Happy new year, and welcome to 2026. While we may still be pondering the meaning of auld lang syne or waxing philosophical about the new year, we’ll quickly move on  and get to work defending our clients. That’s what we do as defense hacks, and kudos to all of you for doing it so well.

We’ve written many times about plaintiffs who try (and fail) to plead injury by alleging hypothetical risks, speculative future harm, or buyer’s remorse untethered to actual loss. Today’s dismissal of a putative class action from the Northern District of California is a new year’s reminder that Article III and statutory standing remain stubbornly real requirements.  Druzgalski v. CVS Health Corp., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265766 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025).

The plaintiff in Druzgalski alleged that she was pregnant and requested an RSV vaccine approved for pregnant women (Abrysvo), but instead received a different RSV vaccine (Arexvy), which was not approved for use during pregnancy.  She filed a class action asserting claims under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and common-law negligence.

This was not the defendant’s first trip to the Rule 12(b)(6) well. The court previously dismissed plaintiff’s original complaint for failure to plead standing, but it gave plaintiff leave to amend. When the amended complaint arrived, however, it suffered from the same fundamental defect: conclusory language about “harm” and “danger,” but no concrete facts showing either physical injury or economic loss.

To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and that is (3) likely to be addressed by the requested relief.” Id. at *3 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). In the original complaint, plaintiff alleged that testing “strongly suggests” that the Arexvy vaccine “might” exacerbate RSV infection in young children. The court found that overly speculative and insufficient to establish standing. In her amended complaint, plaintiff attempted to bolster her allegations and overcome the standing deficiency by claiming that:

• Evidence from animal testing suggests that Arexvy might exacerbate RSV infection in children younger than two;
• Plaintiff, and/or her child, suffered damage as a result of the defendant administering an “incorrect, and dangerous, vaccine;” and
• The Arexvy vaccine is untested and likely harmful to pregnant women and young children’s health.”

Id. (emphasis added). The court held that these allegations all remained cursory and were insufficient to establish Article III standing. Plaintiff did not allege that she or her unborn child suffered any harm from the vaccine, and the allegations about non-specific animal testing that “might” exacerbate RSV were “speculative and vague” and failed “to establish any nexus between such testing and CVS’ alleged misconduct.” Id. at *4.

Apart from Article III standing, the court held that the plaintiff did not satisfy the statutory standing requirements under the UCL and CLRA. Under those statutes, a plaintiff must allege that she suffered an injury, typically by alleging the plaintiff would not have purchased the product or would have paid less if it had not been misrepresented. Additionally, under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege “actual harm such as lost money or property.” Id. at *5. Although plaintiff alleged that she would not have purchased the vaccine if it had not been “misrepresented as the Abrysvo vaccine,” she did not allege any actual payment for the vaccine. Instead, her allegations skirted the question of payment, vaguely alleging that the plaintiff “went to the CVS Pharmacy . . . to receive” the RSV vaccine, “told the CVS employee,” she wanted the vaccine, agreed to receive the vaccine, and then was “administered” the vaccine from CVS. Id. Those vague allegations failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for plaintiff’s claims, and the court held that, even if the plaintiff had established Article III standing, she failed to allege statutory standing under the UCL and CLRA.

Having given plaintiff a prior chance to amend, the court dismissed the complaint without leave for further amendment. While the year may be new, the requirement for standing is not, and it is good to see courts enforcing this threshold requirement. Not a bad way to start the year.