This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
Usually when we are talking about Michigan, it’s to praise the Michigan Products Liability Act which cuts off civil liability for drug manufacturers “if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy by the United States food and drug administration, and the drug and its labeling were in compliance with the United States food and drug administration’s approval at the time the drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.” M.C.L. § 600.2946(5). However, under Michigan law, the distinction between a drug and a device is significant. That is because device manufacturers are not afforded the same immunity. See M.C.L. § 600.2945(b). Of course, device manufacturers do have the broad preemption provided by the Medical Device Amendments. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008). So it’s somewhat rare to get to post on a Michigan law case that isn’t focused on the statute or preemption, but we found one – Avendt v. Covidien, Inc., 2017 WL 2868487 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 5, 2017).
Avendt involves a biologic (as opposed to synthetic) mesh product that was used by plaintiff’s surgeon in plaintiff’s hernia repair surgery. Plaintiff suffered complications following surgery, including an infection and chronic non-healing wound that required multiple revision surgeries and eventual removal of the product. Id. at *1. The biologic mesh product at issue was approved by the FDA via the 510(k) substantial equivalence process. It was cleared to market for use only in “Class I/Clean wounds.” Id. at *17. Plaintiff did not dispute that his wound was Class I and clean, in other words this is an on-label use case. Id. at *19. In addition, the product’s labeling contained a warning that the mesh could weaken or breakdown if used in a contaminated or infected wound or if exposed to “high concentrations of digestive enzymes.” Id. at *17.
Against this background, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant’s product was defective due to failure to test and subsequent failure to warn. Id. at *1. More specifically, plaintiff argued that defendant’s insufficient testing led it to market the product as a “biologic mesh,” when in fact it performs like a synthetic mesh which was the characteristic of the product that led to plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at *22.
In support of his claim, plaintiff disclosed only one expert, Dr. Michael J. Rosen. Dr. Rosen was plaintiff’s treating surgeon who performed the surgery removing the mesh. Plaintiff opted not to have Dr. Rosen prepare a full Rule 26 expert report, the consequences of which were that he would be limited to testifying as a treating physician and so only permitted to testify as to those opinions that were formed “for purposes of, and within the scope of, his care and treatment of [plaintiff].” Id. at *2. Most of Dr. Rosen’s opinions were not.
For example, Dr. Rosen’s opinion that the mesh was unsafe for use in Class I wound was excluded as not being related to his care and treatment of the plaintiff. That may have been an opinion he held at the time he treated plaintiff, but it was not formed for the purpose of or within the scope of his care and treatment of plaintiff. Id. at *23. He had no reason to form a safety opinion to care for and treat plaintiff and he didn’t include any such opinion in his medical records or in any discussion with plaintiff or any of his colleagues. Id. Moreover, Dr. Rosen did not report plaintiff’s case to the FDA as an adverse event. Id. Dr. Rosen’s opinions on the sufficiency of the testing and adequacy of the warning suffered the same fate – to even be considered potentially admissible Dr. Rosen needed to prepare a proper Rule 26 expert report “setting forth the scientific or experiential basis” of his theories. Id. at *25.
But that wasn’t the only fatal flaw for Dr. Rosen’s opinions. His opinions were also unsupported. Unlike his litigation opinion that defendant’s biologic mesh was unsafe for Class I wounds, Dr. Rosen had opined in numerous peer-reviewed articles that defendant’s product was acceptable in that precise situation. Id. at *23-24. The blatant contradiction was another ground for exclusion. Id. at *25. These same peer-reviewed publications also discussed the need for further study of the biologic mesh for treating Class II and III wounds, but nowhere suggested that further testing was needed regarding treatment of Class I wounds such as plaintiffs. So, Dr. Rosen’s opinions on adequate testing were also unsupported. Id. at *26.
As to the adequacy of the warning, plaintiff argued that the product’s labeling should have included a warning to remove the mesh in the event of a seroma (what plaintiff had) or an infection. Id. Dr. Rosen, however, could only opine that “there should be more information” about the types of cases for which the mesh should be used. Id. That was not enough to clear plaintiff’s hurdle of proving as a matter of law that defendant had a duty to warn. Id. Moreover, as noted above, the label did warn about weakening and breakdown – the very side effects plaintiff suffered. Id.
Finally, Dr. Rosen also offered an opinion on causation. He testified that he saw the mesh “sitting on a bed of pus,” removed it, and concluded that the mesh caused the infection because the infection cleared up after removal. Id. at *29. The court didn’t question that Dr. Rosen knew an infection when he saw it. But “the ability to diagnose medical conditions is not remotely the same … as the ability to deduce … in a scientifically reliable manner, the causes of those medical conditions.” Id. (citation omitted). Bottom line – nowhere in his opinion did Dr. Rosen rule out the other potential causes of plaintiff’s infection and failure to heal; such as his diabetes, obesity, blood pressure, and use of immunosuppressants. Id. *29-30.
But Dr. Rosen wasn’t the only problem with plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim also failed for lack of causation. First, the learned intermediary doctrine applies to a medical device. Id. at *21-22. So any duty to warn ran to plaintiff’s surgeon. Second, there was no evidence that plaintiff’s surgeon read the product’s labeling. Id. at *29. He had not met with the defendant’s representative, had not read the instructions for use, and had not read any of the literature about the product. Under this circumstance, no additional or different warning would have made a difference because the doctor wouldn’t have seen it. No failure to warn.
Defendant also had no duty to conduct a randomized prospective clinical trial before marketing the product. There was no evidence that such a clinical trial was the standard of care for 510k mesh products at the time defendant’s product was approved. Id. at *27.
Plaintiff paid dearly for failing to serve a Rule 26 expert report for their sole medical expert, although it appears that even with a report very little of what their expert was offered to opine on would have been admissible under Daubert anyway. And with no causal nexus between the doctor and the warning, plaintiff’s failure to warn claim was dubious regardless of whether the expert testimony was admissible or not. While any one of these things would have sunk the case, we’re glad the court explored them all. The opinion is loaded with good precedent.