The Butler Snow contingent on the DDL blogging team had nothing to do with this post.
New York law is surprisingly good for defendants. Or maybe we’re jaded by bad experiences in other jurisdictions, and New York law manages to seem fair only by comparison. Certainly, we’d rather be in a courtroom in New York
The word of the day is targeted. Targeted discovery on a targeting device and a district court laser-focused on the failure to warn causation target. The end result is a decisive defense win on failure to warn. See In re Biozorb Device Prods. Liab. Litig., 1:23-cv-10599-ADB, No. 1:22-CV-11895-ADB, 2025 WL 509834 (D. Mass. Feb.
To say that we’re not big fans of the “consumer expectation” test in prescription medical product liability litigation is a gross understatement. That supposed “test” for design defect – the Third Restatement expressly ditched it as a separate test, Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §2, comment g (1998) – exists primarily to let plaintiffs claim they never expected that any product would ever injure them, no matter how badly they misused it. So again and again, we’ve decried the consumer expectation “test” on the Blog.
But at least in some states, the learned intermediary rule ameliorates the consumer expectation test in our sandbox – by considering the relevant “consumer” to be the physician to whom a drug or device warning is directed. Generally speaking, consumers of prescription medical products lack any expectations about the performance and safety of those products other than what their physicians tell them. Thus, quite a few courts have held that, in the context of prescription medical products, the physician is actually the “consumer” or the “intended user” of such products. Continue Reading Learned Consumer Expectations
We hope we have some 1980s cartoon fans out there who will remember that G.I. Joe ended each of his cartoons with a PSA – “Now you know. And knowing is half the battle . . .” The PSA was usually about something dangerous kids did unintentionally—like running out into traffic. The idea was
We write a lot about the learned intermediary rule. There are 50 state surveys and summaries of helpful decisions, as well as numerous posts on state-specific decisions. We tracked the development of the rule in jurisdictions like West Virginia and Arizona, and we’ve generally been pleased to report positive developments. At the end of 2024, though, we flagged the Himes case from California as one of the ten worst decisions of the year based on its novel approach to warnings causation. Given our criticisms of Himes, we found it both bizarre and troubling to see the case cited recently by an MDL court in Massachusetts applying Pennsylvania law. Our colleagues in the plaintiffs’ bar are clearly advocating to expand Himes into other jurisdictions, and the defense bar should be ready to counter those efforts.Continue Reading Himes Makes a Sneak Appearance on the East Coast
May the holidays treat you well. We trust that none of you got burnt by any of the many hot things loitering around this time of year: yule logs, candles, figgy puddings, overloaded electrical outlets, and Aunt Sally’s line dancing after she downs a third eggnog.
Today’s case is not exactly hot, but it’s got
The last time we looked into Bueno v. Merck, it was anything but bueno. Taking the position that, “if there is a cause of action, there must be jurisdiction,” a misguided decision had held that a branded drug manufacturer could be haled to court under an innovator liability claim, despite the defendant having never sold anything to the plaintiff in the state. See Bueno v. Merck & Co., 626 F. Supp.3d 1154 (S.D. Cal. 2022). That decision made our bottom ten list in in 2022.
Two years later – and who knows how many $$$ spent in the interim – the result on the merits was incomparably better. All claims dismissed with prejudice for a variety of excellent reasons. Bueno v. Merck & Co., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2024 WL 3974754 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2024). Ditto for a companion case decided the same day. See Parker v. Merck & Co., 2024 WL 3974764 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2024).
Here’s what happened.Continue Reading Bueno and More Bueno
We posted earlier this year about the failure to warn causation decision from the California Supreme Court in Himes v. Somatics, 549 P.3d 916 (Cal. 2024), and the potential parade of horribles that might ensue. Here comes the grand marshal of the parade.Continue Reading California District Court Punts on Learned Intermediary Causation Post-Himes
Our prior TwIqbal post concerning learned intermediary causation was well received by our readers, so we’re back with a second, related (and, as it turned out, even longer) discussion of pleading in prescription medical product warning litigation.
In addition to pleading causation, a product liability plaintiff alleging an inadequate warning must plead how the warning was inadequate. Sounds rather obvious, but never underestimate the capacity of plaintiffs in our sandbox for failing to plead their cases. The amount of precedent bouncing lazy plaintiffs for not bothering to allege what (they claim) is wrong with prescription medical product warnings is surprisingly (or maybe not) extensive.Continue Reading Using TwIqbal To Require Plaintiffs To Identify Claimed Warning Inadequacy
Anybody who has litigated a prescription medical product liability case knows about the learned intermediary rule, which is now followed in all fifty states. Just as prescription medical product warnings are routed through prescribing physicians, so necessarily is the causation aspect of such warnings. The details vary from state to state, but in all learned intermediary cases, correcting an allegedly inadequate warning must cause the learned intermediary physician to do something differently, and that “something” must prevent the plaintiff’s claimed injury.
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s TwIqbal decisions require that plaintiffs plead facts to support the elements of their causes of action. From the defense perspective, that means that complaints against our clients should be required to plead (at minimum): (1) the identity of the relevant prescriber, (2) what that prescriber would have done differently with a “better” warning, and (3) how that difference would have prevented the claimed harm. We don’t ask for a lot, but at least one fact supporting these essential causal elements should certainly be mandatory.Continue Reading Using TwIqbal To Enforce Warning Causation in Learned Intermediary Cases