December 2016

Photo of Eric Alexander

As we head into December, there is quite a bit of attention being paid to when sales start, when shipping occurs, and when gifts are given.  Were one concerned with such an inquiry, one might imagine a few different points in time when gifting might commence.  For purposes of our space-filling exercise, assume the putative gift is tangible, labeled to identify the intended recipient, wrapped such that it must be opened to reveal its contents, and left in a place where the intended recipient is expected to retrieve it.  Has gifting commenced when the giftor leaves the gift in this place, even if it might be removed before the giftee assumes possession?  Need there be some last clear chance when the gift can no longer be removed or replaced with something else before the giftee claims it?  Must there be a direction like “open it” to signal an exchange?  What if the gift has labeling that states that it cannot be opened for another six weeks or so?  If the “gift” is merely a box containing a note that an actual gift will be forthcoming, then was there a gift at all?  What if we droned on and on?

Goldthrip v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., __ Fed. Appx. __, 2016 WL 6933450 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2016), involves these exact same issues if one can consider a product liability lawsuit a gift and an Alabama courthouse a suitable place for receiving such a gift.  In Goldthrip, the plaintiff alleged that her implanted prosthetic hip manufactured by defendants injured her on December 25, 2013.  As this was a day when many Alabamians were exchanging gifts, we can guess that the timing of the injury was easy to identify.  The plaintiff filed her case on December 23, 2015, two days before the statute expired and another day of mass gifting.  Her complaint, however, came with a curious note, indicating that she was “‘withholding service of process’ in an effort to avoid expenses and facilitate settlement discussions.” Id. at *1.  The complaint was served on the defendant (without a summons) a week later, a summons was issued about six weeks after that, and the defendant was served with the summons sometime later.  (If you are wondering, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c) provides that “A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint. The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service.”  Service of the summons and complaint together, absent waiver, is necessary to get things started in federal court.)Continue Reading Dispensing With Commencing: A Statute of Limitations Gift

Photo of John Sullivan

This post comes from the Cozen O’Connor side of the blog.

After two months, the third bellwether trial in the Pinnacle Hip Implant MDL is coming to an end. The jury heard closing arguments yesterday and began deliberating late in the afternoon. They start up again this morning.

Much like the second bellwether trial, this trial was not without controversy. The signs were ominous before it began.  Two weeks before trial, the court issued a sua sponte order consolidating six separate plaintiffs for the trial, close to any defendant’s worst nightmare. The court also ruled that plaintiffs could serve notices that would require company witnesses who were outside the geographic reach of the court to nonetheless testify live via satellite. Defendants could not substitute trial depositions for the satellite testimony, even though trial depositions had already been taken, complete with cross-examination of the witnesses by plaintiffs’ counsel. This order was sufficiently controversial that a Fifth Circuit judge, while concurring with his colleagues’ decision to reject defendants’ writ of mandamus challenging the order, chose to issue a one-sentence concurring opinion saying that the MDL judge got it wrong.Continue Reading Buckle Up: The Jury Is Out in the Pinnacle Hip Implant MDL’s Third Bellwether Trial