Four weeks ago, we posted concerning an MDL judge’s decision not to sanction a plaintiff lawyer for false representations concerning diversity jurisdiction.  We disputed that acting in the client’s “best interest” was a good excuse and questioned whether MDL courts cut plaintiff lawyers more slack than they should.  We also had a bit of a tie-in to the then-on-ongoing NFL playoffs.  Those playoffs ended on Sunday with the crowning of the Philadelphia franchise that routinely and effectively utilized a version of the quarterback sneak known by a play on the city’s moniker.  Quite coincidentally, our post today relates to a Philly federal judge’s sanctioning of a local plaintiff lawyer for some ineffective sneakiness of his own.

We would not normally post about a case about an automobile accident without product liability claims or some relevant constitutional issue (such as personal jurisdiction in Ford v. Montana), but Shelton v. Chaudry, No. 24-5657, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2025), caught our eye.  While we do not tend to mention judges or plaintiff lawyers by name, we note at the outset that the judge was a plaintiff lawyer before taking the bench and the plaintiff lawyer in this case will be called by the generic “PL” in this post.  The case was actually the second one filed by PL about the same accident.  The first had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but not before the judge noticed contradictory assertions in the complaint concerning diversity jurisdiction and issued a show cause order asking PL to “explain why he should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for asserting diversity while pleading facts that explicitly demonstrated the absence of diversity jurisdiction, requiring the Court to devote time and attention to addressing a frivolous pleading.”  Id. at *3.  (Our continuing summary of the decision omits some details, not because we are eschewing our own non-existent duty of diligence in blogging, but because we do not want our readers to devote too much time and attention to a post about a judge’s frustration in addressing frivolous pleadings.)  PL’s response basically blamed “his team” at the firm he founded and managed.  The court considered these errors “egregious,” but imposed no sanctions yet at that point.  Id. at *5.  Then PL filed another case in the same court over the same accident, omitting the prior non-diverse defendants.  It ended up with the same judge, who noticed the second complaint contradicted the first and itself on the location of the accident in relation to venue, among other issues.  “Dismayed by [PL’s] continued factual and legal misrepresentations to the Court,” the judge issued another show cause order.  Id. at *6.  PL basically said “oops,” disclaimed bad intent, and agreed the case should be transferred to the district with proper venue.  The judge was not letting the case go without first giving PL a not-so-brotherly shove on his way out.

As you read our ensuing recitation of the Shelton court’s analysis supporting imposing sanctions against PL, we suggest asking how the same considerations would apply to fairly routine plaintiff lawyer conduct in MDLs, coordinated proceedings, and mass torts.  “As officers of the court, lawyers must not mislead courts.  So before they state facts, they must investigate reasonably.”  Id. at *9 (quoting Wharton v. Superintendent Graterford SCL, 95 F.4th 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2024)).  That means “negligence” by the lawyer is enough to impose sanctions under Rule 11.  As for PL, he was not just negligent, but “duplicitous in his representations to the Court.”  Id.  However, the absence of bad faith would not be an excuse anyway, as “Rule 11 does not have a ‘pure heart and empty head defense.’”  Id. at *13 (citation omitted).  There is also no defense of no harm, no foul as PL tried to assert by agreeing to transfer the second case.  Unfounded contentions in each complaint forced the court and Defendants to spend their resources, which justified “weighty sanctions.”  Id. at *16-17.   By contrast, “[i]mposing sanctions for these completely unfounded contentions will hardly deter valid litigation.”  Id. at *17.  PL’s request for leniency by pointing to his position in his firms and the local plaintiffs’ bar—on the Board for the Philadelphia Trial Lawyers and the Pennsylvania Association for Justice—only made the gaffes worse in the court’s view.  The claim of acting in his client’s interest, such as worked in the decision in our prior post, also did not work here.  The idea that PL helped his client “get the best medical care for his injuries” was easily rebuffed as a litigation tactic for which PL was reimbursed, and which resulted in no actual care for the plaintiff.  Id. at *20-21.

The actual sanctions imposed—a formal reprimand, $7500, and a directive that every attorney at PL’s firm get the decision—may not seem like much, but we think they could have deterrent value.  For one thing, by the rules of most courts we know, the formal reprimand for “[f]ailing to comply with the duties of an attorney by filing pleadings containing false representations and legally unsupportable contentions” would have to be reported in connection with any application for admission, pro hac vice or otherwise.  Id. at *21.  In addition, the justification for circulating the decision could have ripples:  “[B]ased on the many [PL’s firm] cases that have come before me and my colleagues, I am persuaded that the facially obvious errors found in this case reflect a cultural norm at [PL’s firm] to prioritize volume at the expense of accuracy.”  Id. at *26.  The reference to the judge’s colleagues on the bench of this fairly prominent district is not too subtle.  Nor is how similar reasoning about the problem with “prioritiz[ing] volume at the expense of accuracy” would apply to the drug and device cases we see.