We have a couple of updates on the learned intermediary rule in California. We reported to you three months ago on the California Supreme Court’s tweaking of the learned intermediary rule in Himes v. Somatics, and the tweaks were not good. As we wrote back then, the Court did not make any fundamental
In Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008), the court, applying California law, correctly “decline[d plaintiff’s] invitation to create a new exception” to that state’s privity requirement “that would permit [plaintiff’s] action to proceed.” Id. at 1023-24. “[A] federal court sitting in diversity is not free to create new exceptions” to state law limiting liability. Id. at 1024 (citing Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975)). D&Z held, as we’ve discussed many times:
A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits.
423 U.S. at 4. And the Supreme Court has kept on saying this. Erie principles prohibit “federal judges” from “displac[ing] the state law that would ordinarily govern with their own rules.” Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988). “[A] federal court is not free to apply a different rule however desirable it may believe it to be, and even though it may think that the state Supreme Court may establish a different rule in some future litigation.” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988).
But when updating the learned intermediary section of his treatise, Bexis came across a peculiar MDL holding, that because a defendant supposedly “cite[d] no cases” for the proposition “that the learned intermediary doctrine should apply to Plaintiffs’ . . . consumer protection claims” under the laws of California, Maryland, Illinois, and Florida, then “the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply” to claims brought by plaintiffs in any of these states. In re Natera Prenatal Testing Litigation, 664 F. Supp.3d 995, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal. 2023). The decision did not cite any precedent from any of these states (not even a trial court decision) affirmatively creating any exception to the learned intermediary rule for consumer fraud claims. Id.Continue Reading Debunking Another Stunningly Wrong MDL Expansion of Liability
In Cajun French “tracas” means trouble, or so the Internet says.
Bexis is updating the learned intermediary rule section of his product liability treatise, and he noticed a little tracas brewing in Louisiana. We’re calling it out so that defense counsel litigating in Louisiana are aware of it and (we hope) can do
On its face, Osos v. Nuvasive, Inc., 2024 WL 3585092 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2024), is a fairly routine medical implant product liability lawsuit, involving allegations of metallosis that have already been around the block quite a few times in hip implant cases. Osos involves a somewhat different device, but the legal principles are no different.
But Osos involves Michigan law, and Michigan (as we first mentioned at the end of last year, and discussed more thoroughly here) only recently repealed a longstanding conclusive presumption of non-defectiveness based on FDA drug approvals. That presumption, which “functionally foreclosed” most product liability claims against, such products, White v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 538 F. Supp.2d 1023, 1029 (W.D. Mich. 2008), undoubtedly reduced litigation by Michigan plaintiffs. See Our “Michigan Diaspora” post. The repeal will equally undoubtedly cause Michigan prescription medical product litigation to rebound.Continue Reading Possible Learned Intermediary Showdown in Michigan
We have often characterized judicial options as mixed bags, and a recent example of such a mixed bag can be found in Muldoon v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130020 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2024). The plaintiff claimed injuries from a ceramic-on-metal hip implant. He alleged that friction and wear caused the
The California Supreme Court issued its widely anticipated opinion on the learned intermediary rule the other day, and the opinion is worth the wait. Based on the oral argument (which we reported on here), we did not expect the Supreme Court to enact a fundamental change to the learned intermediary doctrine, and the Court
Smith v. Angiodynamics, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73561 (M.D. Alabama April 23, 2024), offers the veritable mixed bag of rulings. The plaintiff alleged that an implanted vascular device fractured, resulting in pieces of the device migrating to the plaintiff’s heart. The plaintiff underwent surgery to remove the fragments. The plaintiff’s lawsuit included claims
We observed oral argument the other day before the California Supreme Court in Himes v. Somatics, a case that places California’s learned intermediary doctrine squarely in the spotlight. A learned intermediary case before the California Supreme Court? For your ever-vigilant DDL bloggers, that is like Thanksgiving and Christmas wrapped into one!
Who will be
Sometimes there’s a little something for everyone. Today’s case has personal jurisdiction, corporate veil piercing, PMA preemption, statute of limitations, and learned intermediary. Not every decision on these issues goes the way we think it should, and perhaps the thorns outnumber the roses, but it caught our attention nonetheless.
The case is Franks v. Coopersurgical
This post is only from the non-Butler Snow part of the Blog.
As our 50-state survey of the learned intermediary rule demonstrates, the rule now applies in all fifty states. That includes statutes or high court decisions from 38 states and the District of Columbia, intermediate state appellate decisions from four more states, and federal appellate Erie predictions from seven more states and Puerto Rico. All told, only three states lack binding appellate precedent approving of the learned intermediary rule: Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont. All three of those states have federal district court precedent, and Rhode Island has unpublished federal appellate authority in addition.
Then there’s Oregon. That state was an early adopter of the learned intermediary rule, see McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974), but a subsequent decision held that the Oregon product liability statute, which basically adopted Restatement §402A in toto, meant that the rule did not apply in strict liability cases, because §402A did not reference the rule. Griffith v. Blatt, 51 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Or. 2002).
But in Oregon strict liability litigation, or anywhere else that some plaintiff argues that for some reason the rule doesn’t apply, there is a backup argument – implied preemption.Continue Reading Preemption as a Backup for the Learned Intermediary Rule