We’ve blogged a lot recently about preemption and the dismissal of complaints alleging that certain over the counter products, including acne medications, sunscreens, antiperspirants, expectorants, and shampoos contain benzene. Almost a year ago we blogged about the dismissal of an OTC case involving medicated shampoo that allowed plaintiff leave to amend. Today’s decision, Pineda v. Lake Consumer Products, Inc., 2025 WL 2698991 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2025), is a mixed bag that addresses plaintiff’s amended complaint. It’s about coal-tar shampoos, which are known to include benzene and are subject to an FDA monograph that recognizes the naturally occurring presence of benzene in coal tar. Yet, shockingly, plaintiff filed a class action claiming she would not have purchased the shampoos had she known they contained benzene.Continue Reading OTC Preemption Letdown in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Plaintiff Talc Expert Must Give Deposition Testimony in Trade Libel Lawsuit
We previously blogged about the bogus “scientific” articles in the cosmetic talcum powder litigation and the defendant’s relentless efforts to expose the likely fraud. Prior posts are here, here and here. If you do not recall the ongoing saga, here’s the quick refresher. Plaintiffs’ paid experts in the talc litigation published two articles that purported to study groups of individuals whose only potential asbestos exposures involved talcum powder. Those “studies” were based on plaintiffs in litigation where the authors served as experts. The defendant discovered that several of the subjects in the articles were plaintiffs in ongoing cases, and the defendant knew from those cases that certain subjects had numerous, potential exposures to asbestos other than talcum powder—thus undercutting the entire foundation of the articles. The defendant aggressively sought discovery about the study subjects’ identities and filed trade libel lawsuits against the authors.
Today’s decision, Moline v. Pecos River Talc LLC, 2025 WL 2898086 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2025), involves a motion to quash a subpoena issued to Dr. Jacqueline Moline (who authored one of the papers) by Pecos River in the trade libel lawsuit brought against the other authors, Pecos River Talc LLC v. Emory et al., No. 4:24-cv-75 (E.D. Va.) (Pecos River was the entity created as part of Johnson & Johnson’s effort to resolve the talc-related claims through bankruptcy). We’ll call the defendants in that case the Emory defendants.Continue Reading Plaintiff Talc Expert Must Give Deposition Testimony in Trade Libel Lawsuit
A Real Pain in the . . .
We’ve been defending drug and device litigation for a long time, and we’ve seen many plaintiffs who experienced real injuries. Those of us at the blog, our colleagues at other defense firms, and our clients are genuinely sympathetic to injuries a plaintiff actually experienced. Many plaintiffs we’ve encountered also endured terrible circumstances earlier in their lives. Some of those can be heartbreaking. Defending cases on the basis that our clients’ products did not cause the injury or that the injury was a known and warned of risk doesn’t mean the defense bar looks askance at plaintiffs and their experiences. But, when we see a case involving a syringe needle purportedly propelled into a plaintiff’s derrière, some of us might exhibit a moment of minor moral weakness and include the above title in a blog post. Mea culpa.
Today’s case, Rudzinskas v. Retractable Techs., Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191860 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2025), involves a type of syringe that automatically retracts once the plunger handle is fully depressed. Plaintiff’s husband regularly administered vitamin B-12 shots to her and had been doing so for six or seven years. Plaintiff claimed that, on one of those occasions, the needle from defendant’s syringe “shot into [her] like a slingshot.” Id. at *4. Plaintiff went to the hospital and an ultrasound suggested the needle was embedded in the plaintiff’s buttock. Plaintiff underwent surgery to have the needle removed, but the surgeon was not able to extract it. Continue Reading A Real Pain in the . . .
The Best Test of Truth Is the Power of the Thought to Get Itself Accepted in the Competition of the Market
The title of today’s post is from a quote by Justice Holmes in a dissenting opinion, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Abrams involved a conviction under the Espionage Act based on the publication of leaflets that were distributed in New York during World War I. Among other things, the leaflets denounced President Wilson as a hypocrite and a coward, and lamented the “hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington and vicinity.” Id. at 620. In his dissent (joined by Justice Brandeis), Justice Holmes espoused the power of free speech in connection with our country’s experiment with its Constitution. Or, as Justice Holmes more eloquently put it: “It is an experiment. All life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system[,] I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death . . . .” Id. at 630.Continue Reading The Best Test of Truth Is the Power of the Thought to Get Itself Accepted in the Competition of the Market
More Filshie Clip Preemption
We’ve blogged recently about good preemption decisions in the Filshie Clips litigation from the Southern District of Texas (per Bexis, “as good a PMA medical device preemption decision as a defendant has a right to expect”) and the Northern District of Georgia. Today we add another preemption win in the same litigation from the
Trimming Down the GLP-1 MDL
Our readership is tuned into current events and stays up to date on significant drug and device litigation. We bet no one missed that Taylor and Travis are getting married, or that a college football game being hyped as the biggest regular season game in at least a decade (Texas v. Ohio St.) happens tomorrow. We also bet that the blog’s readers know what GLP-1 inhibitors are—medications developed for diabetes and now widely prescribed for weight loss. At least one poll estimated that 12% of the U.S. population has taken a GLP-1 medication.
About a year ago, we posted about the successful efforts of the defendants in the GLP-1 MDL to have the court, rather than permitting unfettered discovery at the outset, instead tee-up certain “cross-cutting” issues that would impact the scope of the MDL. Yesterday we posted about the MDL court’s ruling on preemption of the plaintiffs’ design defect claims. Today we address a separate decision addressing the admissibility of expert testimony on a cross-cutting issue. In re Glucagon-Like Peptide-1 Receptor Agonists Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 3094, 2025 WL 2396801 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2025).Continue Reading Trimming Down the GLP-1 MDL
PMA Preemption in the Southern District of New York
Today’s decision, Croci v. Zoll Medical Corp., 2025 WL 2307728 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2025), is a straightforward, preemption-based 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint involving a Class III medical device. The case involves claims about a Life Vest, which is worn externally and monitors the wearer’s heart rate. The device is able to detect ventricular tachycardia and ventricular fibrillation, and it can deliver a therapeutic shock to restore the wearer’s heart rate to a normal rhythm. The complaint alleged that the decedent experienced problems with the Life Vest, and that a representative of the Life Vest’s manufacturer visited the decedent’s home to “desensitize the device.” Id. at *1. Shortly after the alleged visit from the representative, the decedent experienced a cardiac arrest and died.Continue Reading PMA Preemption in the Southern District of New York
Summers Round 2: Learned Intermediary Rule Applies to Claim Based on Device Recall
Today’s post is our second installment about a case in the District of Massachusetts alleging injury from a Class III medical device. We blogged about it this spring when the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim that an implanted defibrillator and associated leads caused her numerous, unnecessary shocks. The court dismissed that complaint based on straightforward, premarket approval preemption. But the court granted plaintiff leave to amend, and she moved to file an amended complaint. Today’s decision, Summers v. Medtronic, Inc., 2025 WL 2201110 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2025), denied plaintiff’s motion for leave based on the learned intermediary rule in Massachusetts. It’s a helpful decision because it applies the learned intermediary rule at the 12(b)(6) stage in the context of a device recall.Continue Reading Summers Round 2: Learned Intermediary Rule Applies to Claim Based on Device Recall
Belt and Suspenders – Dismissal in the Western District of Washington
Sometimes opinions go entirely in favor of the defense, analyzing numerous, independent bases for the dismissal of a complaint. Today’s decision, Doyle v. Bayer Corp., 2025 WL 1666261 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2025), is definitely one of those. It is a perfect example of what should happen when a plaintiff files a generic, bare-bones complaint in a prescription medical product case.
Plaintiff had an intrauterine device (IUD) implanted, and after about two years was informed that the IUD had likely been expelled from her body. More than ten years after that, plaintiff obtained an x-ray for a persistent cough. Doctors suspected that a shadow shown on the x-ray in the plaintiff’s abdomen was the IUD. Plaintiff subsequently had surgery to remove the IUD, and she and her husband then filed suit against the manufacturer. Plaintiffs asserted five common law product liability claims and a sixth for unfair business practices.Continue Reading Belt and Suspenders – Dismissal in the Western District of Washington
Snap! Sometimes the Third Time Isn’t a Charm
Snap removal is one of the few ways that defendants can counter plaintiffs’ efforts at forum shopping. When a case analyzes snap removal and expressly adopts fraudulent misjoinder in the Third Circuit, you know it gets our attention.
Today’s decision, Paddock v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2025 WL 1908806 (D. Del. July 11, 2025), is a report and recommendation denying remand following the defendant’s snap removal. The case involves claims by multiple plaintiffs that the defendant wrongfully promoted the off-label use of terbutaline (an asthma drug) to treat pre-term labor in pregnant women, and that the plaintiffs’ children developed autism as a result of their ingestion of the drug during pregnancy.Continue Reading Snap! Sometimes the Third Time Isn’t a Charm