We were in western Tennessee last week for an argument.   We stayed at a beautiful and venerable hotel, most famous for twice-daily “march of the ducks.” Every morning, at 11 a.m. sharp (at least 30 minutes after guests have packed the lobby), an elevator door opens, and a uniformed “duck master” leads a perfect procession

We had been waiting for the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Burningham v. Wright Medical for some time.  As we pointed out in a blogpost when Burningham was first certified by the district court (Utah is one of the few courts allowing district court certification), over a year ago, “[p]ractically no court has . . 

A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. A jack of all trades is a master of none. These cutesy little phrases throw some derision toward one who possesses some knowledge in a bunch of areas. Representing drug and device companies in litigation can make a lawyer reject the negative interpretation of these phrases. We have

Here is the third and final part of our 50-state opus on precedent supporting the principle that plaintiffs asserting claims dependent on propositions that ordinary people aren’t expected to know must come forward with expert opinions for those propositions.  As mentioned previously, this project arose from something we read about in the Mirena litigation –

What follows is the second part of our extensive 50-state of cases precluding plaintiffs from proceeding with claims in the absence of admissible expert support.  Part One was last week.  In most states such rulings originated in medical malpractice and workers’ compensation actions, with the relevant principles broadening to encompass product liability and toxic torts. 

So said the Connecticut state appellate court last week.  It’s a pretty simple equation.  Like No shoes, no shirt, no service.  No pain, no gainNo risk, no reward.  In other words, you can’t get one without the other.  In Ferrari v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., — A.3d —, 2019 WL 2167849

A product is not defective simply because someone was harmed by it. That seems a simple enough point. Courts often acknowledge it, though sometimes in a perfunctory, mumbling fashion. What gives teeth to the mumbling is when state law requires the plaintiff to show a safer alternative product. If really pressed, many plaintiffs cannot articulate