Last week, we took a short Western Caribbean cruise to celebrate a jarringly-advanced birthday. While the weather wasn’t an asset (it was 43 degrees when we departed Fort Lauderdale, and hovered in the 60s for most of the trip), we left behind record cold and treacherous ice in Philadelphia, so we had no climatic complaints. We were slightly apprehensive, however, because we were sailing on the very ship that had been in the news a few weeks earlier for a norovirus outbreak that sickened a couple hundred passengers. But we convinced ourselves that the adverse publicity surrounding the recent outbreak would ensure that pre-sailing sanitation and onboard precautions were at an all-time high. And we were correct: the entrance to every venue on the ship was blocked by crew members bearing giant bottles of hand sanitizer, application of which was required for passage. Even at the 24-hour soft-serve frozen yogurt machine (if we were assured this would be operational at all times, we could happily exist without dining rooms), the crew member manning the controls would not hand over a cone to anyone who did not sanitize first. It apparently worked: we came through unscathed and heard of no reports of illness on the ship. (We also had a blast — played round after round of trivia, “clear kayaked” off the coast of Cozumel, drank many glasses of wine, and spent hours and hours motionless except for turning the pages of our book.) Bottom line was that the cruise line did all that it was supposed to do to protect its passengers. Beyond that, people had to be smart and careful, because the ship’s duty only extended so far.
Today’s case also involves questions of duty and of whether the defendant’s duty extended as far as the plaintiff said it did. In Liu v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, No. B269318, 2018 WL 272219 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2018), an unpublished decision from the California Court of Appeal, the plaintiff’s son and decedent died after briefly participating in a clinical trial for a long-acting injectable form of the defendant’s antipsychotic medication. The decedent had begun treatment for mental illness nine years earlier, and had been taking another antipsychotic medication for five of those years. His treating psychiatrist was the doctor selected to be the principal physician/investigator for the defendant’s clinical trial, and it was she who invited the decedent to participate in the study.
The decedent underwent a screening EKG, which revealed several abnormalities, and a blood test, which revealed slightly elevated liver enzymes. The treater concluded that the results were not clinically significant, and “based on [the decedent’s] otherwise normal physical examination and denial of a family history of cardiac disease,” she admitted him to the study. Liu, 2018 WL 272219 at *1.
Three days later, after a second blood test, the decedent was injected with a non-therapeutic one-milligram dose of the study drug to test for adverse reactions. A second EKG was performed within two hours. The next day, the results of this EKG and the pre-injection blood test were analyzed, and they indicated worsened cardiac function and much higher liver enzymes than four days earlier. The decedent was admitted to an acute-care hospital, where he was diagnosed with cardiomyopathy, pneumonia, failing liver function, and altered mental state. He died two days later.
The plaintiff sued a host of study defendants, including the treater and the drug manufacturer, for negligence, product liability, and negligent failure to warn. After much motion practice, the case proceeded to trial on only the negligence claims and against only the drug manufacturer. The defendant moved in limine to exclude the plaintiff’s cardiology and pharmacology experts’ opinions that the one-milligram test dose contributed to the decedent’s death, but the trial court admitted the testimony.
At the close of evidence, the trial judge granted a partial directed verdict, finding that the physician/investigator (the treater) was not the agent of the defendant for purposes of finding the defendant vicariously liable for her medical negligence. This left two issues for the jury to consider: 1) whether the defendant manufacturer had an independent duty to intervene in the decedent’s medical care, even if the medical issues “preexisted, or were unrelated to, the study itself,” id. at *5; and 2) the defendant’s duty to monitor the administration of the study drug, including the issue of whether the one-milligram test administration caused the decedent’s death. The jury found that the defendant was negligent and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death, assessing the defendant’s fault at 70% and awarding $5.6 million in damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether the defendant had a duty to intervene in the decedent’s treatment for his preexisting heart disease, and whether there was sufficient evidence that the single one-milligram test dosage was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death. With respect to the first question, the court held, “We agree as a matter of law that defendant, as the drug manufacturer/sponsor of a clinical trial, undertook a general duty not to harm the study participants as part of the clinical trial protocols. Administration of the [test dose] fell within the scope of this duty, and we will discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support liability under this duty of care . . . . But the significant legal question . . . is whether the general duty not to harm study participants encompassed a duty to diagnose or treat [the decedent’s] preexisting, life-threatening heart disease and to intervene in the medical care and decisions precipitated by [the decedent’s] abnormal test results. . . . [W]e conclude that it did not.” Id. at *6.
The court’s holding turned on the question of foreseeability. It explained that the general duty FDA regulations impose on study sponsors – to ensure compliance with study protocols and the participants’ safety – is intended to “protect participants generally from foreseeable harm caused by the drug studies themselves, including participants’ adverse reactions to study medications.” Id. at *7. But it cited state law decisions standing for the proposition that “it is not foreseeable to a study sponsor that study physicians with the primary responsibility for participants’ health and safety will fail to recognize, diagnose, and properly treat preexisting, life-threatening conditions that first manifest during drug studies,” as did the decedent’s heart and other conditions. Id. (citations omitted). Simply put, “it is not reasonably foreseeable to a drug study sponsor that the response by study physicians . . . would fall below the standard of care for a medical practitioner.” Id. at *8.
That left the question of medical causation. As noted, the jury’s verdict was based on the testimony of the plaintiff’s cardiology and pharmacology experts. Both experts testified on direct examination that the test dose was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death. But, while the pharmacologist testified that the drug could cause heart arrhythmias, she admitted that there was no evidence that the decedent died from an arrhythmia. And, while the cardiologist “unequivocally concluded the administration of any amount of the test drug . . . was sufficient to push the decedent ‘over the edge,’ [he] did not provide a reasoned explanation that illuminated for the jury how or why such a low dose of [the drug] could have had such a substantial effect on [the decedent’s] life-threatening heart disease.” Id. As such, the appeals court found that, “at best, [both] causation experts opined as to a theory that might have contributed to [the decedent’s] death, [they] did not provide the necessary factual basis to qualify that theory as substantial evidence.” Id. at *12.
Judgment for the plaintiff reversed. And though the decision is unpublished and can’t be cited, it reinforces the reality that duties are not unlimited and drug companies aren’t responsible for medical care and aren’t liable for everything that happens to everyone who takes their drugs. We like this decision and wish it were published – we’ll keep our eyes open for one that is. And now, we’d gladly use a gallon of hand sanitizer for one more stroll around the deck with a frozen yogurt cone.