For the decades that we have been handling drug and medical device product liability cases, it has been a given that we wanted to make it clear that our clients did not provide medical care or healthcare directly to patients. For one thing, unauthorized practice of medicine would be bad. Also, when dealing with prescription
Bad fact patterns sometimes make bad law. And sympathetic plaintiffs who experience unfortunate outcomes can lead to decisions that stray from established precedent. Today’s decision from the Northern District of Oklahoma addresses a sad fact pattern, but the court conducted a rigorous Erie analysis and concluded that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would not recognize a duty that pharmacies must fill prescriptions. Scholl v. Walgreens Specialty Pharm., LLC, 2025 WL 950866 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2025). Continue Reading Federal Court’s Erie Analysis Concludes That Pharmacies Do Not Have a Duty to Fill Prescriptions in Oklahoma
Public policy favors scientific and medical research. So do we. While the theories of various claims asserted against sponsors of medical research—and the reasons for rejecting them—vary greatly, the underlying incentive to promote good research certainly plays a role in protecting those that sponsor and conduct medical research from virtually unlimited liability for alleged
This is from the Holland & Knight side of the Blog only.
If you have followed the Blog, then you will know that we have long touted the importance of Erie deference by federal courts sitting in diversity. We have also questioned the expansion of tort law to allow governmental entities to use public nuisance to shift the costs of governmental services to private entities without calling it a tax. We have even discussed the issue of abrogation of common law claims, which can be seen as a lingering source of unchecked liability, when a state enacts a product liability act. For various reasons, however, we have largely declined to comment on the use of public nuisance as the primary theory for governmental entities as plaintiffs in opioid litigation. Today’s post is an exception, and it deals with a pretty significant decision, which we think is overdue.Continue Reading Ohio Does Not Recognize Public Nuisance Claims For Products
This is from the non-Dechert part of the Blog.
Over the years, the Blog has had many, many posts related to the issue of whether Pennsylvania recognized any form of strict liability in product liability actions against prescription medical products. In addition to the fact that several of the principal authors of the Blog have
Adding to the growing favorable precedent concerning state human tissue shield statutes is Heitman v. Aziyo Biologics, Inc., 2024 WL 4019318 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 22, 2024).
The plaintiff alleged that he was infected with tuberculosis from an unfortunately contaminated human tissue allograft that was implanted in his spine during surgery. The plaintiff alleged
In Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008), the court, applying California law, correctly “decline[d plaintiff’s] invitation to create a new exception” to that state’s privity requirement “that would permit [plaintiff’s] action to proceed.” Id. at 1023-24. “[A] federal court sitting in diversity is not free to create new exceptions” to state law limiting liability. Id. at 1024 (citing Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975)). D&Z held, as we’ve discussed many times:
A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits.
423 U.S. at 4. And the Supreme Court has kept on saying this. Erie principles prohibit “federal judges” from “displac[ing] the state law that would ordinarily govern with their own rules.” Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988). “[A] federal court is not free to apply a different rule however desirable it may believe it to be, and even though it may think that the state Supreme Court may establish a different rule in some future litigation.” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988).
But when updating the learned intermediary section of his treatise, Bexis came across a peculiar MDL holding, that because a defendant supposedly “cite[d] no cases” for the proposition “that the learned intermediary doctrine should apply to Plaintiffs’ . . . consumer protection claims” under the laws of California, Maryland, Illinois, and Florida, then “the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply” to claims brought by plaintiffs in any of these states. In re Natera Prenatal Testing Litigation, 664 F. Supp.3d 995, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal. 2023). The decision did not cite any precedent from any of these states (not even a trial court decision) affirmatively creating any exception to the learned intermediary rule for consumer fraud claims. Id.Continue Reading Debunking Another Stunningly Wrong MDL Expansion of Liability
For design defect claims, a key issue is whether the relevant jurisdiction requires evidence that a suitable alternative design existed that would have allowed the plaintiff to dodge the alleged injury. This blog has posted at length about alternative design requirements and their nuances. These posts address everything from the existential question of “What
Abuse of substantive law as a weapon to force settlement occurs so frequently in multidistrict litigation (“MDL”), that we’ve given it a name – “the MDL treatment.” The linchpin of the MDL treatment is that plaintiffs are allowed to take way more liberties with state law than the Erie doctrine allows. Readers can recall from our prior posts that both the Supreme Court and Third Circuit (to take the relevant example), view expansive federal court “predictions” of state law – and state tort law in particular – usurp the prerogatives of the states and are an abuse of power. Continue Reading CPAP MDL Overinflates Plaintiffs’ Claims
For much of the sixteen and a half years of this Blog, we have been tracking the acceptance and rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine. The first year that we compiled a worst decisions of the year list it was topped by a case that still holds the title for worst, most thinly veiled legislation