We have seen a recent plague of purported class actions against various FDA-regulated OTC products that include allegations of contamination (usually benzene) that are purportedly supported by “independent laboratory” testing. Fortunately, we have also seen these cases dismissed one after another for a variety of reasons, including lack of standing. Today’s case is a great example of how vague allegations about testing are not enough to confer standing. Although Lurenz v. The Coca-Cola Company, 2025 WL 2773188 (S.D.N.Y Sep. 29, 2025) is about purported food contamination rather than drugs or devices, everything that this case holds is equally applicable to them.

Plaintiff filed the purported class action in December 2022 and filed two amended complaints over the next year and a half. The most recent amendment included allegations that plaintiff had the at issue products (juices) tested as follows: samples collected in July 2022 tested in February 2023; additional samples tested in February 2023; and additional testing in July 2024, including two products purchased by plaintiff. Id. at *1. The complaint claims those tests show the samples contained PFAs. But plaintiff’s allegations about that sample testing were not enough to demonstrate that the products tested were either the actual products plaintiff purchased or that the court should extrapolate the test results to the broader product line.

Overall plaintiff’s allegations about the “independent testing” were just too vague for the court to draw any reasonable conclusions that would support standing. As to the first two sample sets, plaintiff made no allegations that he actually purchased any of the products tested. As to the third set, plaintiff’s allegations were unclear as to whether the samples were from his own purchased products or whether he simply had purchased products from the product lines tested. The court was also concerned about the seven-month gap between collection of the samples and testing because the products could have been PFAs-free when collected and then contaminated “through no fault of Defendants.” Id. at *4. Moreover, plaintiffs did not allege anything about how many products were tested, how many tests were run, what percentage of the products/tests detected PFAs. “Absent specific facts concerning the various tests, the Court cannot conclude the presence of PFAs in the test Products was anything more than a “sheer possibility.” Id. at *5.

The court also took issue with the timing of the testing. If plaintiff was alleging that the July 2024 testing was of actual product he purchased around the time of the testing, that put those purchases nineteen months after he filed the lawsuit—nineteen months too late for plaintiff to claim to have been misled.  “A plaintiff that self-inflicts his alleged injury solely to manufacture standing for litigation does not have standing.” Id.

Not being able to show that the testing was done on any product plaintiff actually purchased, he also tried to argue that the court should draw a “plausible inference” that the contamination was so widespread that plaintiff must have purchased at least once mislabeled product. Here the court considered a variety of factors. First, was the testing “reasonably near in time” to plaintiff’s purchases? Between the 7-month gap between purchase and testing for the first sample set and the lack of any allegations of when the products for the other samples sets were purchased, plaintiff could not establish this factor. Second, did plaintiff “regularly purchase” the product? Id.  Plaintiff’s claim that he bought the products “numerous times” was not enough to establish “regular” purchases. Third, did the testing involve “more than a small number” of samples and what was the “geographic proximity of the testing to plaintiff’s purchases?” Id. Plaintiff failed to provide any details about where the tested product was purchased, when it was purchased, how much was purchased, or any methodology used to conduct the testing. Plaintiff did not provide SKU numbers of lot codes that would show where the tested products were purchased. Overall, the plaintiff failed to establish a “meaningful link” between the products tested and the products he actually purchased. Allegations “describing general and unspecific results of testing [are] insufficient to sustain Article III standing.” Id. at *6. 

Striking out on the testing, plaintiff also argued he had standing to pursue a “benefit of the bargain” theory of injury—that he received a product worth less than what he paid for it. But regardless of the “all-natural” claim on the label, “plaintiff paid for fruit juice and received fruit juice, which he consumed without suffering any harm,” (otherwise he would have brought a personal injury claim, not an economic injury claim). Id. at *7.  In other words, he did get the benefit of the bargain. He didn’t get a rock in a bottle or an IOU. The benefit of the bargain was a functional, drinkable juice, not a moral victory in the war on marketing buzzwords.

Finally, since this was plaintiff’s second amended complaint and he still failed to allege sufficient facts to confer standing, the case was dismissed with prejudice.