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As we discussed at length in this post, since the 1940s, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and other courts applying Pennsylvania law have refused to subject prescription medical products to strict liability.  That is significant because, unlike (now) every other state in the country, since 1987 Pennsylvania precedent prohibited defendants from introducing evidence of their

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Beginning – at least − with the awful decision in Schrecengost v. Coloplast Corp., 425 F. Supp.3d 448, 465 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (discussed here), plaintiffs seeking to overturn the longstanding Pennsylvania (since the 1940s) prohibition against strict liability in prescription medical product liability litigation have been systematically attacking the precedential weight

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We have blogged several times about the somewhat esoteric issue of whether intangible items – chiefly computer software, website algorithms, and other electronic information – is treated as a “product” for purposes of imposing strict liability on their creators.  It’s an interesting topic; Eric recently wrote a paper on it, and Bexis is putting together a “white paper” for the Product Liability Advisory Council on the same subject.  From these exercises we concluded that a 50-state survey on intangibles as “products” for product liability purposes would be both doable and useful.Continue Reading How the Fifty States View Electronic Data as a “Product”

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Montana became the first state to ban TikTok this month.  You no doubt have seen the press and have read the spirited discussion condemning foreign spies on the one hand and championing First Amendment rights on the other.  Litigation has already commenced.  But, while all that was developing, you may have overlooked that Montana

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If we have said it once, we have said it a hundred times:  medical product manufacturers are not insurers of their products.  Almost as frequently uttered would be that strict liability is not the same thing as absolute liability.  In the show position might be that the temporal relationship between a new medical condition and

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At some point, early in the pelvic mesh litigation, some genius on the other side decided it would be a good idea to include a stand-alone claim for “defective product” in at least one of the plaintiffs’ standard complaints.  “Defective product” was pleaded as some generic form of strict liability, separate and apart from the three accepted theories of manufacturing, design, and warning defect.  We have no idea where this concept of “defective product” came from.  It’s not adopted by the law of any state as far as we can tell.Continue Reading Defective Claims for “Defective Product”

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Keralink Intl., Inc. v. Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals  Corp., 2023 WL 2000999 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023), is unusual because it is an affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  

Many years ago, we won a summary judgment on behalf of our big bank client, which was suing another big bank for failure to fulfill

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Recently, in describing a decision granting summary judgment in an IVC filter case, we identified some additional analyses we would have liked to have seen:

[W]hile interrelated, we think the concepts of a “compensable injury” and causation are separate.  For instance, an exposure might cause a risk of future injury, but state law may hold that such a risk without present injury is not compensable.  Or a subclinical injury like pleural thickening may not be compensable, in part because of the inconsistency with the principles of accrual of claims for statute of limitations purposes.  Is a medical procedure not required by specific symptoms—regardless of what caused them—itself a compensable injury?  We think not.  A surgery may be part of the damages allegedly related to an injury allegedly caused by the drug/device/exposure, but is not an injury in and of itself.  Gomez did not delve into this either.

That same day—but well after we had set our prescient post to publish—the court in Fuss v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2019-02348, 2022 Mass. Super. LEXIS 251 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2022), did those same analyses in another IVC filter case.  Rather than fall prey to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy that plagues plaintiffs’ causation theories in so many drug and device product liability cases, we will admit this is mere coincidence.  After all, compensable injury seems like an obvious threshold issue in an IVC filter case where perforation of the inferior vena cava (IVC) is the only claimed injury.

Given the facts of Fuss, we will go a step further and say that it would be better if there were a way to get rid of cases without compensable injuries without the time and expense of going through fact and expert discovery and briefing an all-issues summary judgment motion with accompanying Daubert motion.  After a pulmonary embolism, plaintiff had his IVC filter implanted by an experienced vascular surgeon in 2007.  It has remained in place, without embolism or any symptoms tied a complication, for the fifteen years since.  Then plaintiff saw a lawyer advertisement, was sent by lawyers to get a CT scan ordered by a doctor he did not know and never met, and brought a lawsuit over an alleged perforation.  After suing, plaintiff conferred with his implanting surgeon, who, with the benefit of an x-ray, concluded the filter was doing its job and required no treatment or intervention.  In deposition, plaintiff admitted that he had been asymptomatic.  After the parties completed discovery and teed up motions for both summary judgment and exclusion Massachusetts’s version of a Daubert motion on plaintiff’s catchall expert, plaintiff still had never received any treatment or intervention.Continue Reading No Muss, No Fuss In Disposing Of Litigation-Driven “Injury”