, 611 (Mo. App. 2018) (rejecting general jurisdiction by corporate registration); Madlock v. Westar Energy, Inc., 517 S.W.3d 678, 679 (Mo. App. 2017) (following Dolan); Siegfried v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 WL 2778107, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017) (“[c]ompliance with Missouri’s registration statute does not confer personal jurisdiction”); Everett v. Aurora Pump Co., 2017 WL 2778091, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017) (following Dolan; “registration no longer provides a basis for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant”); Matthews v. BNSF Railway Co., 2017 WL 2266891, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2017) (following Dolan; reconsidering prior decision); Alvarracin v. Volume Services, Inc., 2017 WL 1842701, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 4, 2017) (“agree[ing] with the findings of those courts who have determined that Knowlton’s [see Minnesota] holding cannot survive in light of” Bauman); MacCormack v. The Adel Wiggins Group, 2017 WL 1426009, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. April 21, 2017) (similar; overruling prior decisions in same litigation); Addelson v. Sanofi S.A., 2016 WL 6216124, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2016) (“personal jurisdiction is not established by appointment of an agent for service of process”; Knowlton not good law post-Bauman); In Re: Zofran (Ondansetron) Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 2349105, at *4 (D. Mass. May 4, 2016) (general jurisdiction by consent “would distort the language and purpose of the Missouri registration statute and would be inconsistent with” Bauman) (applying Missouri law); Beard v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 2016 WL 1746113, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2016) (rejecting registration to do business as general jurisdiction by consent; prior precedent no longer valid after Bauman); Hovsepian v. Crane Co., 2016 WL 2997641, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. April 13, 2016) (no jurisdiction “as to the moving defendants that purportedly are registered to do business in this state”); Keeley v. Pfizer, Inc., 2015 WL 3999488, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (“A defendant’s consent to jurisdiction must satisfy the standards of due process and finding a defendant consents to jurisdiction by registering to do business in a state or maintaining a registered agent does not”); Neeley v. Wyeth LLC, No., 2015 WL 1456984, at *3 (E.D. Mo. March 30, 2015) (Bauman “clearly rejects” general jurisdiction based on corporate registration); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 2015 WL 191118, at *3 (Mo. Cir. St. Louis City Jan. 12, 2015) (having registered agent “does not automatically establish general personal jurisdiction”).

Before the Missouri Supreme Court’s Dolan decision, some post-Bauman Missouri federal and state courts sought to continue with general jurisdiction by consent, claiming to be bound by Knowlton (see Minnesota), and allowed general jurisdiction by consent based on compliance with corporate registration.  Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F. Supp.3d 967, 975-79 (E.D. Mo. 2016); Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2016 WL 7332992, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2016); Regal Beloit America, Inc. v. Broad Ocean Motor LLC, 2016 WL 3549624, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2016); Chalkey v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., WL 705134, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2016); Jackson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2016 WL 454735, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2016); Trout v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2016 WL 427960, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2016); Gracey v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015 WL 2066242, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2015); Hogans v Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 10353121, at *6 (Mo. Cir. St. Louis City March 17, 2015).  Cf. Ocepek v. Corporate Transportation, Inc., 950 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) (pre-Bauman decision extending Knowlton to Missouri law); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Marketing,, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 7335739, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2016) (split authority on general jurisdiction by consent meant defendant could not be dismissed as fraudulently joined) (applying Missouri law).  Don’t be fooled by those decisions.  No federal court has permitted a jurisdiction-by-consent theory since the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan.

Montana

In DeLeon v. BNSF Railway Co., 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2018), the Supreme Court of Montana, reached the same result joined other jurisdictions in rejecting general jurisdiction by consent.  “We conclude a company does not consent to general personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in Montana and voluntarily conducting in-state business activities.”  Id. at 4 (Mont. 2018).  DeLeon distinguished corporate registration from other types of “consent” that courts actually recognize:

Registration-based consent is distinguishable from other types of consent jurisdiction in its breadth.  It permits a court to obtain general personal jurisdiction over a defendant − it is not limited to one case or one contract.

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  Dismissing pre-[Bauman] decisions as outdated, DeLeon held:

[E]xtending general personal jurisdiction over all foreign corporations that registered to do business in Montana and subsequently conducted in-state business activities would extend our exercise of general personal jurisdiction beyond the narrow limits recently articulated by the Supreme Court. . . . Every state requires foreign corporations doing in-state business to register. . .   Reading our registration statutes to confer general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations would swallow the Supreme Court’s due process limitations on the exercise of general personal jurisdiction, and we accordingly refuse to do so.

Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).

The relevant Montana statute provides: “The appointment or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in the state.” Mont. Code Ann. §35-7-105.  Thus, even before Bauman, the Ninth Circuit declined to permit consent through registration under Montana law.  King v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2011) (where the nonresident defendant’s “sole contacts” were “Certificates of Authorization and . . . an agent for service of process” they could not support general jurisdiction) (applying Montana law).  Montana is now rock solid.

Nebraska

Under Nebraska law, “[b]y designating an agent upon whom process may be served within [the] state, a defendant has consented to the jurisdiction in personam by the proper court.”  Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 328 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Neb. 1982); see also Ytuarte v. Gruner & Jahr Printing & Publishing Co., 935 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 1991) (appointment of an agent for service of process by corporate defendants gives consent to the jurisdiction of a state’s courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state) (applying Nebraska law).  Post-Bauman Nebraska decisions have not retreated from general jurisdiction by consent.  See, e.g., Consolidated Infrastructure Group, Inc. v. USIC, LLC, 2017 WL2222917, at *7 (D. Neb. May 18, 2017) (“[o]ne of the most solidly established ways of giving . . . consent [to general jurisdiction] is to designate an agent for service of process within the State”; citing Knowlton (see Minnesota)); Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., 2015 WL 1538088, at *7 (D. Neb. April 7, 2015) (allowing general jurisdiction based on consent through registration).  Nebraska is another of the few states firmly in the expansive jurisdiction category.

Nevada

Well before Bauman, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a foreign corporation’s compliance with the state’s registration statute does not “in itself subject a nonresident . . . company to the personal jurisdiction of Nevada Courts.”  Freeman v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1 P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) (“[o]ther courts and legal scholars have agreed that the mere act of appointing an agent to receive service of process, by itself, does not subject a non-resident corporation to general jurisdiction”).  Accord Hunt v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2015 WL 3626579, *5 n.2 (D. Nev. June 10, 2015) (“corporate licensure and amenability to service of process” “in Nevada does not establish personal jurisdiction”); cf. Corbo v. Laessig, 2011 WL 1327680, at *5 (D. Nev. April 6, 2011) (under Freeman registration as an insurance agent does not create general jurisdiction); contra Knudsen v. Queenstake Resources U.S.A., Inc., 2010 WL 11571247, at *4 (D. Nev. May 24, 2010) (“[t]hough the weight of authority comes out to the contrary, the Court holds that [defendant] consented to personal jurisdiction in Nevada by registering to do business”).  Despite one pre-Bauman contrary voice, Nevada is solid.

New Hampshire

New Hampshire’s registration statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. §293-A:15.01, does not provide that a nonresident defendant’s compliance results in its consent to general jurisdiction.  The First Circuit has held that “[c]orporate registration in New Hampshire adds some weight to the jurisdictional analysis, but it is not alone sufficient to confer general jurisdiction.”  Cossaboon v. Maine Medical Center, 600 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying New Hampshire law).  Cossaboom did not address Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1984), wherein an entirely non-constitutional analysis interpreted a prior New Hampshire’s statute, “at least where litigation is causally connected to a defendant’s acts in New Hampshire,” corporate registration constituted “consent to jurisdiction.”  Id. at 699.  The caveat makes clear that Holloway was a specific jurisdiction case, as it refused to rule on whether registration “would authorize a suit on a cause of action that has no relationship to the state of New Hampshire.”  Id.  Cossaboon is much more on point than Holloway, so we put New Hampshire in the anti-consent majority.

New Jersey

The New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to pass on general jurisdiction by consent, but since Bauman, the Appellate Division did in Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 164 A.3d 435 (N.J. App. Div.), certif. denied, 173 A.3d 596 (N.J. 2017).

[W]e conclude reliance of an entity’s business registration to establish general jurisdiction is belied by the holding set forth in [Bauman’s] clear narrow application of general jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to answer for a cause of action unrelated to the entity’s conduct in the forum, i.e., general jurisdiction, requires a plaintiff establish the corporation is “at home” in the forum, a standard established in Goodyear and clarified in [Bauman]. A plaintiff must show more than that the defendant engaged in some business or complied with corporate registration requirements of the forum.

*          *          *          *

In light of [Bauman], we reject the application of [pre-Bauman precedent] as allowing general jurisdiction solely based on the fiction of implied consent by a foreign corporation’s compliance with New Jersey’s business registration statute. Registration is required to conduct any level of business. Importantly, the exercise of general jurisdiction requires satisfaction of the “continuous and systematic contacts” to comply with due process. Mere registration to conduct some business is insufficient.

Id. at 444-46 (citations omitted).

Although some New Jersey federal courts allowed consent by registration before Dutch Run, the majority did not.  See Metropolitan Group Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2018 WL 2422023, at *2 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018) (“to conclude that a corporation consents to personal jurisdiction based solely on registration would be inconsistent with” Bauman); Horowitz v. AT&T, Inc., 2018 WL 1942525, at *12 (D.N.J. April 25, 2018) (“consent by registration is inconsistent with” Daimler; registration-based general personal jurisdiction “developed from an outmoded way of thinking about jurisdiction” and is “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent Daimler decision”); Fundamental Innovation Systems International LLC v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2018 WL 279091, at *2 (Mag. E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2018) (“registering to do business in New Jersey or appointing an agent for service of process is not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction”) (applying New Jersey law), adopted, 2018 WL 837711, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (“the mere fact that [a company] is registered to do business in New Jersey and appointed an agent to receive process does not mean that it is subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey”); Boswell v. Cable Services Co., 2017 WL 2815077, at *4-6 (D.N.J. June 28, 2017) (corporation’s registration to do business did “not mean it consented to general jurisdiction in New Jersey”); Display Works, LLC, v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp.3d 166, 175-76 (D.N.J. 2016) (“the doctrinal refinement reflected in . . . the [Supreme] Court’s 21st century approach to general and specific jurisdiction” has replaced “sweeping interpretation[s]” of “routine registration statute[s]”; “Pa. Fire . . . cannot be squared with” Bauman); Singh v. Diesel Transportation, LLC, 2016 WL 3647992, at *3 (D. N.J. July 7, 2016) (“reject[ing] Plaintiff’s argument that compliance with [a statutory] designation of agent requirement renders [defendant] susceptible to general jurisdiction in New Jersey”); Barrera v. Hitachi Koki U.S.A., Ltd., 2015 WL 12839496, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (corporate registration does “not subject [defendant] to general jurisdiction in New Jersey”); McCourt v. A.O. Smith Water Products Co., 2015 WL 4997403, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2015) (“The single fact that Defendant registered to do business in New Jersey is insufficient to conclude that it ‘consented’ to jurisdiction here.”); Kubin v. Orange Lake Country Club, Inc., 2010 WL 3981908, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2010) (“[f]iling a certificate to do business in New Jersey is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”); Davis v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 2009 WL 3335860, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2009) (rejecting jurisdiction by consent by designation of agent for service of process under federal statute); Smith v. S&S Dundalk Engineering Works, Ltd., 139 F. Supp.2d 610, 620 n.6 (D.N.J. 2001) (“fil[ing]a certificate to do business in New Jersey . . . would still be insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”); Atkinson & Mullen Travel Inc. v. New York Apple Tours Inc., 1998 WL 750355, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 1998) (corporate registration not “in and of itself sufficient to establish continuous and substantial contacts” for general jurisdiction).

Except for a 2014 state trial court decision overruled by Dutch Run, the only post-Bauman New Jersey cases allowing jurisdiction-by-consent based on registration were all pharmaceutical patent cases decided prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which declined to base general jurisdiction on this basis.  See Senju Pharmaceutical Co. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp.3d 428, 436-37 (D.N.J. 2015) (following Pa. Fire); Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Mylan Inc., 2015 WL 1305764, at *8-11 (D.N.J. March 23, 2015) (same).

Unless and until the New Jersey Supreme Court messes things up, New Jersey now looks strong against jurisdiction by consent.

New Mexico

A long time ago, the Tenth Circuit, interpreting New Mexico law, held:

The relevant New Mexico statute . . . does not specifically provide that foreign corporations are made subject to process for causes of action not resulting from the corporations’ activities in New Mexico. . . .  The Supreme Court . . . indicated a preferential construction of foreign corporation process statutes which excludes their operation if the cause of action does not arise out of business done by the corporation in the state. . . .  [The New Mexico statute] d[oes] not extend to causes of action not arising out of business done by the corporation in New Mexico. . . .  [C]onsidering the Supreme Court’s preferential construction, we cannot say that [the statute] extends to causes of action not arising out of corporations’ New Mexico business.

Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying New Mexico law) (citations omitted).

However, more recent New Mexico precedent is to the contrary.  Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 272-73 (N.M. App. 1993), interpreted a registration statute and concluded that “without an express limitation, the legislature intended [New Mexico’s registration statute] to apply to any claims against a foreign corporation with a registered agent in New Mexico.”  Id. at 1200.  Werner further held that due process analysis was not necessary.  Id. (citing Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1200 (see Minnesota)).  A pre-Bauman district court decision, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction, Ltd., 2011 WL 13085934, at *2-3 (D.N.M. July 29, 2011), opted to follow Werner in preference to Budde, but was itself reversed on other grounds, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction, Ltd., 703 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 2012).  Finally, the only post-Bauman decision, Brieno v. Paccar, Inc., 2018 WL 3675234 (D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2018), chose to stick with Werner . Id. at *3-4.  With this kind of split, we put New Mexico in the unsettled category.

New York

Decades before Bauman, back in the Pennoyer days of Pa. Fire, the New York Court of Appeals allowed general jurisdiction by consent.  Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1916).  While Bagdon has not been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court in Bauman targeted a different New York state decision with its comment that “cases from” the Pennoyer era dominated “should not attract heavy reliance today.”  571 U.S. at 138 n.18 (citing Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917), as an example) . Thus, the Second Circuit has twice observed that Bauman “expressly cast doubt” on old, expansive New York jurisdictional precedent.  SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 343 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying New York law); Gucci America, Inc. v. Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014).

The only directly on point appellate New York decision is Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, (2d Cir. 2014), a third-party discovery decision that, post-Bauman, treated registration/“consent” as a specific, and not general, jurisdiction issue:

Even without general personal jurisdiction, the district court may be able to require [third-party] compliance . . . by exercising specific jurisdiction.15

15 The district court may also consider whether [third-party] has consented to personal jurisdiction in New York by applying for authorization to conduct business in New York and designating the New York Secretary of State as its agent for service of process.

Id. at 136 n.15 (citing, inter alia Bagdon).  The Second Circuit’s decision in Brown (see Connecticut) has also been influential with post-Bauman New York trial courts.

And the New York trial courts have been active, issuing a spate of decisions.  A distinct majority of these post-Bauman New York cases have recognized that general jurisdiction can no longer constitutionally be obtained by “consent” amounting to nothing more than registration to do business in New York.  One noteworthy decision is Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 227 F. Supp.3d 249 (N.D.N.Y. 2016), which concluding after a lengthy discussion of conflicting precedents – particularly Brown (see Connecticut) − that general jurisdiction can no longer be created by registration to do business.

[T]the Supreme Court’s shift in the general jurisdiction analysis over foreign corporations from the “minimum contacts” review described in International Shoe to the more demanding “essentially at home” test enunciated in [Bauman] − suggests that federal due process rights likely con strain an interpretation that transforms a run-of-the-mill registration and appointment statute into a corporate “consent” to the exercise of general jurisdiction.

Id. at 264 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Other post-Bauman New York decisions rejecting general jurisdiction by “consent” resting upon corporate registration are:  FederalHitachi Data Systems Credit Corp. v. Precision Discovery, Inc., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 4284290, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018) (“Courts have often noted that allegations similar to those Precision makes here – particularly in regard to maintaining an office in New York and registering to do business in the state – are not sufficient to provide general jurisdiction after [Bauman].”); Indelicato v. Liberty Transportation, Inc., 2018 WL 3934074, at *5, 7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018) (registration to do business, even with other in-state contacts, insufficient to create general jurisdiction); Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group AG, 277 F. Supp.3d 521, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (rejecting registration to do business under banking statute as consent to general jurisdiction); Wilderness USA, Inc. v. DeAngelo Brothers LLC, 265 F. Supp.3d 301, 310-14 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (rejecting general jurisdiction by consent; “this doctrine has been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler”); Sae Han Sheet Co. v. Eastman Chemical Corp., 2017 WL 4769394, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017) (“corporations do not consent to general jurisdiction when they register under the various New York registration statutes”); Spratley v. FCA US LLC, 2017 WL 4023348, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (“Since every state in the union has a business registration statute, treating the registration to do business in a state as an implicit consent to general jurisdiction must also be ‘unacceptably grasping.’”); Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. APR Energy Holding Ltd., 2017 WL 3841874, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (“a foreign corporation did not consent to the exercise of general jurisdiction simply by registering to do business and appointing an agent”; third-party discovery case); FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, L.P. v. Citibank, N.A., 2017 WL 3600425, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (“Plaintiffs may not use New York’s [banking] registration statute as a basis for asserting general jurisdiction over the Foreign Defendants”); Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 2017 WL 2470844, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2017) (“the reasoning [of pre-Bauman precedent was] incomplete and unpersuasive in that those cases did “not meaningfully analyze the impact of [the] watershed case”); Justiniano v. First Student Management LLC, 2017 WL 1592564, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. April 26, 2017) (jurisdiction by consent “has been placed in serious doubt” by recent Supreme Court precedent); Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, 2017 WL 685570, at *39-40 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2017) (no consent to general jurisdiction based on registration under banking statute); Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 176 F. Supp.3d 264, 277 & n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (same); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp.3d 3, 17 & n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (same); Taormina v. Thrifty Car Rental, 2016 WL 7392214, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2016) (applying Brown to New York law; prior precedent not valid after Bauman); Bonkowski v. HP Hood, LLC, 2016 WL 4536868, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016) (following Brown; pre-Bauman jurisdiction by consent precedent no longer viable); In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 1268267, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (registration to do business not “broad” consent to jurisdiction); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 132 F. Supp.3d 518, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“satisfaction of any [state] licensing requirements [] is not constitutionally sufficient to establish general jurisdiction”); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp.3d 97, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“the mere fact of [defendant’s] being registered to do business is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction in a state that is neither its state of incorporation or its principal place of business”); 7 W. 57th Street Realty Co., LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., 2015 WL 1514539, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2015) (state bank registration insufficient to confer general jurisdiction).  StateKyowa Seni Co. v ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., 80 N.Y.S.3d 866, 869-70 (N.Y. Sup. 2018) (agreeing with “most New York courts [that] have rejected general jurisdiction by consent based on corporate registration”); Fekah v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 2018 WL 4257338, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 6, 2018) (under Bauman, corporate registration does not confer general jurisdiction); New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3859695, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 14, 2018) (“The mere fact [defendant] is registered to do business in New York, after [Bauman], is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction in New York over the corporation.”); New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3697142, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 3, 2018) (same); New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3575072, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. July 25, 2018) (same); New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3145929, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. June 27, 2018) (same); New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3158514, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. June 27, 2018) (same); Amelius v. Grand Imperial LLC, 64 N.Y.S.3d 855, 865-69 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (defendant “is not subject to general jurisdiction merely because it has registered to do business here”); Mischel v. Safe Haven Enterprises, LLC, 2017 WL 1384214, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. April 17, 2017) (general jurisdiction based on registration to do business is improperly “coercive” after Bauman), reversed on other grounds, 74 N.Y.S.3d 496 (N.Y.A.D. 2018) (specific jurisdiction); Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. v UBS Ag, 2016 WL 7158077, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Dec. 7, 2016) (defendant “is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York for registration to do business); Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., 2014 WL 3899209, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 4, 2014) (under Bauman bank registration statute “provid[es] for the exercise of specific jurisdiction, not general”).  Cf. In re Del Valle Ruiz, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 5095672, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (that bank “is supervised by the New York State Department of Financial Service” and had numerous other contacts insufficient to support general personal jurisdiction); Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp., 2016 WL 1366920, at *9-10 (Mag. S.D.N.Y. March 3, 2016) (no general jurisdiction by consent created by forum selection clause), adopted, 2016 WL 3453656, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016 (same) aff’d on other grounds, 691 F. Appx. 8 (2d Cir. 2017); Magdalena v. Lins, 999 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y.A.D. 2014) (no general jurisdiction by consent via forum selection clause); Chambers v. Weinstein, 2014 WL 4276910, at *16, 997 N.Y.S.2d 668 (table) (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 22, 2014) (under Bauman, attorney “not subject to [general] personal jurisdiction merely by virtue of having once been admitted to the Bar of the State of New York”).

Contrary post-Bauman decisions that continue to follow Bagdon are:  Beach v. Citigroup Alternative Investments, 2014 WL 904650, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2014); Wheeler v. CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., 2017 WL 3611295, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 17, 2017); Serov v. Kerzner International Resorts, Inc., 43 N.Y.S.3d 769 (table), 2016 WL 4083725, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. July 26, 2016); Aybar v. Aybar, 2016 WL 3389890, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. May 25, 2016); Corporate Jet Support, Inc. v. Lobosco Insurance Group, LLC, 2015 WL 5883026, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Oct. 7, 2015); Fallman v. Hotel Insider Ltd., 2016 WL 316378, at*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016); Bailen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 2014 WL 3885949, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 5, 2014).

With the pro-Bagdon cases almost extinct for the last couple of years, New York looks pretty firm, particularly in federal court.

North Carolina

Decades before Bauman, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that “the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated activity in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”  Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1965). Other courts likewise refuse to construe North Carolina’s registration statute – which does not discuss jurisdiction – as authorizing jurisdiction on the basis of a foreign corporation’s registration alone.  Debbie’s Staffing Services, Inc. v. Highpoint Risk Services, LLC, 2018 WL 1918603, at *3 (M.D.N.C. April 20, 2018) (“Long-standing precedent forecloses [plaintiff’s] argument that [defendant’s] registration to do business in North Carolina is sufficient to subject it to the general jurisdiction of this Court.”); Sebastian v. Davol, Inc., 2017 WL 3325744, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2017) (North Carolina statute “contains no reference to jurisdiction by consent”; finding “no decision − state or federal − construing North Carolina’s registration or licensing statutes to extend personal jurisdiction over registered businesses”); JPB Installers, LLC v. Dancker, Sellew & Douglas, Inc., 2017 WL 2881142, at *4 (M.D.N.C. July 6, 2017) (same as Debbie’s Staffing); Public Impact, LLC v. Boston Consulting Group, Inc., 117 F. Supp.3d 732, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (there is “no decision − State or federal − construing North Carolina’s registration statute to extend personal jurisdiction over registered businesses”); Thompson v. Mission Essential Personnel, LLC, 2013 WL 6058308, at *2 n. 1 (Mag. M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2013) (“registration to do business in the state alone is not the deciding factor on which jurisdiction should be determined”), adopted, 2014 WL 4745947 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2014).  Rock solid.

North Dakota

The North Dakota statute provides that “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”  N.D. Cent. Code §§10-01.1-15.  Thus, “[m]ere registration to transact business in North Dakota does not render [defendant] subject to general jurisdiction in the state.”  HomeRun Products, LLC v. Twin Towers Trading, Inc., 2017 WL 4293145, at *4 (D.N.D. Sept. 27, 2017).  North Dakota looks solid.

Ohio

Ohio State and federal courts have held that designating an agent for service is insufficient to warrant consent to general jurisdictions.  The United States Supreme Court determined that, were Ohio to treat the designation of an agent for service of process as consent to general jurisdiction, that result would violate the Commerce Clause:

[A] designation with the Ohio Secretary of State of an agent for the service of process [that] likely would have subjected [defendant] to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts over transactions in which Ohio had no interest . . . is an unreasonable burden on commerce.

Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895 (1988).

That Ohio courts would do something like that is highly unlikely.  In Wainscott v. St. Louis-S.F. Railway Co., 351 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ohio 1976), the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the “consent theory” of personal jurisdiction only extends to claims based on minimum contacts with the forum, reversing the appellate court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Older, Pennoyer-era thinking has been “displaced”:

The problem presented in this case arises from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe. . . .  The court, in International Shoe, described the various fictions inherent in the doctrines of presence and consent and the problems associate with the application of the ‘doing business’ standard. While the court did not establish definite criteria for determining when a state’s in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation could be invoked, it did displace the doctrines of consent and presence as constitutional grounds for in personam jurisdiction.

Id. at 472.  See also Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1993) (following Wainscott; plaintiffs “cannot assert personal jurisdiction over [defendant] based on consent”) (applying Ohio law); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Alien Tech. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 700, 711 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“It appears that registration to do business in Ohio is simply one fact to consider in analyzing personal jurisdiction.”).  These cases indicate that the recent contrary decision in Grubb v. Day to Day Logistics, Inc., 2015 WL 4068742, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 2, 2015), is wrongly decided and based on obsolete precedent.  Between the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit, Ohio belongs in the anti-consent column.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma’s registration statute is silent on whether registration constitutes consent to jurisdiction.  Okla. Stat. tit. 18 §1022.  Oklahoma state courts have yet to address this issue, but a federal district court acknowledged the lack of state precedent,and followed Bauman, holding that mere registration to do business is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, dismissing the prescription pharmaceutical product liability claims of nonresident plaintiffs.  Aclin v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 189 F. Supp.3d 1294, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (recognizing the Supreme Court’s and Tenth Circuit’s “preferential construction,” and declining “to exercise general jurisdiction over the Defendants on the basis of their registration in Oklahoma”).  Aclin relied on Samuelson v. Honeywell, 863 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (E.D. Okla. 1994), a pre-Bauman case holding that “compliance by [defendant] with Oklahoma statutory requirements for conducting business in Oklahoma does not automatically subject [it] to the jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma in a suit unrelated to its Oklahoma contacts.”  Id. at 1507.   See also In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 2012 WL 1345175, at *5 (E.D. Ky. April 18, 2012) (rejecting general jurisdiction by consent under pre-Bauman Oklahoma law).

Other Oklahoma law cases rejecting general jurisdiction by consent post-Bauman are:  Tarver v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 7077045, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2016) (rejecting, as “unacceptably grasping” argument that defendant “voluntarily] subjects itself to the jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts” because it “maintained its corporate registration with the Oklahoma Secretary of State since 1920”), certification denied, 2017 WL 9477739 (W.D. Okla. March 10, 2017), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 3527710 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2017); Guillette v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2016 WL 3094073, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (same as Aclin); Manning v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2016 WL 3094075, at *7-8 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (same as Aclin); Nauman v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2016 WL 3094081, at *7-8 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (same as Aclin).

Oklahoma is OK.

Oregon

In Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co., 390 P.3d 1019 (Or. 2017), the Oregon Supreme Court “conclude[d] that appointing a registered agent to receive service of process merely designates a person upon whom process may be served. It does not constitute implied consent to the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts.”  Id. at 1021-22.  See also Lanham v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, 2015 WL 5167268, at *11 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015) (“nothing in Oregon law supports a conclusion that compliance with these statutes confers general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for conduct occurring outside Oregon”).  Another post-Bauman state high court ruling controls the issue in Oregon.

Pennsylvania

Due to a 1978 amendment (see P.L. 202, No. 53 §10(60)) to its long-arm statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5301, Pennsylvania’s statute uniquely specifies that corporate registration confers “general personal jurisdiction”:

(a) General rule. − The existence of any of the following relationships between a person and this Commonwealth shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction. . . .

*          *          *          *

(2) Corporations. −

(i) Incorporation under or qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth.

(ii) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.

(Emphasis added).  Based almost entirely on this state statute, most Pennsylvania courts currently enforce general jurisdiction based on nothing more than corporate registration.

Most importantly, in the pre-Bauman decision, Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit held that, “[b]y registering to do business in Pennsylvania, [defendant] ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within’” Pennsylvania.  Id. at 640 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).  Further, corporate registration “can be viewed as its consent to be sued” and “[c]onsent is a traditional basis for assertion of jurisdiction long upheld as constitutional.”  Id. at 641 (citations omitted).

We hold that because [defendant] was authorized to do business in Pennsylvania, it was subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Pennsylvania courts under section 5301(a)(2)(i) or (ii). The . . . statute gave [defendant] notice that was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and thus it should have been “reasonably able to anticipate being haled into court” in Pennsylvania.

Id. (citations omitted).

Notwithstanding Bauman, in Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp.3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016), the court determined that the Supreme Court had “eliminate consent to general personal jurisdiction over a corporation registered to do business in Pennsylvania.”  Id. at 653.  “Consent” was considered a “separate” basis for general jurisdiction outside the Supreme Court’s “at home” standard.  Id. (quoting Acorda Therapeutics (see Delaware – as we discuss there, Delaware has since reversed its position).  The big difference between Pennsylvania every other state, held Bors, was the “notice” provided by the 1978 amendment to the Pennsylvania statute:

Pennsylvania’s statute specifically advises the registrant of the jurisdictional effect of registering to do business. . . .  [L]ong after Pennsylvania enacted its specific notice statute and after our Court of Appeals confirmed personal jurisdiction based on registration, [defendant] elected to register to do business in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation.  [Defendant’s] compliance with Pennsylvania’s registration statute amounted to consent to personal jurisdiction.

Id. at 655.  We discussed Bors in more detail here.

Most subsequent Pennsylvania decisions have parroted the rationales in Bane and Bors although they differ in some details.  See Murray v. American Lafrance, LLC, ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL 4571804, at *3 (Pa. Super. Sept. 25, 2018) (two paragraphs following Bane/Bors); Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. International Rug Group, LLC, 192 A.3d 1133, 1138-39 (Pa. Super. June 28, 2018) (“guided by” Bors/Gorton, but extending general personal jurisdiction to “acts committed prior to registration” when the corporate defendant conducted no in-state activity at all); Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 303 F. Supp.3d 278, 295-99 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (following Bane/Bors notice analysis of §5301(a); consent only applicable after 1978 amendment); Aetna Inc., v. Mednax, Inc., 2018 WL 5264310, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2018) (following Bane/Bors); Pager v. Metropolitan Edison, 2018 WL 491014, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2018) (citing Bane); Mendoza v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 5010352, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) (following Bors) (applying Pennsylvania law); Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017) (citing Bane/Bors); Hegna v. Smitty’s Supply, Inc., 2017 WL 2563231, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (same); Kukich v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2017 WL 345856, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2017) (following Bors) (applying Pennsylvania law).  The temporally unbounded consent rationale adopted in Webb-Benjamin is even more radical and expansive than what the Supreme Court rejected as “overly grasping” and “exorbitant” in Bauman, since mere registration alone, absent any actual business activity, supposedly gives rise to general jurisdiction.  Cf. George v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2016 WL 4945331, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2016) (general jurisdiction not created, even under Bane, by registration after an alleged injury).

However, some Post-Bauman courts have rejected the proposition that mere registration to do business in Pennsylvania can be a sufficient basis for general jurisdiction.  Antonini v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3633287, at *2 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) (“regist[ration] to do business in Pennsylvania” among other contacts, was “insufficient to establish general jurisdiction” in Pennsylvania); McCaffrey v. Windsor at Windermere Ltd. Partnership, 2017 WL 1862326, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2017) (Pennsylvania corporate registration did not show “contacts with Pennsylvania [that] are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Spear v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 2016 WL 194071, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2016) (no general personal jurisdiction based “solely on the fact that defendants are registered to do business” in Pennsylvania); Osadchuk v. CitiMortgage, 2015 WL 4770813, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2015) (registered agent in Pennsylvania not enough for general jurisdiction); Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 2018 WL 3043601, at *4-5 (Pa. C.P. May 30, 2018) (“federalism prevents this Court from exercising general jurisdiction over Defendant simply because Defendant does business in Pennsylvania”; to interpret §5301(a) as imposing general jurisdiction on a lesser showing than Bauman renders the statute unconstitutional).

We think that Bane is no longer good law after Bauman and that Bors is wrongly decided, for the following reasons.  First, as literally scores of cases have held, Bauman’s Due Process analysis rejects constructions of state law that could result in national corporations being sued for anything in every state that they do business.  Make no mistake about it, application of  “consent” jurisdiction is likewise a matter of Due Process.  “The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows . . . from the Due Process Clause. ” ICI, 456 U.S. at 702.  Personal jurisdiction “represents a restriction on judicial power . . . as a matter of individual liberty.” Id.  If Pennsylvania can amend its statute to impose general jurisdiction on a lesser showing than Bauman requires, so could any other state.  That a panel decision such as Bane “is contrary to a decision . . . of the Supreme Court” is a reason for the Third Circuit to reconsider that decision.  3d Cir. Loc. R.A.P. 35.1.  Of the jurisdictions within the Third Circuit, only Pennsylvania courts continue to follow Bane – Delaware, New Jersey, and the Virgin Islands have all abandoned Bane and concluded that Bauman controls.  See Relevant sections of this survey.

Second, both Bane and Bors, got the concept of “notice” all wrong, suggesting that, by specifying “general jurisdiction,” §5301(1), the Pennsylvania statute, under Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487, provides “fair warning” that defendants might be “haled into court” in Pennsylvania for over unrelated claims by anyone in the country.  They thus misapplied Burger King on a most fundamental level, since Burger King is not even a general jurisdiction case.  Notice is not relevant to general jurisdiction – it is a consideration in determining the fairness of recognizing specific jurisdiction under a minimum contacts analysis:

Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities.

471 U.S. at 472 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Even in specific jurisdiction analysis such “fairness” issues are not dispositive. See BMS, 137 S. Ct. 1780-81 (“[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience . . .; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)).

The state’s “manifest interest” recognized in Burger King is to “provid[e] its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.”  Id. at 473 (emphasis added).  There is no such interest in providing a forum for non-residents to sue non-residents over claims having nothing to do with the forum state. Rather, the “’purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . . ‘attenuated’ contacts.”  Id. at 475 (citation omitted).  Bare corporate registration is the epitome of an “attenuated contact” – even if Burger King had been discussing general jurisdiction.

Third, Bane and Bors also mess up the statutory interpretation side of things.  As discussed at the beginning of this post, post-International Shoe decisions such as ICI no longer treat corporate registration as “consent” – and neither does §5301(a), which expressly distinguishes between “qualification as a foreign corporation” and “consent.”  Compare §5301(a)(2)(i) (“qualification as a foreign corporation”), with §5301(a)(2)(ii) (“Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent”).  Even the Pennsylvania legislature did not consider compliance with Pennsylvania’s corporate domestication requirements to be any form of “consent.”  Indeed, since unregistered corporations cannot be subjected to general personal jurisdiction, e.g., Rittinger v. Keystone Maintenance Services Corp., 2018 WL 3455856, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2018), we could even make a pretty good “absurd result” argument against Bane/Bors, since they put a corporate lawbreaker that failed to register at all in a better position than a company that duly qualified to do business in Pennsylvania.

By interpreting §5301(a) to merge “qualification” with “consent,” so as to transgress federal Due Process standards, post-Bauman Pennsylvania cases treating corporate registration is ipso facto “consent” to general jurisdiction ignore the “presumption” that “the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth.”  1 Pa. C.S.A. §1922(3).  These decisions also ignore the express terms of the Long Arm Statute that preclude exercise of personal jurisdiction beyond what is permitted by “the Constitution of that United States.”  42 Pa. C.S.A. §§5307, 5308, 5322(b).

Ultimately, we believe Pennsylvania will cease to adhere to general jurisdiction by consent, although perhaps not without another United States Supreme Court public flogging.  The jurisdictional constraints addressed in Bauman, after all, are based on the Due Process protections of the federal constitution, and those simply cannot be overridden by a mere state statute.  But for now, Pennsylvania is perhaps the leading practitioner of general jurisdiction by consent.

Puerto Rico

We don’t swear by the details of the on-line translation, so we aren’t going to quote anything, but it appears that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, in a pre-Bauman decision, adopted general jurisdiction by consent.  See Riego Zuniga v. Lineas Aereas LACSA, 139 D.P.R. 509, 519-23 (P.R. 1995).

Rhode Island

Although no state court has adjudicated general jurisdiction by consent, federal courts have rejected this argument.  North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 16 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“courts have consistently held that the appointment of an agent of process alone does not suffice to allow for the exercise of general jurisdiction”) (applying Rhode Island law); Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Indemnity Co., 2017 WL 3225924, at *4 (Mag. D.R.I. March 3, 2017) (defendant’s “license to transact insurance business in Rhode Island and its designation of [a] Rhode Island . . . agent to accept service of process do not tip the balance in favor of asserting general jurisdiction”), adopted, 2017 WL 2983879 (D.R.I. July 13, 2017); Harrington v. C.H. Nickerson & Co., 2010 WL 3385034, at *4 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2010) (“this Court will not presume that Defendant consented to personal jurisdiction where there is no indication that either the Rhode Island legislature, or Defendant itself, intended that corporate registration would serve as consent to personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island”).  Rhode Island is right, indeed.

South Carolina

Way back in 1971, the court in Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying South Carolina law), held that “the application to do business and the appointment of an agent for service to fulfill a state law requirement is of no special weight in” a general jurisdictional context.  Not quite a decade later, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed:

While jurisdiction could be exercised over appellant under [the long arm statute], that section applies only to causes of action arising directly from the act relied upon to establish jurisdiction. Here respondents seek to assert jurisdiction in an action on unrelated contracts to which appellant was not a party.

Yarborough & Co. v. Schoolfield Furniture Industries, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1980) (applying S.C. Code §36-2-803).

A post-Bauman South Carolina court held that “even after an effective service of process, personal jurisdiction must still comport with due process,” rejecting an argument that mere service on a foreign corporation’s appointed agent effectuated personal jurisdiction.  Gibson v. Confie Insurance Group Holdings, Inc., 2017 WL 2936219, at *6 (D.S.C. July 10, 2017).  See Gracious Living Corp. v. Colucci & Gallaher, PC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 662, 668 (D.S.C. 2016) (service of defendant’s statutory agent for service did not create general personal jurisdiction); Gabrish v. Strickland Marine Agency, Inc., 2005 WL 5168410 (S.C. Dist. Dec. 2, 2005) (following Ratliff).  Rock solid.

South Dakota

South Dakota’s registration statute expressly mandates that “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction.”  S.D. Cod. L. §59-11-21 (2009).  This provision overruled a contrary federal court decision.  See Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1393-95 (8th Cir. 1993) (purporting to apply South Dakota law, but really extending Knowlton (see Minnesota)).  Given the statute, we think South Dakota is reliably anti-general jurisdiction by consent.

Tennessee

Tennessee state courts “historically” allowed consent on the basis of registration, Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 756 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tenn. 1988) (dictum), but such cases were all pre-Bauman.  Cf. First Community Bank, N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 489 S.W.3d 369, 401-02 (Tenn. 2015) (finding issue waived post-Bauman).  Even before Bauman, Tennessee precedent was not uniform.  JRM Investments, Inc. v. National Standard, LLC, 2012 WL 1956421, at *3 (Tenn. App. May 31, 2012) (affirming dismissal of defendant admittedly with a Tennessee agent for service of process for lack of general jurisdiction); Ratledge v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 958 F. Supp.2d 827, 838 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (construing Davenport as relating to specific jurisdiction only).

Since Bauman, federal court decisions have rejected this theory.  In Bobick v. Wyndham Worldwide Operating, Inc., 2018 WL 4566804 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2018), “[a]ll of the . . . Defendants are registered to conduct business in Tennessee. ” Id. at *1.  Nonetheless, general jurisdiction was unavailable:

[T]he court lacks general jurisdiction over the . . . Defendants.  None of the . . . Defendants is “at home” in Tennessee. . . .  [Plaintiffs] do not contend that the . . . Defendants’ contacts with Tennessee are atypical relative to the companies’ contacts in other states or that senior management decisions are made in Tennessee.  Alleging only that the[y] . . . do considerable business in Tennessee . . . is insufficient to establish that they are subject to general jurisdiction here.

Id. at *5.  See Western Express, Inc. v. Villanueva, 2017 WL 4785831, at *5-7 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2017) (“it is clear that [defendant’s] designation of an agent for service of process, standing alone, [did] not constitute consent to the general jurisdiction” in Tennessee; “mere designation of an agent for service of process in a particular state, in compliance with a state statute, standing alone, does not constitute consent to general jurisdiction within that state”); Bauer v. Nortek Global HVAC LLC, 2016 WL 5724232, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016) (“consent” argument “failed to make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction” because “the mere presence of a defendant in the forum does not subject it to all-purpose jurisdiction”).

Tennessee has been improving so we no longer rate it as undecided, but now put it (tentatively, until we have appellate authority) in the anti-consent category.

Texas

Both state and federal Texas appellate courts have ruled that registration to do business does not amount to consent to jurisdiction.  Before Bauman, Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App. 1997), held that, “[b]y registering to do business, a foreign corporation only potentially subjects itself to jurisdiction.”  Id. at 416 (emphasis original).  Accord Asshauer v. Glimcher Realty Trust, 228 S.W.3d 922, 933 (Tex. App. 2007); (quoting Conner); Juarez v. United Parcel Service de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 933 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tex. App. 1996) (“the designation of an agent for service of process, without more, does not satisfy due process requirements for the exercise of general jurisdiction”); Ford Motor Co. v. Cejas, 2018 WL 1003791, at *7-10 (Tex. App. Feb. 22, 2018) (plaintiffs “have not alleged jurisdictional facts to support the trial court’s finding that [defendants’] affiliations with Texas are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [them] essentially at home’ in Texas”; both defendants alleged to have Texas registered agents, among numerous other in-state contacts) (unpublished); Salgado v. OmniSource Corp., 2017 WL 4508085, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 2017) (a registered agent “without evidence of substantial business relations or other contacts, is not enough to subject a nonresident defendant to general jurisdiction”) (citation omitted) (unpublished); Northern Frac Proppants, II, LLC v. 2011 NF Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 3275896, at *16 (Tex. App. July 27, 2017) (“general jurisdiction . . . not established by showing that foreign business entities . . . were registered to do business” and “had registered agents for service of process”) (unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, weighed in with Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (“the mere act of registering an agent . . . does not act as consent to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute with any party anywhere concerning any matt er”). In Texas, “[t]he lines drawn by [Bauman] appear to act as absolute hard boundaries in the general jurisdiction context.”  Michelin North America, Inc. v. DeSantiago, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2018 WL 3654919, at *7 (Tex. App. Aug. 2, 2018).

Numerous district courts agree.  Wartsila North America, Inc. v. International Center for Dispute Resolution, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 3870015, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2018) (“‘doing business’ and being ‘at home’ are not similar standards”; being “licensed in Texas,” along with other in-state contacts, “are not sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction under [Bauman]”; declining to follow Bors (see Pennsylvania)); Cunningham v. Nationwide Security Solutions, Inc., 2018 WL 4575005, at *12 (Mag. N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) (registration to do business does “not show that the Court has general jurisdiction”), adopted, 2018 WL 4568803 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2018); Griffin v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3841890, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2017) (“the existence of a registered agent, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction”); Agribusiness United DMCC v. Blue Water Shipping Co., 2017 WL 1354144, at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. April 13, 2017) (“while having a registered agent in Texas may reflect the reasonable anticipation of being haled into court in this forum related to activities in the state, it does not reflect an expectation of being haled into court for activities unrelated to Defendant’s contacts with Texas”); Axxess Technology Solutions Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp., 2017 WL 3841604, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2017) (allegation that defendant “registered to do business in Texas” insufficient to establish general jurisdiction); Clasen v. National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, Inc., 2015 WL 9489507, at *4 (Mag. E.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2015) (“although [defendant] has a registered agent in Texas, this alone does not establish general jurisdiction”), adopted, 2016 WL 890675 (E.D. Tex. March 9, 2016); ADT, LLC v. Capital Connect, Inc., 2015 WL 7352199, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015) (following Wenche); Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Publishing Ltd., 2015 WL 5227955, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015) (“effecting service in the forum State on a registered corporate agent is not enough to show personal jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation”), aff’d on other grounds, 647 F. Appx. 455 (5th Cir. 2016); Fiduciary Network, LLC v. Buehler, 2015 WL 2165953, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2015) (consent through “registration of an agent for process and registration to do business” will not suffice for general jurisdiction); Haskett v. Continental Land Resources, LLC, 2015 WL 1419731, at *6 (S.D. Tex. March 27, 2015) (“registering as a foreign entity in a state, [and] nominating a registered agent for service of process . . . do not establish . . . general jurisdiction”), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 668 F. Appx. 133 (5th Cir. 2016); Transverse, LLC v. Info Directions, Inc., 2013 WL 3146838, at *5 (Mag. W.D. Tex. June 17, 2013) (“Courts have consistently held that the appointment of an agent of process alone does not suffice to allow for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”), adopted, 2013 WL 12133970 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 545 F. Supp.2d 562, 569 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (“A party does not consent to personal jurisdiction merely by complying with a state’s registration statutes or appointing an agent for service of process.”); Goodman v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 2006 WL 8432867, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006) (“That [defendant] was still registered to do business in Texas at the time [plaintiff] sustained his alleged injuries and at the time suit was filed is not dispositive of the general jurisdiction issue.”); Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Transportes de Nuevo Laredo, 879 F. Supp. 699, 700-01 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (Texas certificate to do business does not establish general jurisdiction); Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (“A foreign corporation must have contact, other than mere compliance with Texas domestication requirements, to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas.”).  Cf. Johnston v. Multidata Systems International Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Never before have we held that licenses to do work can create general jurisdiction.”) (applying Texas law).  But see Del Castillo v. PMI Holdings North America, Inc., 2015 WL 3833447, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2015) (allowing general jurisdiction based on registration and agent for service of process).  Texas doesn’t put up with this general jurisdiction by consent nonsense.

Utah

Utah’s registration statute “[does] not create an independent basis for jurisdiction.”  Utah Code Ann. §16-17-401 (2013).  Utah precedent rejects general jurisdiction by consent. See Staker & Parson Cos. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 2018 WL 3575314, at *2 (D. Utah July 25, 2018) (despite defendant’s in-state registration to do business and agent for service of process, “its affiliations with Utah are insufficient to render it essentially at home in Utah”); Oversen v. Kelle’s Transportation Service, 2016 WL 8711343, at *3 (D. Utah May 12, 2016) (rejecting general jurisdiction; noting “the constitutional questions that would arise if the [registration] statute were interpreted to require that all entities must consent to general personal jurisdiction in Utah”); Ayers v. Tanami Trading Corp., 2009 WL 1362402, at *3 (D. Utah May 14, 2009) (“[d]esignating an agent for the service of process within a state, without more, is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”); Miller v. Robertson, 2008 WL 270761, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 29, 2008) (“qualifying to do business or appointing a registered agent are relevant factors . . ., but they are not decisive by themselves”).  Utah is favorable.

Vermont

Vermont’s statute and state court cases provide no guidance.  Federal courts have predicted that Vermont would reject consent to general jurisdiction based on registration  Bertolini-Mier v. Upper Valley Neurology Neurosurgery, P.C., 2016 WL 7174646, at *4 (D. Vt. Dec. 7, 2016) (“mere registration to do business in Vermont is not determinative of the jurisdictional questions in this case,” following Brown, (see Connecticut)); Viko v. World Vision Inc., 2009 WL 2230919, at *7 (D. Vt. July 24, 2009) (“compliance with Vermont’s foreign corporation registration statute does not entail consent to general personal jurisdiction, at least independently of the minimum contacts required by due process”); cf. Hegemann v. M & M American, Inc., 2018 WL 4502181, at *6 (D. Vt. Sept. 20, 2018) (relying on much of same  anti-consent precedent to hold that registration under federal motor carrier statute did not create general jurisdiction.  Vermont thus looks good.

Virginia

Virginia law has long recognized that “a finding of general personal jurisdiction on the basis of registration and appointment of an agent alone is extremely conducive to forum shopping because many companies have registered to do business and appointed an agent for service of process in numerous states.”  Reynolds & Reynolds Holdings, Inc. v. Data Supplies, Inc., 301 F. Supp.2d 545, 551 (E.D. Va. 2004).  “A nonresident corporation consents to jurisdiction in a state’s courts by actually doing business in that state, not simply by fulfilling a state-law requirement that it register and appoint an agent for service of process so that it potentially could do business there.”  Id.  Most recently, a Virginia trial court followed Reynolds in ruling that “[d]esignating an agent does not amount to continuous and systematic operations that render [defendant] ‘essentially at home’ in Virginia, as is minimally required for general personal jurisdiction.”  New York Commercial Bank v. Heritage Green Development, LLC, 2017 WL 954197, at *2 (Va. Cir. March 7, 2017).  An older case, Cognitronics Imaging Systems, Inc. v. Recognition Research, Inc., 83 F. Supp.2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2000), discussed the pre-Bauman “divergent approaches” in a patent case, but avoided deciding the issue.  Id. at 693-94.  We think Virginia will follow the majority rule.

Virgin Islands

Citing Bauman’s “reluctance to extend general jurisdiction,” In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 2014 WL 5394310 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) (applying Virgin Islands law), held that a defendant’s current Virgin Islands license to do business and agent for service of process were “not so significant that they could substitute for its place of incorporation or principal place of business.”  Id. at *9.  The relevant statute “personal jurisdiction based on enduring relationship,” restricts jurisdiction to those “domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining . . . its principal place of business in, this territory.”  5 V.I.C. § 4902.  Not a lot to go on, but what there is looks good.

Washington

Washington’s long arm statute provides that “designation or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity.”  Wash. Rev. Code §§23.95.460.  Therefore, “[a] certificate of authority to do business and appointment of a registered agent do not then confer general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. ” Washington Equipment Manufacturing Co. v. Concrete Placing Co., 931 P.2d 170, 173 (Wash. App. 1997); accord Anglin v. 21st Century Insurance Co., 2003 WL 1076538, at *2 (Wash. App. March 10, 2003) (“registering to do business in Washington alone is an insufficient basis for imposing jurisdiction on a foreign corporation”; defendant “did not consent to jurisdiction in Washington courts simply by registering to do business in this state”) (unpublished); Korzyk v. Swank Enterprises, Inc., 2005 WL 1378758, at *11 (E.D. Wash. June 9, 2005) (“a foreign corporation’s obtaining a certificate of authority to do business in Washington, and the appointment of a registered agent to transact business in Washington, do not constitute consent to general personal jurisdiction”).

Post-Bauman Washington precedent rejects general jurisdiction by consent.  Dokoozian Construction LLC v. Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Co., 2015 WL 12085859, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2015) (“reject[ing] the idea that the appointment of an agent for service of process alone works as consent to be sued in that state”); United States ex rel. Imco General Construction, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 2014 WL 4364854, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3, 2014) (basing general jurisdiction on registration to do business was “exorbitant” assertion of jurisdiction barred by Bauman); Cox v. Alco Industries, Inc., 2015 WL 10891167, at *4-6 (Wash. Super. Sept. 10, 2015) (registration to do business, even with other contacts, insufficient to support general jurisdiction; following Brown (see Connecticut)).  Washington looks solid.

West Virginia

The West Virginia long arm statute provides that “only a cause of action arising from or growing out of one or more of the acts specified . . . may be asserted.  W. Va. Code Ann. §56-3-33.  The corporate registration statute provides:

(d) A foreign corporation is deemed to be transacting business in this state if . . . [t]he corporation manufactures, sells, offers for sale or supplies any product in a defective condition and that product causes injury to any person or property within this state notwithstanding the fact that the corporation had no agents, servants or employees or contacts within this state at the time of the injury

W. Va. Code §31D-15-1501(d) (emphasis added).  While this statute may have other constitutional problems, it is not a vehicle for litigation tourism.

Pre-Bauman federal courts have held that corporate registration alone did not establish general jurisdiction.  Gallaher v. KBR, Inc., 2010 WL 2901626, at *10 (N.D.W. Va. July 21, 2010) (corporate registration and having agent for service of process “are not sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction”); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (D. Md. 1981) (“With no contact with West Virginia . . ., [defendant’s] consent [by registering to do business] to jurisdiction is an insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction”) (applying West Virginia law), aff’d on other grounds, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).

Post-Bauman, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals passed on an opportunity to address the limits to general jurisdiction in State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. McGraw, 788 S.E.2d 319, (W. Va. 2016), because of an insufficient record.  Id. at 334-35.  Plaintiff in McGraw had asserted registration to do business, among a variety of other non-record facts.  Id. at 334.  A federal court rejected general jurisdiction by consent in

[T]he facts contained within the complaint are insufficient to establish . . . general . . . jurisdiction. . . .  [T]he Plaintiff avers that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant simply because it is a corporation that is registered to do business, and in fact does business, in this state. . . .  This information does not comport with the requirements announced in BNSF and does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.

Javage v. General Motors, LLC, 2017 WL 6403036, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 18, 2017) (simultaneous discussion of specific jurisdiction omitted), aff’d, 736 F. Appx. 418 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming “for the reasons stated by the district court”).

West Virginia looks like it would reject general jurisdiction by consent where registration/agent for service of process is the only alleged tie to the state.

Wisconsin

The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected general jurisdiction by consent in Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 898 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 2017).  Expansive jurisdiction by consent “would extend Wisconsin’s exercise of general jurisdiction beyond the tapered limits recently described by the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 80.  “A foreign corporation’s contacts with Wisconsin would be irrelevant so long as it registered an agent for service of process − which all foreign corporations authorized to transact business in this state must do,” which would render the Long Arm statute “idle and nugatory.”  Id. at 79.

The shade of constitutional doubt that Goodyear and [Bauman] cast on broad approaches to general jurisdiction informs our assessment of this court’s older cases. . . .  [W]e instead give preference to prevailing due process standards when interpreting a contemporary statute for the first time. . . .  [S]ubjecting foreign corporations to general jurisdiction wherever they register an agent for service of process would reflect the “sprawling view of general jurisdiction” rejected by the Supreme Court.

Id. at 81-82 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Pa. Fire, by contrast, “represent[ed] a disfavored approach to general jurisdiction.”  Id. at 82.  Contrary language in two earlier cases was disavowed.  Id. at 81-83 (criticizing Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1975), and State ex rel. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Fowler, 220 N.W. 534 (Wis. 1928)).  Now solid.

Wyoming

There is utterly no Wyoming precedent on the issue of general jurisdiction by consent through registration or appointment of an agent, and the statutes are silent.  See Wyo. Stat. §§5-1-107, 17-16-1501.  An ancient case contains the language:

A foreign corporation is not doing, carrying on, transacting, or engaging in business in a state, within the meaning of the statutes under consideration, by merely appointing an agent for the transaction of future business.

Creamery Package Manufacturing Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 166 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1946) (quoting Corpus Juris).  Creamery Package, however, was a tax case.

While it is probably likely that Wyoming would follow the majority rule rejecting such jurisdiction, it would be pure speculation to assign Wyoming to either side of the debate with no on-point precedent.

We’ve already unloaded on Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL 3030754 (Pa. Super. June 19, 2018), where the court made a virtually unprecedented holding that a defendant challenging personal jurisdiction on Due Process grounds had the burden of proof in the course of allowing a litigation tourist from Indiana to stay in Pennsylvania, based on “contacts” that had no causal relationship to that plaintiff’s injuries.  Hammons involved high profile mass tort litigation, and we’re sure the story there is far from over.

Now there’s Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. International Rug Group, LLC, ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL 3153602 (Pa. Super. June 28, 2018), a small commission dispute case involving a single event in Canada.  Heck, the non-resident defendant was not even registered in Pennsylvania until after the events in question.  Id. at *1.  In Webb-Benjamin, another panel of the same court has ruled that a corporation’s mere act of registering to do business in Pennsylvania subjected it to general personal jurisdiction, supposedly because registration equals “consent” and consent is a separate basis for personal jurisdiction not subject to the Due Process analysis.

Webb-Benjamin relied almost exclusively on Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp.3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (which we criticized here), and an asbestos case following Bors, Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 303 F. Supp.3d 278 (M.D. Pa. 2018). Webb-Benjamin, 2018 WL 3030754, at *4.  Thus,

Guided by the reasoning in Bors and Gorton, we conclude that [Bauman] does not eliminate consent as a method of obtaining personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5301, Pennsylvania may exercise general personal jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] claims against [defendant].

Id. at *5.

The analysis in Webb-Benjamin and the two district court cases is fairly simple.  First, the aforementioned §5301(a) “qualification as a foreign entity under the laws of this Commonwealth” is a “sufficient basis . . . to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person.”  Second, registration is a form of “consent” to personal jurisdiction.  Third, “consent” is distinct ground for general personal jurisdiction not subject to the ordinary general jurisdiction tests enunciated in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).  That’s simple, but also simply wrong.

First, the statute says what it says.  But a state statute cannot trump federal Due Process – that’s what the Supremacy Clause is all about.  Thus, Judge New recognized that to interpret the state’s registration statute in this fashion renders it unconstitutional as applied to a non-resident corporation being sued by a non-resident plaintiff over activities outside the state of Pennsylvania:

Under the current state of Pennsylvania law, the only way foreign corporations such as Defendant can avoid Pennsylvania courts’ assertion of general jurisdiction over them is for those corporations to avoid doing business in Pennsylvania.  Faced with this Hobson’s choice, a foreign corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania can hardly be characterized as voluntary.  In light of the Supreme Court’s repeated admonishment that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from claiming general jurisdiction over every corporation doing business within its borders, it logically follows the Due Process Clause also prohibits a state from forcing every corporation doing business within its borders to consent to general jurisdiction.

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 2018 WL 3025283, at *5 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co. May 30, 2018) (citations omitted).  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a corporate defendant must be “at home” in order to justify general jurisdiction – not merely that it conduct “continuous and substantial” business.  E.g., BSNF Railway. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).

Personal jurisdiction, “represents a restriction on judicial power . . . as a matter of individual liberty.”  Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).  A mere state statute cannot change federal constitutional law.  “By wrapping general jurisdiction in the cloak of consent, Pennsylvania’s mandated corporate registration attempts to do exactly what the United States Supreme court prohibited.”  Mallory, 2018 WL 3025283, at *6.  Indeed, the same Pennsylvania statute expressly recognizes Due Process limitations.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5308 (“tribunals of this Commonwealth may exercise jurisdiction under this subchapter only where the contact with this Commonwealth is sufficient under the Constitution of the United States”); 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5307 (jurisdiction only extends “to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States”).

Nor does Webb-Benjamin’s step two accurately state the law.  The Pennsylvania statute itself treats registration and consent as separate means of obtaining general jurisdiction.

(a) General rule. − The existence of any of the following relationships . . . shall constitute a sufficient basis . . . [for] general personal jurisdiction. . . .

(i) Formation under or qualification as a foreign entity under the laws of this Commonwealth.

(ii) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.

(iii) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business within this Commonwealth.

42 Pa. C.S. §5301(a)(1-3) (emphasis added).  On its face, the statute plainly distinguishes between registration and consent.  They are different bases for jurisdiction.  Webb-Benjamin improperly merges subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii).

Nor does the United States Supreme Court currently (as opposed to 100 years ago) consider registration to do business as a form of consent.  Generally, the Court has dispensed with “the fiction[] of implied consent to service on the part of a foreign corporation” in favor of “ascertain[ing] what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to local suit.”  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1977).

We initially upheld these [corporate registration] laws under the Due Process Clause on grounds that they complied with Pennoyer’s rigid requirement of either “consent,” or “presence.”   As many observed, however, the consent and presence were purely fictional.

Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (citations omitted).

Further, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court listed the currently recognized ways by which a defendant could “consent” to personal jurisdiction in the forum:  (1) “submi[ssion] to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance”; (2) “parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court”; (3) “a stipulation entered into by the defendant”; (4) “agreements to arbitrate”; (5) “a judgment in personam may be rendered in a cross-action against a plaintiff in its courts”; (6) “waive[r] if not timely raised”; and (7) “fail[ure] to comply with a pretrial discovery order.”  456 U.S. at 705-06.  Corporate registration to do business is conspicuously absent from this list.  See also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880-81 (2011) (more recent discussion of consent likewise omitting corporate registration).  Registration is not consent.  To the contrary, a state may not “requir[e] the corporation, as a condition precedent to obtaining a permit to do business within the State, to surrender a right and privilege secured to it by the Constitution.”  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595, 607 (2013) (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 207 (1892)).

To conduct any business in Pennsylvania, however slight, a foreign corporation must register. 15 Pa. C.S. §412(a).  All 50 states and the District of Columbia have similar laws.  E.g., T. Monestier, “Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, & the Fallacy of Consent,” 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343, 1363-64 n.109 (2015) (string cite of all 50 states’ registration statutes).  Thus, if an authorizing statute was sufficient to create general jurisdiction – whether called “consent” or anything else – a corporation could constitutionally be subjected to general jurisdiction in every state where they conducted business, whether or no not the business was “continuous and substantial” – indeed even if they actually did no business at all (recall that the defendant in Webb-Benjamin only registered after the events at suit).  That result is incompatible with Bauman, which held that to “approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” would be “unacceptably grasping.”  571 U.S. at 138 (quotation marks omitted).  Since Webb-Benjamin’s “consent” theory does not even require “continuous and substantial” corporate activity as a predicate to general jurisdiction, Due Process does not allow theories of jurisdiction that would expose a corporation to suit for anything in any state:

[T]he same global reach would presumably be available in every other State. . . .  Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.

Id. at 139 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  “A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”  Id. at 139 n.20.  “[I]n-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction.”  Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.

Unlike Webb-Benjamin, almost every other appellate court in the country has read the Supreme Court’s decisions in BSNF, Bauman, and Goodyear to mean what they say, and has recognized the handwriting on the wall against expansive jurisdiction by consent theories.  We’ll start with Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016), since:  (1) Delaware knows something about corporate law, and (2) until Bauman, Delaware law had recognized precisely the same consent theory of jurisdiction as Webb-Benjamin.  No longer.  Cepec understood that general jurisdiction by consent merely by means of registration to do business is incompatible with Bauman:

An incentive scheme where every state can claim general jurisdiction over every business that does any business within its borders for any claim would reduce the certainty of the law and subject businesses to capricious litigation treatment as a cost of operating on a national scale or entering any state’s market.  [Bauman] makes plain that it is inconsistent with principles of due process to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that is not “essentially at home” in a state for claims having no rational connection to the state.  The foreign corporation in this case does not have its principal place of business in Delaware; nor is there any other plausible basis on which Delaware is essentially its home.  Hence, Delaware cannot exercise general jurisdiction over it consistent with principles of due process.

137 A.3d at 127-28 (footnote omitted)

General jurisdiction by consent was likewise rejected in State ex. rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 51-53 (Mo. 2017).  The court first observed, citing Cepec, that “a broad inference of consent based on registration would allow national corporations to be sued in every state, rendering [Bauman] pointless.”  Id. at 51.  It therefore refused to interpret its statute to raise such constitutional questions.  “The plain language of Missouri’s registration statutes does not mention consent to personal jurisdiction for unrelated claims.”  Id. at 52. Accord State ex rel. Bayer Corp. v. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227, 232-33 (Mo. 2017) (following Dolan in prescription medical product case).

Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440 (Ill. 2017), rejected the proposition that corporate registration creates general jurisdiction:

[T]hat a foreign corporation registered to do business in Illinois is subject to the same duties as a domestic one in no way suggests that the foreign corporation has consented to general jurisdiction. . . .  [T]hat a foreign corporation has registered to do business under the Act does not mean that the corporation has thereby consented to general jurisdiction over all causes of action, including those that are completely unrelated to the corporation’s activities in Illinois.

Id. at 447-48.  Accord Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2018 WL 2305692, at *4 (Ill. App. May 18, 2018) (“Nor does the fact that [defendant] has a registered agent for service of process in Illinois show that it consented to jurisdiction in this State”) (following Aspen).

In the otherwise unfortunate Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), reversed, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), the California Supreme Court likewise held that “a corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process, when required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to its California transactions.”  Id. at 798.  See also Am Trust v. UBS AG, 681 F. Appx. 587, 589 (9th Cir. 2017) (consent to jurisdiction not required of corporations registering to do business) (applying California law).  The same conclusion governs Wisconsin law.  In Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 898 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 2017), the court overturned lower court precedent, cautioning that it “generally avoids interpreting statutes in a way that places their constitutionality in question,” which was precisely basing general jurisdiction on corporate registration would do:

The shade of constitutional doubt that Goodyear and [Bauman] cast on broad approaches to general jurisdiction informs our assessment of this court’s older cases. . . .  Significantly, the [Bauman] Court cautioned that “cases decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking should not attract heavy reliance today.”  134 S.Ct. at 761 n.18 (citation omitted). . . .  [W]e  instead give preference to prevailing due process standards when interpreting a contemporary statute for the first time. . . .  [S]ubjecting foreign corporations to general jurisdiction wherever they register an agent for service of process would reflect the “sprawling view of general jurisdiction” rejected by the Supreme Court.

Id. at 82.  Accord Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co., 390 P.3d 1019, 1021-22 (Or. 2017) (“we conclude that appointing a registered agent to receive service of process merely designates a person upon whom process may be served.  It does not constitute implied consent to the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts.”); Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 379 P.3d 1033, 1038 (Colo. 2016) (corporate registration cannot support general jurisdiction where defendant’s in-state contacts “pale in comparison to the significant contacts that were deemed ‘slim’ in” Bauman).

So that’s seven state high courts rejecting general jurisdiction based on considering registration to do business as “consent” since Bauman – to zero in favor.

Appellate authority in other jurisdictions is in accord with the above decisions.  The Second Circuit in Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Connecticut law), refused to “err[] in casually dismissing related federal due process concerns” and became the first post-Bauman appellate decision to reject “consent” based on mere registration to do business as a basis for general personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 636.  “[T]he history of such statutes suggests that assent only to specific jurisdiction is what the statute required.” Id. at 637. So-called “consent” jurisdiction, if generally conferred by registration to do business raises the same constitutional concerns that drove the result in Bauman:

In any event, we can say that the analysis that now governs general jurisdiction over foreign corporations − the Supreme Court’s analysis having moved . . . to the more demanding “essentially at home” test . . . − suggests that federal due process rights likely constrain an interpretation that transforms a run‐of‐the‐mill registration and appointment statute into a corporate “consent” − perhaps unwitting − to the exercise of general jurisdiction by state courts.

Id.  “If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in state agent – without an express consent to general jurisdiction – nonetheless sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and [Bauman’s] ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back‐door thief.”  Id. at 640.  See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lemaire, 395 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Ariz. App. 2017) (“there is no need to base personal jurisdiction solely upon a murky implication of consent to suit − for all purposes and in all cases − from the bare appointment of an agent for service.  We therefore agree with those decisions holding that registration statutes do not imply consent to general jurisdiction.”); Magwitch, LLC v. Pusser’s West Indies, Ltd., 200 So.3d 216, 218 (Fla. App. 2016) (registration cannot create general jurisdiction; old law “has yielded to the two-prong analysis for long-arm jurisdiction set forth in recent decades by the Supreme Court”); Dutch Run Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block LLP, 164 A.3d 435, 444-45 (N.J. App. Div. 2017) (court could not “agree business registration rises to consent to submit to the general jurisdiction in the forum,” given Bauman’s “clear narrow application of general jurisdiction”); Stisser v. SP Bancorp, Inc., 174 A.3d 405 (Md. App. 2017); Salgado v. OmniSource Corp., 2017 WL 4508085, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 2017) (having a “registered agent in Texas . . . [alone] is not enough to subject a nonresident defendant to general jurisdiction”) (unpublished); Northern Frac Proppants, II, LLC v. 2011 NF Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 3275896, at *16 (Tex. App. July 27, 2017) (“general jurisdiction contacts are not established by showing that foreign business entities . . . were registered to do business in Texas, and had registered agents for service of process in Texas”) (unpublished); Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 717 F. Appx. 394, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting “other outdated view[s] of general jurisdiction”; no general jurisdiction by reason of corporate registration) (applying Louisiana law).

There are literally dozens of trial court level decisions in numerous other states that also reject corporate registration as a basis for general jurisdiction when a corporate defendant is not “at home” under Tyrell/Bauman.  For prior decisions, see our 50-state survey on jurisdiction by consent.  For future decisions (not divided by state) see our post-BMS jurisdictional cheat sheet.

With WebbBenjamin, those of us who defend cases in Pennsylvania now have to cope with loopy Superior Court decisions on both general and specific jurisdiction.  Pennsylvania’s prior reputation as a hotbed of litigation tourism remains well and fairly earned.  Expect multiple appeals to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and perhaps even higher, to the United States Supreme Court.

In the wake of the defense wins during the last Supreme Court term in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017) (“BMS”), and BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017), we’re retiring the personal jurisdiction cheat sheet we had been maintaining for the last three-plus years since Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) (“Bauman”).  That cheat sheet, as our readers know, had covered general jurisdiction cases generally – all areas, not just prescription medical product liability, or product liability generally.  That was a big undertaking, but we did it because litigation tourism was, and remains, a huge issue for our clients.  Now we think that, between them, BMS, BNSF, and Bauman have now settled the larger general jurisdiction point.

So we think we can be more focused going forward in our ongoing monitoring of personal jurisdiction cases. So we’re creating a new cheat sheet devoted to a couple of specific lingering issues.  The first of these issues is the so-called (at least by us) “jurisdiction by consent” theory – that general personal jurisdiction is created in a state when a corporation registers to do business/appoints an agent for service of process in a state.  Since all states have such registration statutes, recognition of that theory would do what the United States Supreme Court has now held multiple times that Due Process prohibits – allowing a corporation to be sued in many jurisdictions where it is not “at home” by anybody, in particular out-of state litigation tourists.  Not surprisingly, since Bauman most courts have rejected this theory (as the cases below demonstrate) as incompatible with Due Process, but since the Supreme Court has not put a stake through itself, plaintiffs still raise it relatively frequently.

Almost all of the older – that is to say, pre-BMS − decisions in this new cheat sheet address jurisdiction by consent theories.  We were keeping specific track of jurisdiction by consent cases in our original cheat sheet, so we’ve pulled out those cases and compiled them here.

Another reason for keeping track of jurisdiction by consent cases is that we litigate a lot in Pennsylvania, and we expect Pennsylvania to be Ground Zero for the battle over this theory.  An unfortunate combination – Pennsylvania’s unique registration statute (42 Pa. C.S.A. §5301) that actually specifies “general” jurisdiction, and adverse pre-Bauman Third Circuit precedent interpreting Pennsylvania law (Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1991)) – have led some Pennsylvania courts to ignore constitutional Due Process as interpreted by BMS and Bauman and hold mandatory registration to do business in Pennsylvania somehow to equate with “consent” to general jurisdiction.  E.g., Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017); Hegna v. Smitty’s Supply, Inc., 2017 WL 2563231, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017); Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp.3d 648, 653–55 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

Surely, most Pennsylvania lawyers and judges learned in law school like we did that a state statute can’t override federal constitutional Due Process guarantees, but the litigation tourism industry in Pennsylvania is entrenched and well-funded.  Given that that most of plaintiffs’ other favorite jurisdictions:  California, Illinois, Missouri, and New Jersey, to name a few (see below for details), do not recognize jurisdiction by consent as a matter of state law, we expect to have a ring-side seat as the consent issue is eventually appealed, perhaps interlocutorily, from some Pennsylvania court all the way to the United States Supreme Court if necessary.

The second jurisdictional theory we’ll be keeping track of in this cheat sheet is what we call “BMS-lite.”  This is a litigation tourist’s last gasp in jurisdictions, such as those listed below, that have already rejected jurisdiction by consent. BMS-lite is the variant of specific jurisdiction based on corporate activities related, not to any plaintiff’s case, but to the product in general, that plaintiffs will argue somehow “caused” their injuries in a broad sense and thus justifies opening the courthouse doors in multiple states to litigation tourists.  We discussed an early example of that recently, and the theory’s most notable exemplar, M.M. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 61 N.E.3d 1026 (Ill. App. 2016). M.M. (and the post-BMS case we discussed) predicated “specific” jurisdiction on the very non-specific fact that some of the drug’s clinical trials (17 of 361) included in-state investigators.

The type of facts that M.M. seized upon to preserve Illinois’ litigation tourism business don’t involve the plaintiffs, so “a defendant’s relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  As the Illinois Supreme Court held, albeit in a discussion of general jurisdiction, in late September, 2017:

[P]laintiff has established that defendant does business in Illinois through the warehouse. . . .  But this fact falls far short of showing that Illinois is a surrogate home for defendant.  Indeed, if the operation of the warehouse was sufficient, in itself, to establish general jurisdiction, then defendant would also be at home in all the other states where its warehouses are located. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this reasoning.

Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ill. 2017).  Substitute “clinical trial” for “warehouse” in this Aspen Insurance quote and you’ve got M.M.

Thus, we believe that, short of a major causal tie – such as the product being manufactured in the forum state in a manufacturing defect case – we don’t think BMS-lite theories are of any greater constitutional validity than what was rejected in BMS itself, so we’ll also be collecting favorable cases that make such holdings.  But so far, given how recent BMS is, we haven’t seen any favorable cases.  We expect them to be coming.

As always, with cheat sheets, we don’t do the other side’s research for them, so we won’t be including any bad cases.

With all this in mind, here is our Post-BMS Personal Jurisdiction Cheat Sheet:

  1. Renfroe v. Nichols Wire & Aluminum Co., 83 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 1957) (Michigan) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Registration to do business did not subject a corporate defendant to litigation having nothing to do with Michigan.
  2. Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1965) (North Carolina) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss affirmed on specific jurisdiction grounds. The casual presence of an agent for service of process is not enough to subject a corporation to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities within the state.
  3. Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. June 29, 1971) (South Carolina) (prescription medical product liability). Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Application to do business and the appointment of an agent for service does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  4. Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. March 6, 1975) (New Mexico) (non-product liability).  Affirming grant of motion to dismiss.  Registration to do business is not enough to subject a corporation to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities within the state.
  5. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 1981) (West Virginia) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business is not consent to general personal jurisdiction. Modified on other grounds, 541 F. Supp. 62; affirmed on other grounds, 704 F.2d 125.
  6. Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983) (Arkansas) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Appointment of an agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction.
  7. Gray Line Tours v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Cal. App. June 5. 1987) (California) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business in California alone was not consent to general jurisdiction.
  8. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 540 A.2d 482 (Md. 1988) (Maryland) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Agent for service of process insufficient to permit general jurisdiction.
  9. Jones v. Family Inns of America, 1989 WL 57130 (E.D. La. May 23, 1989) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Designation of agent for service of process alone cannot be sufficient minimum contacts.
  10. Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. May 17, 1990) (Maine) (product liability – non drug/device).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Corporation that was licensed to do business in forum and had appointed agent for service of process did not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  11. Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 1990) (Indiana) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss remanded.  Registration to do business alone is not a basis for general personal jurisdiction.
  12. Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. July 17, 1992) (Texas) (product liability – non drug/device).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  13. Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1993) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business was not automatic consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  14. Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1993) (Ohio)  (product liability – non drug/device).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  15. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Transportes de Nuevo Laredo, 879 F.Supp. 699 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1994) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  A certificate to do business does not create general personal jurisdiction.
  16. Samuelson v. Honeywell, 863 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 1994) (Oklahoma) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  General personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over corporation based on its registration to do business.
  17. Juarez v. United Parcel Service de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 933 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 1996) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  That foreign corporation had registered to do business and appointed agent in state did not confer general personal jurisdiction.
  18. Washington Equipment Manufacturing Co. v. Concrete Placing Co., 931 P.2d 170 (Wash App. Feb. 13, 1997) (Washington) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  That foreign corporation had registered to do business and appointed agent in state did not confer general personal jurisdiction.
  19. Atkinson & Mullen Travel Inc. v. New York Apple Tours Inc., 1998 WL 750355 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 1998) (New Jersey).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  20. Sofrar, S.A. v. Graham Engineering Corp., 35 F. Supp.2d 919 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 1999) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process and registration to do business were insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  21. Allied Carriers Exchange, Inc. v. All. Shippers, Inc., 1999 WL 35363796 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 1999) (Colorado) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Appointment of a registered agent does not necessarily subject a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction.
  22. Freeman v. Second Judicial District, 1 P.3d 963 (Nev. June 9, 2000) (Nevada) (non-product liability). Mandamus from grant of motion to dismiss denied.  The mere act of appointing an agent to receive service of process does not subject a non-resident corporation to general jurisdiction.
  23. Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. July 5, 2000) (federal and Florida law) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  On a federal claim, the casual presence of a corporate agent for service of process anywhere in the United States is not enough to subject an overseas corporation to general personal jurisdiction.  Nor is the presence of a registered agent in a state sufficient under for that state to exercise general personal jurisdiction.
  24. Alderson v. Southern Co., 747 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. March 22, 2001) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Reversing denial of motion to dismiss.  Appointment of agent for service of process is not automatically “doing business” that gives rise to general personal jurisdiction.
  25. Smith v. S&S Dundalk Engineering Works, Ltd., 139 F. Supp.2d 610 (D.N.J. April 16, 2001) (New Jersey) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Designation of agent for service of process is not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  26. Lyons v. Swift Transportation Co., 2001 WL 1153001 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2001) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Designation of agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  27. DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 683 (Cal. App. Dec. 24, 2002) (California) (non-product liability).  Mandamus granted, reversing denial of motion to dismiss.  Designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business alone are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction.
  28. Tyler v. Gaines Motor Lines, Inc., 245 F. Supp.2d 730 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2003) (Maryland) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Having a registered agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  29. Thomson v. Anderson, 6 Cal. Rptr.3d 262 (Cal. App. Nov. 13, 2003) (California) (non-product liability). Quashing of service affirmed.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.
  30. Anglin v. 21st Century Insurance Co., 2003 WL 1076538  (Wash. App. March 10, 2003) (Washington) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.
  31. Reynolds & Reynolds Holdings, Inc. v. Data Supplies, Inc., 301 F. Supp.2d 545 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2004) (Virginia) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Complying with registration statutes and appointing an agent for service of process do not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  32. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 2005 WL 1363210 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2005) (Mississippi) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss tentatively granted, pending jurisdictional discovery.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  33. DNH, LLC v. In-N-Out Burgers, 381 F. Supp.2d 559 (E.D. La. June 24, 2005) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Qualifying to do business in a state and appointing an agent for service of process there do not amount to a general business presence that could sustain general personal jurisdiction.
  34. Gabrish v. Strickland Marine Agency, Inc., 2005 WL 5168410 (S.C. Dist. Dec. 2, 2005) (South Carolina) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction.
  35. Goodman v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 2006 WL 8432867 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006) (Texas) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not support general jurisdiction.
  36. In re Farmland Industries, Inc., 2007 WL 7694308 (M.D. Fla. March 30, 2007) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Summary judgment granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction.
  37. Asshauer v. Glimcher Realty Trust, 228 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App. July 12, 2007) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Affirming grant of motion to dismiss.  Registration to do business is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  38. Bray v. Fresenius Medical Care Aktiengesellschaft Inc., 2007 WL 7366260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2007) (Illinois) (prescription medical product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process is does not alone support general personal jurisdiction.
  39. Keston v. FirstCollect, Inc., 523 F. Supp.2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2007) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Presence of a corporate agent for service of process and a license to do business in a state are not enough to support general personal jurisdiction.
  40. Miller v. Robertson, 2008 WL 270761 (D. Utah Jan. 29, 2008) (Utah) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for process and registration to do business do not create general personal jurisdiction.
  41. North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. May 19, 2009) (Rhode Island) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss affirmed.  Appointment of an agent of process alone does not suffice to allow for the exercise of general jurisdiction.
  42. Ayers v. Tanami Trading Corp., 2009 WL 1362402 (D. Utah May 14, 2009) (Utah) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss denied on other grounds.  Designation of an agent for service of process is insufficient to permit general jurisdiction.
  43. Continental First Federal, Inc. v. Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 2009 WL 2032401 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2009) (Mississippi) (non-product liability).  Transfer denied.  Registering to do business and appointing an in-state agent for service of process do not establish general personal jurisdiction, so the matter cannot be transferred.
  44. Viko v. World Vision, Inc., 2009 WL 2230919 (D. Vt. July 24, 2009) (Vermont) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  A defendant foreign corporation’s registered agent does not, by itself, confer general personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
  45. Advanced Datacomm Testing Corp. v. PDIO, Inc., 2009 WL 2477559 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2009) (Maryland) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process do not create general personal jurisdiction.
  46. Davis v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 2009 WL 3335860 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2009) (New Jersey) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registering to do business and appointing an in-state agent for service of process do not establish general personal jurisdiction
  47. McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F. Supp.2d 883 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2010) (Indiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and having an agent for service of process are not sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.
  48. Cossaboon v. Maine Medical Center, 600 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. March 25, 2010) (New Hampshire) (non-product liability).  Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction affirmed.  Registration to do business alone is an insufficient basis on which to assert personal jurisdiction.
  49. Gallaher v. KBR, Inc., 2010 WL 2901626 (N.D.W. Va. July 21, 2010) (West Virginia) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and having an agent for service of process are not sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.
  50. Harrington v. C.H. Nickerson & Co., 2010 WL 3385034 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2010) (Rhode Island (non-product liability). In light of constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction, registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process do not constitute consent to general jurisdiction.
  51. Kubin v. Orange Lake Country Club, Inc., 2010 WL 3981908 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2010) (New Jersey) (product liability – non drug/device).  Transfer granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process do not create general personal jurisdiction.
  52. King v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (Montana) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Appointment of an agent for service of process does not, standing alone, create general personal jurisdiction in the absence of causal connection to the state.
  53. WorldCare Corp. v. World Insurance Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 341, 351-57 (D. Conn. 2011) (Connecticut) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process and registration to do business within the state is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  54. Crochet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 489204 (W.D. La. Feb. 13, 2012) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process and registration to do business within the state is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  55. In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 2012 WL 1345175 (E.D. Ky. April 18, 2012) (Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas) (prescription medical product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  56. JRM Investments, Inc. v. National Standard, LLC, 2012 WL 1956421 (Tenn. App. May 31, 2012) (Tennessee) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Appointment of an agent for service of process  is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  57. White Rosebay Shipping S.A. v. HNA Group Co., 2012 WL 6858239, at *14 (Mag. S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2012) (maritime law) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process  is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  58. Strickland v. Bae Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems, LP, 2013 WL 2554671 (D. Idaho June 10, 2013) (Idaho) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.   Appointment of an agent for service of process  is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  59. Transverse, LLC v. Info Directions, Inc., 2013 WL 3146838 (Mag. W.D. Tex. June 17, 2013) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process  is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.  Adopted, 2013 WL 12133970 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013).
  60. Mio, LLC v. Valentino’s, Inc., 2013 WL 3364392 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Summary judgment granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction.
  61. Kuennen v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL 5873277 (W.D. Va. Oct. 30, 2013) (District of Columbia) (prescription medical product liability). Summary judgment granted.  A business certificate and appointed agent are not independent support for general jurisdiction.
  62. ACUITY v. Roadtec, Inc., 2013 WL 6632631, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013) (product liability – non drug/device).  Registration to do business, even with other contacts insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.
  63. Louisiana Limestone & Logistics, LLC v. Granite Group International, Inc., 2014 WL 1217956 (W.D. La. Feb. 28, 2014) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Presence of the registered agent and registered business office alone is insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.
  64. Robinson v. Knight Protective Service, Inc., 2014 WL 1326096 (S.D. Miss. March 31, 2014) (Mississippi) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.
  65. Rawlins v. Select Specialty Hospital , Inc., 2014 WL 1647182 (N.D. Ill. April 23, 2014) (Illinois) (non-product liability) Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of an agent for service of process  is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  66. Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp.3d 390 (D. Conn. May 14, 2014) (Connecticut) (product liability – non drug/device).  Asbestos motion to dismiss granted.  Corporate registration/agent for service of process insufficient consent to justify jurisdiction after Bauman. Affirmed 2/19/16 see below.
  67. Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., 2014 WL 3899209 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 4, 2014) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Rejecting jurisdiction through consent by service on registered agent.
  68. Overhill Farms Inc. v. West Liberty Foods LLC, 2014 WL 4180920 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (California) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.   Registration to do business insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  69. Chambers v. Weinstein, 2014 WL 4276910, 997 N.Y.S.2d 668 (table) (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 22, 2014) (New York) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted. Severance granted.  No jurisdiction on the basis of consent by registration of agent in-state.
  70. U.S. ex rel. Imco General Construction, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 2014 WL 4364854 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3, 2014) (Washington) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.   Registration to do business insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  71. Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 2014 WL 4927041 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (Massachusetts) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.   Registration to do business insufficient to create general jurisdiction.  Reversed on other grounds, 804 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2015) (specific jurisdiction held proper).
  72. Recao v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 2014 WL 12595302 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2014) (Florida) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and having a registered agent is insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  73. In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 2014 WL 5394310 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) (Virgin Islands) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process did not establish general jurisdiction.
  74. Sullivan v. Sony Music Entertainment, 2014 WL 5473142 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2014) (Illinois) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.   Registration to do business and having agent for service of process is not consent to general jurisdiction.
  75. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 F. Supp.3d 549 (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2014) (Delaware) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted in part.  No general jurisdiction through consent by registration to do business.  Denying motion to dismiss on specific jurisdiction.  Aff’d on other grounds, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
  76. NExTT Solutions, LLC v. XOS Technologies, Inc., 71 F. Supp.3d 857 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2014) (Indiana)  (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.   Registration to do business, even with other in-state contacts, insufficient to create general jurisdiction. Otherwise “at home” requirement would be meaningless.
  77. Shrum v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 6888446 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014) (Illinois) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  No general jurisdiction by consent for having registration and agent for service of process.
  78. Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 2015 WL 191118 (Mo. Cir. St. Louis City Jan. 12, 2015) (Missouri) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Asbestos defendant’s registration to do business and agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction by consent.
  79. Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp.3d 97 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (New York) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part.  Rejecting consent by registering to do business.
  80. Royal Acquisitions 001, LLC v. Ansur America Insurance Co., 2015 WL 14376894 (S.D. Fla. March 27, 2015) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process did not establish general jurisdiction.
  81. Haskett v. Continental Land Resources, LLC, 2015 WL 1419731 (S.D. Tex. March 27, 2015) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process did not establish general jurisdiction. Aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 668 F. Appx. 133 (5th Cir. 2016) (ruling not appealed).
  82. 7 W. 57th Street Realty Co., LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., 2015 WL 1514539 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2015) (New York)  (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  State bank registration insufficient to confer general jurisdiction.
  83. Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 2015 WL 12658485 (S.D. Cal. April 8, 2015) (California) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business, even with other contacts, did not establish general jurisdiction.
  84. Fiduciary Network, LLC v. Buehler, 2015 WL 2165953 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2015) (Texas) (non-product liability). Motion to remand denied.  Rejecting general jurisdiction by consent through “registration of an agent for process and registration to do business.”
  85. Hunt v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2015 WL 3626579 (D. Nev. June 10, 2015) (Nevada) (non-product liability).  Neither registration nor an agent for service of process is sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
  86. Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., 2015 WL 3999488 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (Missouri) (prescription medical product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction by registration to do business.
  87. Rozumek v. Union Carbide Corp., 2015 WL 12831301 (S.D. Ill. July 1, 2015) (Illinois) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Registration to do business did not establish general jurisdiction.
  88. Rozumek v. General Electric Co., 2015 WL 12829795 (S.D. Ill. July 1, 2015) (Illinois) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Registration to do business did not establish general jurisdiction.
  89. Dokoozian Construction LLC v. Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Co., 2015 WL 12085859 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2015) (Washington) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Appointment of agent for service of process is insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  90. Public Impact, LLC v. Boston Consulting Group, Inc., 117 F. Supp.3d 732 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2015) (North Carolina) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Rejecting jurisdiction by consent by registration to do business.
  91. Osadchuk v. CitiMortgage, 2015 WL 4770813 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2015) (Pennsylvania) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Appointment of agent for service of process is insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  92. Mullen v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 136 F. Supp.3d 740 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 17, 2015) (Mississippi) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business did not establish general jurisdiction.
  93. McCourt v. A.O. Smith Water Products Co., 2015 WL 4997403 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2015) (New Jersey) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  No consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business.
  94. Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp.3d 676 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 2015) (Mississippi) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  95. Family Wireless #1, LLC v. Automotive Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL 5142350 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2015) (Michigan) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Registration, even with other in-state contacts is far from sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  96. Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Publishing Ltd., 2015 WL 5227955 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Having agent for service of process cannot create general jurisdiction.  Affirmed on other grounds, 647 F. Appx. 455 (5th Cir. 2016)
  97. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 132 F. Supp.3d 518 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (New York) (non-product liability).  Discovery subpoena quashed.  Licensure as a state-regulated bank insufficient to create general personal jurisdiction.
  98. Cox v. Alco Industries, Inc., 2015 WL 10891167 (Wash. Super. Sept. 10, 2015) (Washington) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Registration to do business, even with other contacts, did not establish general jurisdiction.
  99. Freedman v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 139 F. Supp.3d 271 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2015) (District of Columbia) (non-product liability).  Motion to transfer granted.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  100. United States Bank National Ass’n v. Bank of America, N.A., 2015 WL 5971126 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2015) (Indiana)  (non-product liability).  Motion to transfer granted.  Registration to do business not a waiver of objection to jurisdiction.
  101. Barrera v. Hitachi Koki U.S.A., Ltd., 2015 WL 12839496 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (New Jersey) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Corporate registration is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  102. Surita v. AM General LLC, 2015 WL 12826471 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2015) (Illinois) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  103. Freeney v. Bank of America Corp., 2015 WL 12535021 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2015) (California)  (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  104. ADT, LLC v. Capital Connect, Inc., 2015 WL 7352199 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process are not consent to general jurisdiction.
  105. Handshoe v. Yount, 2015 WL 7572344 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 24, 2015) (Mississippi) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration and appointment of agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  106. Dimitrov v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2015 WL 9304490 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2015) (Illinois) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Defendant did not consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business.
  107. Clasen v. National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, Inc., 2015 WL 9489507 (Mag. E.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2015) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.  Adopted, 2016 WL 890675 (E.D. Tex. March 9, 2016).
  108. Angelini Metal Works Co. v. Hubbard Iron Doors, Inc., 2016 WL 6304476 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016) (California) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business, even with other contacts, is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  109. Tulsa Cancer Institute, PLLC v. Genentech Inc., 2016 WL 141859 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2016) (Oklahoma) (prescription medical product liability).   Multi-plaintiff complaint.  Reconsideration and motion to dismiss granted.  That resident and non-resident plaintiffs share a common nucleus of facts does not provide non-residents with specific personal jurisdiction.
  110. Spear v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 2016 WL 194071 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2016) (Pennsylvania) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business, by itself, is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  111. Demaria v. Nissan, Inc., 2016 WL 374145 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2016) (Illinois) (product liability – non drug/device).  Multi-plaintiff class action complaint.  Motion to dismiss granted.  Defendant did not consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business.  Pendent jurisdiction does not exist to allow non-residents allegedly injured by same product defect sue because one resident plaintiff can do so.
  112. Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 2016) (Connecticut) (product liability – non drug/device).  “If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in state agent − without an express consent to general jurisdiction – nonetheless sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back‐door thief.”   Affirming 19 F. Supp.3d 390, above.
  113. Long v. Patton Hospitality Management, LLC, 2016 WL 760780 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2016) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Contacts including registering to do business and maintaining a registered agent for service insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.
  114. Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp., 2016 WL 1366920 (Mag. S.D.N.Y. March 3, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability).  Recommending vacation of default judgment. Jurisdiction by consent argument based on contractual choice of law provision “borderline frivolous.”  Adopted 2016 WL 3453656, below.
  115. Firefighters’ Retirement System v. Royal Bank PLC, 2016 WL 1254366 (M.D. La. March 29, 2016) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business, appointment of agent for service of process, and payment of taxes insufficient.  Registration was not consent to general jurisdiction.
  116. Thompson v. Carnival Corp., 174 F. Supp.3d 1327 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2016) (maritime law) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted. Contractual consent to jurisdiction insufficient absent independent basis for jurisdiction. Rule 4(k)(2) cannot confer general jurisdiction where defendant is not “at home.”
  117. Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 176 F. Supp.3d 264 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss denied, but only as to specific jurisdiction.  Registration was not consent to general jurisdiction.
  118. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp.3d 3 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss denied, but only as to specific jurisdiction.  Registration was not consent to general jurisdiction.
  119. In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 1268267 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability).  Granting motion to dismiss.  Registration was not consent to general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction criteria the same under both federal and state law.
  120. Hovsepian v. Crane Co., 2016 WL 2997641 (E.D. Mo. April 13, 2016) (Missouri) (product liability – non drug/device).  Granting motion to dismiss.  Out-of-state asbestos plaintiff failed to establish general personal jurisdiction or consent to general jurisdiction.
  121. Agribusiness United DMCC v. Blue Water Shipping Co., 2017 WL 1354144 (S.D. Tex. April 13, 2017) (Texas) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process do not establish general jurisdiction.
  122. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. April 18, 2016) (Delaware) (product liability – non drug/device). Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  123. Display Works, LLC, v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp.3d 166 (D. N.J. April 25, 2016) (New Jersey) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business is not consent to general jurisdiction, nor is doing business in a state.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  124. Beard v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 2016 WL 1746113 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2016) (Missouri) (prescription medical product liability). Motion to transfer granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  125. In Re: Zofran (Ondansetron) Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 2349105 (D. Mass. May 4, 2016) (Missouri) (prescription medical product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Motion to remand denied.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman, and would “distort” the registration statute.
  126. Oversen v. Kelle’s Transportation Service, 2016 WL 8711343 (D. Utah May 12, 2016) (Utah) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to transfer granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  127. Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp.3d 734 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2016) (Illinois) (non-product liability). Motions to quash granted. Bauman is not limited to defendants and applies to third-party subpoenas.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service do not establish general jurisdiction by consent or waiver.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  128. Aclin v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 189 F. Supp.3d 1294 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (Oklahoma) (prescription medical product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  See Guillette v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 2016 WL 3094073 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016); Manning v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2016 WL 3094075 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016); Nauman v. PD-RX Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2016 WL 3094081 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (identical opinions).
  129. Goldstein v Hawker Beechcraft Services, 2016 WL 3771165 (Fla. Cir. June 3, 2016) (Florida) (product liability – non drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business, even with other in-state activities, cannot create general jurisdiction by consent.
  130. Magna Powertrain De Mexico S.A. De C.V. v. Momentive Performance Materials USA LLC, 2016 WL 3574652 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2016) (Michigan) (product liability – non drug/device).  Motion to transfer granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service is not consent to general jurisdiction.
  131. Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp., 2016 WL 3453656 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability).  Adopting magistrate’s recommendation (2016 WL 1366920, above) to grant motion to dismiss.  Forum selection clause not consent to general jurisdiction. Affirmed 691 F. Appx. 8, below.
  132. Garcia v. LQ Properties, Inc., 2016 WL 3384644 (N.D. Ind. June 20, 2016) (Indiana) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Registration to do business, even with other contacts, is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  133. Johnson v. Barrier, 2016 WL 3520157 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2016) (Illinois) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Consent to jurisdiction in previous cases not judicial estoppel.
  134. Singh v. Diesel Transportation, LLC, 2016 WL 3647992 (D. N.J. July 7, 2016) (New Jersey) (non-product liability). Motion to transfer granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.
  135. Evans v. Andy & Evan Industries, Inc., 2016 WL 8787062, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (Florida) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted as to general jurisdiction; denied as to specific jurisdiction; transfer granted.  Registration to do business, even with other contacts, is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  136. Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix International, LLC, 198 F. Supp.3d 1127 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (California) (non-product liability).   Registration to do business, even with other contacts, is insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  137. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874 (August 29, 2016) (California) (prescription medical product liability). Denial of dismissal affirmed on other grounds.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process does not create general personal jurisdiction. Reversed 137 S. Ct. 1773, on other (very important) grounds as discussed here.
  138. Bonkowski v. HP Hood, LLC, 2016 WL 4536868 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to transfer granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction by registration to do business.  Prior contrary consent precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  139. Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 7655398 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2016) (Florida) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss deferred to consider transfer.  No consent to general jurisdiction by appointment of agent for service of process.
  140. Magwitch, LLC v. Pusser’s West Indies Ltd., 200 So. 3d 216 (Fla. App. Sept. 7, 2016) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Affirming grant of motion to dismiss.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service is not consent to general jurisdiction.
  141. Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 379 P.3d 1033 (Colo. Sept. 12, 2016) (Colorado) (product liability – non drug/device). Reversing denial of motion to dismiss.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service is not consent to general jurisdiction.
  142. Sciortino v. CMG Capital Management Group, Inc., 2016 WL 4799099 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (Louisiana) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to sell securities in state not consent to general jurisdiction.
  143. Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co, v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 2016 WL 4939113 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (Louisiana) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through licensing, registration, or appointment of agent for service of process.  Affirmed 2017 WL 6553374, below.
  144. George v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2016 WL 4945331 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2016) (Pennsylvania) (product liability – non-drug/device). Remanding for lack of jurisdiction.  Registration to do business is not retroactive consent to general jurisdiction in asbestos case where it occurred after the alleged injury.
  145. U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Bank of America, N.A., 2016 WL 5118298 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016) (Indiana) (non-product liability). Retransfer denied.  Registration and appointment of in-state agent is neither consent to nor waiver of general jurisdiction.
  146. PHD@Western, LLC v. Rudolf Construction Partners, LLC, 2016 WL 5661637 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2016) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business alone is insufficient to support any theory of personal jurisdiction.
  147. American Insurance Co. v. R&Q Reinsurance Co., 2016 WL 5930589, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (California)  (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent does not create general jurisdiction.
  148. Addelson v. Sanofi S.A., 2016 WL 6216124 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2016) (Missouri) (prescription medical product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent is not consent to general jurisdiction.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  149. Perez v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp., 2016 WL 7049153 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Asbestos case.  No consent to jurisdiction by registration and appointment of agent.
  150. Tarver v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 7077045 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2016) (Oklahoma) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss denied on other grounds (specific jurisdiction).  No consent to general jurisdiction by registration to do business, even though considerable business conducted.  Certification denied, 2017 WL 9477739 (W.D. Okla. March 10, 2017), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 3527710 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2017).
  151. Bertolini-Mier v. Upper Valley Neurology Neurosurgery, P.C., 2016 WL 7174646 (D. Vt. Dec. 7, 2016) (Vermont) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Motion to dismiss denied on other grounds pending jurisdictional discovery.  No consent to jurisdiction by registration to do business.
  152. Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. v UBS Ag, 2016 WL 7158077, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Dec. 7, 2016)  (New York) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration does not create general jurisdiction.
  153. Taormina v. Thrifty Car Rental, 2016 WL 7392214 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2016) (New York) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Prior contrary precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  154. Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 227 F. Supp.3d 249  (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2016) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Prior contrary precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  155. Gulf Coast Bank v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 2017 WL 120645 (M.D. La. Jan. 12, 2017) (Louisiana) (non-product liability). Denying motion to alter judgment.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Prior contrary precedent no longer viable after Bauman, and interpreting a registration statute as providing consent to general jurisdiction would “rob [Bauman] of its central meaning.”
  156. Axxess Technology Solutions Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp., 2017 WL 3841604 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2017) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Allegation of registration to do business insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  157. Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, 2017 WL 685570 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted.  Forum selection clause is not consent to general jurisdiction.  Neither is registration to do business.
  158. State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. Feb. 28, 2017) (Missouri) (non-product liability). Writ of prohibition issued.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  159. Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co., 390 P.3d 1019 (Or. March 2, 2017) (Oregon) (non-product liability). Mandamus granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service of process.  Registration is not implied consent to personal jurisdiction.
  160. Am Trust v. UBS AG, 681 F. Appx. 587 (9th Cir. March 3, 2017) (California) (non-product liability). Affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.  Acceptance of service in prior litigation insufficient.
  161. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Indemnity Co., 2017 2017 WL 3225924 (Mag. D.R.I. March 3, 2017) (Rhode Island) (non-product liability).  Motion to transfer granted. No consent to general jurisdiction through insurance registration and appointment of the agent for service.  The statues cannot be “construed as a consent or submission to personal jurisdiction,” and if they could they would violate Due Process.  Adopted 2017 WL 2983879 (D.R.I. July 13, 2017).
  162. New York Commercial Bank v. Heritage Green Development, LLC, 2017 WL 954197 (Va. Cir. March 7, 2017) (Virginia) (non-product liability).  Motion to quash service granted.  Registration to do business insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  163. Rizack v. Signature Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 5197917 (Fla. Cir. March 20, 2017) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Registration to do business insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
  164. Kearns v. New York Community Bank, 400 P.3d 182 (table), 2017 WL 1148418 (Kan. App. March 24, 2017) (Kansas) (non-product liability) (unpublished). Affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  Consent to jurisdiction by registration to do business in-state by non-party subsidiary insufficient.
  165. Muenstermann v. United States, 2017 WL 1408037 (S.D. Ill. April 20, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  166. Mischel v. Safe Haven Enterprises, LLC, 2017 WL 1384214 (N.Y. Sup. April 17, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.  Reversed on other grounds, 74 N.Y.S.3d 496 (N.Y.A.D. 2018) (specific jurisdiction).
  167. MacCormack v. The Adel Wiggins Group, 2017 WL 1426009 (E.D. Mo. April 21, 2017) (Missouri) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Granting motion for reconsideration, and dismissing.  No consent to jurisdiction for registration and an appointment of agent for service.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable under Norfolk Southern v. Dolan.
  168. Justiniano v. First Student Management LLC, 2017 WL 1592564 (E.D.N.Y. April 26, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to transfer granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  169. L.A. Gem & Jewelry Design, Inc. v. Ecommerce Innovations, LLC, 2017 WL 1535084 (C.D. Cal. April 27, 2017) (California) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  170. Alvarracin v. Volume Services, Inc., 2017 WL 1842701 (W.D. Mo. May 4, 2017) (Missouri) (non-product liability).  Motion to transfer granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  171. McCaffrey v. Windsor at Windermere Ltd. Partnership, 2017 WL 1862326, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2017) (Pennsylvania) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  172. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lemaire, 395 P.3d 1116 (Ariz. App. May 11, 2017) (Arizona) (non-product liability).  Reversing denial of motion to dismiss.  No express or implied consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.
  173. Antoon v. Securus Technologies, Inc., 2017 WL 2124466 (W.D. Ark. May 15, 2017) (Arkansas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted. No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service, where statute provided express jurisdictional restriction, and “exception [would be] so large as to swallow the rule.”
  174. Madlock v. Westar Energy, Inc., 517 S.W.3d 678 (Mo. App. May 16, 2017) (Missouri) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  Corporate registration is not a basis for general personal jurisdiction.
  175. Matthews v. BNSF Railway Co., 2017 WL 2266891 (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2017) (Missouri) (non-product liability).  Motion for reconsideration granted and transferred.  No consent to jurisdiction for registration and appointment of agent for service.
  176. Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp., 691 F. Appx. 8 (2d Cir. May 24, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability). Affirming grant of motion to dismiss.  Forum selection clause insufficient to constitute consent to general jurisdiction. Affirming, 2016 WL 1366920, and 2016 WL 3453656, above.
  177. Mercury Rents, Inc. v. Crenshaw Enterprises Ltd., 2017 WL 2382483 (W.D. La. May 30, 2017) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted. Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process are not consent to general jurisdiction.
  178. Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 2017 WL 2470844 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted as to out-of-state class action plaintiffs.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service. Contrary prior precedent longer viable after Bauman.
  179. Siegfried v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 WL 2778107 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017) (Missouri) (prescription medical product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  Out-of-state plaintiffs lacked personal jurisdiction Bauman and BMS.  No consent to jurisdiction through and appointment of agent for service.
  180. Everett v. Aurora Pump Co., 2017 WL 2778091 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017) (Missouri) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.
  181. Boswell v. Cable Services Co., 2017 WL 2815077 (D.N.J. June 28, 2017) (New Jersey) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Statute lacked “express language” indicating consent.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  182. Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 898 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. June 30, 2017) (Wisconsin) (non-product liability).  Reversing denial of dismissal and remanding.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of the agent.  Statute contains no language regarding consent or jurisdiction.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.
  183. Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 164 A.3d 435 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 5, 2017) (New Jersey) (non-product liability).  Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction affirmed.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process do not establish consent to general jurisdiction.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.
  184. JPB Installers, LLC v. Dancker, Sellew & Douglas, Inc., 2017 WL 2881142 (M.D.N.C. July 6, 2017) (North Carolina) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  185. Nationwide Signs, LLC v. National Signs, LLC, 2017 WL 2911577 (E.D. La. July 7, 2017) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  186. Jordan v. Bayer Corp., 2017 WL 3006993 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2017) (Missouri) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims under BMS.
  187. MG Design Assocs. Corp. v. CoStar Realty Information, Inc., 267 F. Supp.3d 1000 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted in pertinent part and denied in part on other grounds.  Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  188. Orafol Americas, Inc. v. DBi Services, LLC, 2017 WL 3473217 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2017) (Georgia) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  189. Hinkle v. Continental Motors, Inc., 2017 WL 3333120 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2017) (Florida) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  190. Smith/Hill v. United States Steel Co., No. 170207649, order & hearing transcript (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Co. July 24, 2017) (Pennsylvania) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Jurisdictional preliminary objections granted. Registration to do business cannot establish general personal jurisdiction after BNSF and BMS.  A state registration statute cannot legitimize what is otherwise a due process violation.
  191. Northern Frac Proppants, II, LLC v. 2011 NF Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 3275896 (Tex. App. July 27, 2017) (unpublished) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Affirming in part and reversing in part on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.  General jurisdiction not established registration to do business and having agent for service of process.
  192. Johnson v. Sandvik Inc., 2017 WL 3263465, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2017) (Michigan) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not support personal jurisdiction over claims with no direct connection to the state.  Reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 3593376 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2017).
  193. Sebastian v. Davol, Inc., 2017 WL 3325744 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2017) (North Carolina) (prescription medical product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted. Registration to do business does not establish general personal jurisdiction.
  194. Turner v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 WL 3310696 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2017) (Missouri) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims under BMS.
  195. Covington v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 WL 3433611 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2017) (Missouri) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims under BMS.  Alleged in-state contacts had no connection with the alleged injuries and the allegedly harmful products.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  196. Frontpoint Asian Event Driven Fund, L.P. v. Citibank, N.A., 2017 WL 3600425 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration under banking statute.
  197. Javage v. General Motors, LLC, 2017 WL 6403036 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 18, 2017) (West Virginia) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Registration to do business insufficient to make corporation “at home” for general jurisdiction purposes.  Affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court, 736 F. Appx. 418 (4th Cir. 2018).
  198. Wilderness USA, Inc. v. DeAngelo Brothers LLC, 265 F. Supp.3d 301 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.  The statute did not support such a reading, and contrary prior precedent is no longer viable after Bauman and Brown.
  199. Antonini v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3633287 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) (Pennsylvania) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Registration to do business, among other contacts, insufficient to make corporation “at home” for general jurisdiction purposes.
  200. Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp.3d 909 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
  201. Jinright v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2017 WL 3731317 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2017) (Missouri) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted. Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims under BMS.  Alleged in-state contacts had no connection with the alleged injuries and the allegedly harmful products.  The in-state contacts belonged to another party.
  202. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. APR Energy Holding Ltd., 2017 WL 3841874 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Granting motion to quash subpoena for lack of jurisdiction.  Compelling discovery requires personal jurisdiction.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration to do business.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  203. Griffin v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3841890 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2017) (Texas) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss denied on other grounds (specific jurisdiction).  Registration and agent for service of process insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  204. Amelius v. Grand Imperial LLC, 64 N.Y.S.3d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 11, 2017) (New York) (non-product liability).  Denying motion to compel compliance with subpoena.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process.  Pre-Bauman contrary cases are no longer good law.
  205. Spratley v. FCA US LLC, 2017 WL 4023348 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in part. Multi-plaintiff class action complaint.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent for service.  Pre-Bauman contrary cases are no longer good law.  Dismissing claims of non-resident plaintiffs.  A non-resident’s exposure to an alleged nationwide marketing scheme does not establish specific jurisdiction.  No pendent jurisdiction based on single in-state resident’s claims.
  206. Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440 (Ill. Sept. 21, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Jurisdictional theory that would allow non-residents to sue the defendant in every state where it operated a warehouse fails Due Process.  Registration to do business and appointment of agent for service is not consent to general personal jurisdiction.  The statute did not support such a reading.
  207. Douthit v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224031 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); Braun v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224034 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); Bandy v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224035 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); Pirtle v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224036 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); Roland v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224037 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); Woodall v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4237924 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); and Berousee v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4255075 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (Illinois) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted. Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims under BMS.  Conducting in-state clinical trials not sufficient contact to support specific personal jurisdiction in suits by non-residents.
  208. HomeRun Products, LLC v. Twin Towers Trading, Inc., 2017 WL 4293145 (D.N.D. Sept. 27, 2017) (North Dakota) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss denied on other grounds, pending jurisdictional discovery.  Corporate registration does not support general jurisdiction.
  209. Salgado v. OmniSource Corp., 2017 WL 4508085 (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 2017) (Texas) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. No general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent for service.  Contracting with in-state entity not enough for specific jurisdiction where plaintiff and accident are out of state.
  210. Fox v. Johnson & Johnson, 539 S.W.3d 48 (Mo. App. Oct. 17, 2017) (Missouri) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Reversing jury verdict for plaintiff.  Multi-plaintiff complaint.  Non-resident plaintiff has no basis for jurisdiction over non-resident defendant over injuries occurring out-of-state.  Plaintiff does not get a jurisdictional do-over of arguments that could have been raised earlier.
  211. Sae Han Sheet Co. v. Eastman Chemical Corp., 2017 WL 4769394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.  Pre-Bauman contrary cases are no longer good law.  No specific jurisdiction under BMS for harm to a nonresident caused by products not sole in-state.
  212. Western Express, Inc. v. Villanueva, 2017 WL 4785831 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2017) (Tennessee) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.
  213. Congdon v. Cheapcaribbean.com, Inc., 2017 WL 5069960, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent for service.
  214. Stisser v. SP Bancorp, Inc., 174 A.3d 405 (Md. Nov. 29, 2017) (Maryland) (non-product liability).  Affirming dismissal.  Incorporating in-state subsidiary is not consent to jurisdiction, nor confers specific jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the incorporation.
  215. Grice v. VIM Holdings Group, LLC, 2017 WL 6210891 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2017) (Massachusetts) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss denied, but only as to specific jurisdiction.  Corporate registration alone is insufficient for personal jurisdiction.
  216. Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp.3d 870 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2017) (Illinois) (non-product liability). Class action complaint. Granting motion for reconsideration, dismissing claims of nonresident plaintiffs. BMS applies to named plaintiffs in putative class actions. Rejecting pendent jurisdiction. No waiver from failure to assert jurisdictional defense before BMS.
  217. Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (Colorado) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Dismissal affirmed.  A defendant must purposefully direct activities at the forum state, and the plaintiff’s claims must arise out of those activities.  A neutral website and distribution of manuals that a federal agency required be uniform nationwide did not constitute directed activities towards any state.
  218. State ex rel. Bayer Corp. v. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. Dec. 19, 2017) (Missouri) (pharmaceutical drug product liability).  Mandamus overturning denial of motion to dismiss granted.  Non-residents alleged nothing establishing “related to”/”arising from” specific jurisdiction.  No consent to jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.  Any future amendment to be decided in the first instance by the trial court.
  219. Hicks v. Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., 2017 WL 6764054 (Mag. D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2017) (New Jersey) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted. Multi-plaintiff complaint. No specific jurisdiction under BMS where plaintiff neither suffered nor harm in nor had any relationship with the forum state.  Adopted 2018 WL 325308 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
  220. In re Santa Fe National Tobacco Co. Marketing & Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 288 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (D.N.M. Dec. 21, 2017) (New Mexico)  (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to transfer granted.  All plaintiffs who did not file their actions where the defendant was “at home” lack personal jurisdiction over the target defendant in an MDL.  MDL jurisdiction mirrors the transferor districts.  A defendant’s extensive involvement in product marketing, advertising, and overall business development is not activity directed at any other state.  Mere influence over a subsidiary insufficient for alter ego.
  221. Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, LLC, 717 F. Appx. 394 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (Louisiana) (non-product liability). Affirming dismissal. No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process. Pennsylvania Fire is probably overruled. Affirming 2016 WL 4939113, above.
  222. Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Hume Lake Christian Camps, Inc., 2018 WL 280025 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018) (California) (non-product liability). Motion to dismiss granted. No general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent.
  223. Fundamental Innovation Systems International LLC v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2018 WL 279091 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2018) (New Jersey) (non-product liability). Denying motion to transfer.  No consent to general jurisdiction in transferee forum through registration to do business and appointment of agent. Prior contrary precedent no longer viable after Bauman.  Adopted 2018 WL 837711 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (same).
  224. Howe v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 2018 WL 2212982 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2018) (Florida) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Class action dismissed as to all out-of-state product sale claims.  Rule 23 cannot expand personal jurisdiction.  No general personal jurisdiction by registration to do business.
  225. LDGP, LLC v. Cynosure, Inc., 2018 WL 439122 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Putative nationwide class-action.  Non-residents lack personal jurisdiction to serve as class representatives against non-resident defendants.  Similar claims by residents cannot create jurisdiction for non-residents.
  226. DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., 2018 WL 461228 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Putative nationwide class-action.  BMS probably outlaws nationwide class actions where general jurisdiction over the defendant is lacking.  Dismissing claims seeking to recover on behalf of nonresident plaintiffs.
  227. Harter v. Ascension Health, 2018 WL 496911 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2018) (Arizona) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted. No consent to jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of an agent. No alter ego.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  228. Moseley v. Suzuki Motor, Inc., 2018 WL 539330 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2018) (Idaho) (product liability – non-drug/device). Motion to dismiss granted.  Stream of commerce personal jurisdiction without state-targeted conduct does not exist. No alter ego.
  229. Dyson v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 534375 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  230. SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2018) (New York) (non-product liability).  Affirming dismissal.  Absent reliance on defendant’s in-state contacts, such contacts cannot be suit related so as to establish jurisdiction.
  231. In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, 2018 WL 827958 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (California) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted. Putative nationwide and multistate class-action. No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and the appointment of agent.  Case-linked jurisdiction cannot be determined without evidence of where plaintiffs resided and where they purchased relevant products.  Jurisdictional conduct must be suit related.  Jurisdictional discovery limited to suit related conduct permitted.
  232. Jordan v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 837700, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.   Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims  based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  233. Perficient, Inc. v. Continuant, Inc., 546 S.W.3d 610 (Mo. App. Feb. 20, 2018) (Missouri) (non-product liability).  Affirming dismissal.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent.
  234. McClain v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 3725777, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Following Dyson.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  235. Johnson v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 999972 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims  based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  236. Schaffer v. Bayer Corp.,  2018 WL 999980 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims  based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  237. Ford Motor Co. v. Cejas, 2018 WL 1003791 (Tex. App. Feb. 22, 2018) (Texas) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Registration to do business, along with many other in-state contacts, insufficient to establish  general personal jurisdiction.
  238. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. March 1, 2018) (Pennsylvania) (prescription medical device product liability).  Affirming dismissal in part.  After BMS, stream of commerce personal jurisdiction without state-targeted conduct no longer exists. Limited jurisdictional discovery on alter ego theory.
  239. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC v. Luciano, 2018 WL 1220891 (Tex. App. March 9, 2018) (Texas) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Finding of jurisdiction reversed.  Statements by third parties about their relationship with defendant are not in-state contacts of the defendant.  Plaintiff failed to establish injury arising from any purposeful in-state conduct by the defendant.
  240. Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 303 F. Supp.3d 278 (M.D. Pa. March. 19, 2018)  (Pennsylvania) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Multiple motions to dismiss, some granted, some not, in asbestos case.  Mere manifestation of injury in the forum does not establish specific jurisdiction.  Asbestos plaintiffs must be exposed in the forum.  Pennsylvania registration statute can establish general jurisdiction by consent, but only after 1978, when the statute was amended to so state, and only for periods during which particular corporations were registered.  Asbestos exposure when a corporation was not registered in Pennsylvania cannot establish jurisdiction.
  241. Humphries v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2018 WL 1510441 (D. Ariz. March 27, 2018) (Arizona) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted. No in-state physical presence. No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent. Such “categorical assertion of general jurisdiction” is prohibited by Bauman and BNSF.
  242. Perry v. JMT Capital Management, LLC, 2018 WL 1635855 (N.D. Ill. April 5, 2018) (Illinois) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent for service of process.
  243. Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 2018 WL 1784126 (N.D. Ill. April 13, 2018) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss nonresident representative class plaintiff granted.  Multi-plaintiff nationwide putative class action.  Identity between resident and nonresident claims insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs.  No consent to jurisdiction based registration to do business, agent for service of process, or defense of previous lawsuits.  No jurisdictional difference between class actions and other types of litigation.
  244. Debbie’s Staffing Services, Inc. v. Highpoint Risk Services, LLC, 2018 WL 1918603 (M.D.N.C. April 20, 2018) (North Carolina) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.    No general jurisdiction through registration to do business.
  245. Bralich v. Sullivan, 2018 WL 1938297 (D. Haw. April 23, 2018) (Hawaii) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No in-state physical presence.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration and appointment of agent.  No stream of commerce jurisdiction.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  246. Huzinec v. Six Flags Great Adventure, LLC, 2018 WL 1919956 (D. N.J. April 24, 2018) (New Jersey) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted as to third-party defendants.  No specific jurisdiction where third-party claims were too attenuated from the negligence that allegedly caused the accident at suit.  None of the goods or services defendants purchased were alleged to have been negligent.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  247. Horowitz v. AT&T, Inc., 2018 WL 1942525 (D.N.J. April 25, 2018) (New Jersey) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted, dismissing three related defendants.  Multi-plaintiff complaint.  No alter ego as to any of the related defendants.  Holding company not subject to general or specific jurisdiction.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business and appointment of agent.  Contrary prior precedent no longer viable after Bauman.  BMS bars class actions by non-resident plaintiffs against non-resident defendants.  One defendant subjected to specific jurisdiction due to direct contacts with plaintiffs.
  248. Chernus v. Logitech, Inc., 2018 WL 1981481 (D. N.J. April 27, 2018) (New Jersey) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in part.  Putative nationwide and multi-state class-action.  Nonresident representative class plaintiff and subclass members dismissed.  Larger issue of whether BMS foreclosed jurisdiction over non-resident absent class members was premature.
  249. Blackburn v. Shire US, 2018 WL 2159927 (N.D. Ala. May 10, 2018) (Alabama) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to amend denied.  Amendment to add non-manufacturing NDA holder futile for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Neither FDA approval nor allegedly creating a defective label did not target any particular state.  No alter ego.  Reconsideration denied, 2018 WL 2159927 (N.D. Ala. May 10, 2018). Seeking FDA approval of a product is not conduct specifically directed to any state.
  250. Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in part.  Non-forum aspects of putative nationwide class action dismissed.  Claims of out-of-state residents against foreign corporation do not arise in the forum.  BMS applies equally to class actions.
  251. Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc., 105 N.E.3d 984 (Ill. App. May 18, 2018) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Non-resident asbestos plaintiff cannot obtain specific jurisdiction over non-resident defendant for exposure to defendant’s products that took place elsewhere.  Continuous and substantial in-state non-asbestos business is not case related, nor is it consent.  Registration to do business is not consent to jurisdiction unrelated to in-state business.  Neither plaintiff’s in-state exposure to other asbestos products, nor plaintiff’s out-of-state exposure to defendant’s products can be a case-related contact.  Purported evidence of in-state exposure to defendant’s products was incompetent.  Personal jurisdiction “by necessity” does not exist.
  252. Metropolitan Group Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2018 WL 2422023 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018) (New Jersey) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business is not implied consent to general jurisdiction.
  253. Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 2018 WL 3043601, slip op. (Pa. C.P. May 30, 2018) (Pennsylvania) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Corporate defendant, not subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction, cannot remain in suit under consent theory based on registration to do business.  Pennsylvania’s registration statute specifying “general” jurisdiction, is unconstitutional under the due process principles of Bauman and BMS.  The statute creates a Hobson’s choice and is not voluntary consent.  Personal jurisdiction beyond Bauman/BMS violates due process.  Pennoyer-era cases treating corporate registration as consent are no longer valid.  On appeal at 802 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super.).
  254. Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., 317 F. Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. June 11, 2018) (District of Columbia) (non-product liability).  Certifying denial of motion to dismiss to appellate court.  Does BMS apply to bar nationwide class actions where non-resident absent class members would be suing non-resident defendants?  Court previously denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.
  255. Kellman v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 313 F. Supp.3d 1031 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2018) (California) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on Internet presence.  No alter ego.
  256. Beasley v. Providence Hospital, 2018 WL 2994380 (S.D. Ala. June 13, 2018) (Alabama) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted in pertinent part and denied on other grounds.  General jurisdiction is not available based on appointment of agent and registration to do business, which are not “exceptional” circumstances..
  257. ASEA/AFSCME Local Health 52 Health Benefits Trust v. Abbot Laboratories, 2018 WL 3022670 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2018) (Illinois) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No alter ego.  Forum state contacts must both relate to the lawsuit and be created by the defendant.  Plaintiff did not pay for the product in state nor were the surgeries in-state.  Specific jurisdiction cannot be premised on claims of unnamed class members.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  258. Rodriguez v. City of Philadelphia, 2018 WL 3036283 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2018) (Iowa) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Denying motion for reconsideration of dismissal.  Targeting a national market does not amount to purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in a specific state.  In-state contacts post-dating suit are irrelevant.
  259. Goellner-Grant v. JLG Industries, Inc., 2018 WL 3036453 (E.D. Mo. June 19, 2018) (Missouri) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  An in-state sales network does not establish jurisdiction where the product was not sold in-state.  The sales network was not a connection to the events of this case.
  260. Jeffs v. Ford Motor Co., McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F. Supp.2d 883, 895 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (following Wilson; pre-Bauman).  (Ill. App. June 12, 2018) (unpublished) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Reversing denial of motion to dismiss in asbestos case.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.  No case-linked jurisdiction where all exposure took place out of state.
  261. Matter of Grabowski v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2018 WL 3158514 (N.Y. Sup. June 27, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of an agent and registration to do business.  No general jurisdiction over separately incorporated subsidiary of parent that was once at home in-state.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Defendant’s several in-state facilities unrelated to plaintiff’s claims are insufficient.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.
  262. Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, ___S.W.3d ___, 2018 WL 3193652 (Mo. App. June 29, 2018) (Missouri) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Reversing jury verdict for plaintiff.  Multi-plaintiff complaint.  A non-resident plaintiff may not establish personal jurisdiction simply by joining his or her claims to a resident’s pleading.  No case-linked jurisdiction over nonresident defendant over injuries to nonresident plaintiff from products sold out-of-state.  Plaintiff does not get a jurisdictional do-over of arguments that could have been raised earlier.
  263. Kyowa Seni Co. v ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., 80 N.Y.S.3d 866 (N.Y. Sup. July 5, 2018) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.  Overseas activities unrelated to defendant’s in-state activities cannot establish case-linked jurisdiction.
  264. Staker & Parson Companies, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.,  2018 WL 3575314 (D. Utah July 25, 2018) (Utah) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process do not establish general jurisdiction.
  265. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3575072 (N.Y. Sup. July 25, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business. Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.  Listing on in-state stock exchange does not create general jurisdiction.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.
  266. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3601393 (N.Y. Sup. July 27, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  267. Hinton v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 3725776, slip op. (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  268. Daniel v. Tootsie Roll Industries, LLC, 2018 WL 3650015 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2018) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Non-resident aspects of class action dismissed.  Products purchased elsewhere have no connection to the state.  No pendent jurisdiction.  CAFA does not authorize non-resident class actions.
  269. Megadrill Services Ltd. v. Brighouse, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2018 WL 3652765 (Tex. App. Aug. 2, 2018) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.  Participation in unrelated prior litigation in the forum state is not perpetual consent to general jurisdiction.  No case-linked jurisdiction because plaintiff’s injuries were not related to in-state refurbishment.
  270. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3636296 , slip op. (N.Y. Sup. July 31, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.   Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  271. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3697135 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 3, 2018 )(New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.   Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  272. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 36971353 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 3, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Case-linked jurisdiction confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.  Without such connection, amount of unrelated in-state activity does not matter.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.   Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  273. EZScreenPrint LLC v. SmallDog Prints LLC, 2018 WL 3729745 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2018) (Arizona) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration of a domain name with an in-state company does not establish general jurisdiction.
  274. Kuhar v. Petzl Co., 2018 WL 3727368 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2018) (New Jersey) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Unrelated in-state purchases do not create case-linked jurisdiction.  Simply placing an item into the stream of commerce, even where it is foreseeable that the item will end up in the forum state, is not enough to establish case-linked jurisdiction.  Alter ego inapplicable where plaintiff dealt in-state with none of the alleged alter egos.
  275. Gaines v. General Motors, LLC, 2018 WL 3752336 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) (California) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Leave to amend to add non-forum class action claims denied.  Class actions under state law cannot involve non-resident plaintiffs suing non-resident defendants over out-of-state activity.  Whether an action is brought as a class action has no real effect on whether a defendant can challenge a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it.
  276. Mark Doyle Construction, LLC v. TriHM Foundation, LLC, 2018 WL 3763014 (W.D. La. Aug. 8, 2018) (Louisiana) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to do business.
  277. Wartsila North America, Inc. v. International Center for Dispute Resolution, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 3870015 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2018) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through registration to conduct insurance business.  On appeal, No. 18-20642 (5th Cir.).
  278. New York City Asbestos Litigation, 2018 WL 3859695 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 14, 2018) (New York) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman.  Defendant’s in-state activities had nothing to do with plaintiff’s exposure, which was entirely out of state.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  279. Wartsila North America, Inc. v. International Center for Dispute Resolution, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 3870015 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2018) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Being licensed did not create general jurisdiction.
  280. Indelicato v. Liberty Transportation, Inc., 2018 WL 3934074 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018) (New York) (non-product liability).  Transfer granted.  Registration to do business, even with other in-state contacts, insufficient to create general jurisdiction.
  281. Storms v. Haugland Energy Group, LLC, 2018 WL 4347603 (Mag. S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4347604 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.
  282. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2018) (Florida) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed in asbestos case.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.  Overly broad interpretation of corporate registration as consent implicates Bauman.
  283. Reinbold v. Advanced Auto Parts, Inc., 2018 WL 4051830 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2018) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted in asbestos case.  Non-resident plaintiffs cannot obtain case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident defendants over out-of-state exposures or injuries.
  284. Moore v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 4144795 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2018) (Missouri) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to remand denied and motion to dismiss granted.  Misjoined, multi-plaintiff complaints no longer preclude removal.  No general jurisdiction under Bauman.  No case-linked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiff claims based on in-state clinical trials and product marketing.  Plaintiffs were neither enrolled in the trials and nor exposed to the marketing.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  285. Woodruff-Sawyer & Co. v. Ghilotti, ___ So.3d ___, 2018 WL 4100386 (Fla. App. Aug. 29, 2018) (Florida) (non-product liability).  Denial of motion to dismiss reversed.   No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.
  286. Cunningham v. Nationwide Security Solutions, Inc., 2018 WL 4575005 (Mag. N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4568803 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2018) (Texas) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration to do business does not create general jurisdiction.
  287. Fekah v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 2018 WL 4257338 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 6, 2018) (New York)  (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.
  288. In re Talc Products Liability Litigation, 2018 WL 4340012 (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 2018) (Delaware) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Multiple motions to dismiss granted.   In-state marketing, contracts, and product testing are insufficient to establish case-linked jurisdiction for non-resident plaintiffs who were not affected by these activities.  No jurisdiction based on in-state subsidiaries, agency or conspiracy.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  289. DeLeon v. BNSF Railway Co., 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. Sept. 11, 2018) (non-product liability).  Grant of motion to dismiss affirmed.  No consent to general jurisdiction through appointment of agent and registration to do business.  Prior contrary precedent is no longer viable after Bauman, and would eliminate Bauman‘s due process limitations.
  290. Morgan v. Trokamed GmbH, 2018 WL 4388457 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2018) (Wisconsin) (prescription medical device product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Overseas manufacturer’s obtaining approval from the FDA were not contacts with any particular state that could constitute purposeful availment of any state’s market.  Any in-state contacts were those of the defendant’s distributor, not of the defendant.
  291. Hitachi Data Systems Credit Corp. v. Precision Discovery, Inc., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 4284290 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018) (New York) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Registration does not create general jurisdiction.
  292. Muray v.Cirrus Design Corp., 2018 WL 4550399 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018) (Illinois) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  That the product was involved in an in-state accident was fortuitous and did not establish case-linked jurisdiction.  The accident did not arise from and was not related to any activity by the defendant in the jurisdiction.
  293. Doucet v. FCA US LLC, 2018 WL 48546324 (D.N.H. Oct. 5, 2018) (New Hampshire) (product liability – non-drug/device).  Motion to dismiss granted.  Plaintiff’s injuries did not arise from the defendant’s in-state sales activities, since the product that allegedly injured him was not sold by the defendant in the state.  Jurisdictional discovery denied.
  294. Dochnal v. Thomson Reuters Corp., 2018 WL 5045205 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2018) (Tennessee) (non-product liability).  Motion to dismiss granted.  In-state activities satisfy the “arise from”  test only if they are the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries.  No in-state activity caused plaintiff’s harm.
  295. In re Del Valle Ruiz, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2018 WL 5095672 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (non-product liability).  Motion to conduct third-party discovery granted.  Bank’s supervision by state agency does not create general jurisdiction, even with other in-state contacts.