This post is not from the Reed Smith or Dechert sides of the blog.
We previously posted about the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling that proper application of Delaware Rule 702 required the exclusion of plaintiffs’ general causation experts in the Zantac litigation. Since then, we’ve been waiting for the other shoe to drop. Last week, it dropped with a resounding boom. Today’s decision applied the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling and dismissed over 80,000 cases. In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litig., No. N22C-090101, 2026 WL 1009008 (Del. Super. Apr. 14, 2026).
The decision focuses on the question of which plaintiffs are bound by the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation experts. The court denied plaintiffs leave to supplement their expert reports on December 1, 2025, and the defense argued that all plaintiffs with cases filed before December 1, 2025, are bound by the ruling. Recognizing that the litigation was about to be eviscerated, plaintiffs made a number of desperate arguments.
Plaintiffs argued that the ruling on general causation applied only to a handful of plaintiffs included in a bellwether pool. But the Case Management Orders negotiated by the parties and entered by the court belied that position. CMO 1 applied to “all cases . . . currently pending . . ., as well as any future cases that are file in, transferred to or otherwise pending in this Court.” Id. at *1. CMO 1 also provided that, if the defendants’ general causation motions were granted such that summary judgment was entered, “those plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed with prejudice . . . .” Id. at *3. CMO 2 provided that the parties “will be bound by any general causation rulings issued by the Court,” and a later CMO reiterated that language. Id. at *2. Plaintiffs argued that language in the CMOs tying general causation decisions to summary judgment rulings created ambiguity. The court had none of it and held that there was no ambiguity in the CMOs. The CMOs were explicit about the implications of general causation rulings. If plaintiffs’ general causation experts were excluded, summary judgment would be warranted.
Even absent ambiguity, the court reiterated its original intent that, “an initial critical phase in these cases was to determine if the Plaintiffs could prove general causation and that an adverse ruling on [general causation] would result in summary judgment.” Id. at *3. And that wasn’t just the court’s intent, it was the plaintiffs’ own understanding. The plaintiffs represented to the court “multiple times” that if their general causation experts were excluded, it “would result in the dismissal of over 80,000 Plaintiffs’ cases.” Id. Plaintiffs couldn’t escape their own representations and now claim that the general causation ruling applied only to bellwethers.
The court also recounted the history of the Zantac litigation and the importance of general causation experts—an importance that plaintiffs clearly recognized:
To suggest that the Daubert challenges applied only to the Bellwether cases ignores not only the expressed intent of the parties and their words but the history of this litigation. Plaintiffs were subject to an MDL. Suit was filed in Delaware shortly before the MDL Judge Robin Rosenberg issued her decision granting Defendants’ Daubert motions and essentially gutting the litigation. With this background in mind, Plaintiffs had to appreciate that they needed to put their best evidence forward to avoid suffering the same fate that Plaintiffs suffered in Judge Rosenberg’s court. Unfortunately they were not able to muster sufficient evidence to pass Delaware’s Daubert requirements. To now argue that only a few cases were affected is simply not supported by anything in the record.
Id. at *4 (internal footnote omitted). Based on the CMOs, the parties’ “word and actions,” and the general history of the litigation, the court found it abundantly clear that the parties fully understood the general causation rulings would apply “docket wide.” Id.
As an aside, we’ve previously emphasized the importance of referring to Rule 702 rather than Daubert as the applicable standard for the admission of expert testimony. Delaware’s Rule 702 tracks the federal rule before the 2023 amendment (and the Delaware Supreme Court embraced the rationale behind the 2023 amendment, as discussed here), but today’s decision continues to refer to Daubert rather than Delaware Rule 702. Given that, we think it’s a good time to flag a comment made by Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit during an oral argument last fall. When the appellant referred to “the Daubert analysis” during argument, Juge Easterbrook responded:
You do realize that Rule 702 has been amended twice since Daubert to replace the Supreme Court standard with a new standard in the rule. Shouldn’t we just refer to Rule 702?
Hillman v. Toro Co., No. 24-2865 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2025) (oral argument recording) (emphasis added) (the quote by Judge Easterbrook is at 1:38-1:50 in the recording). We think that’s a darn good reminder to stop referring to Daubert as the standard and instead to be specific and cite Rule 702. Now back to today’s decision.
The plaintiffs also argued that the entry of summary judgment would violate their due process rights and right to a jury trial. That went nowhere, as the Court held it was “clearly not the law.” Id. at *4. The procedure for summary judgement does not infringe the right to a jury trial, and staging discovery in the management of a mass tort does not change that. As to due process, plaintiffs’ rights weren’t violated for at least three reasons: (1) every plaintiff had notice that the litigation was subject to the CMOs; (2) appointing leadership and having them negotiate and enter into CMOs on behalf of all plaintiffs comports with due process; and (3) every plaintiff that filed in the coordinated proceeding agreed to be bound by the CMOs when they accepted the benefits created by the orders. Id. at *5.
Finally, plaintiffs argued that application of the general causation ruling to all plaintiffs violated Delaware’s public policy that cases be decided on their merits and that courts should find remedies “short of dismissal when expert deadlines have not been met.” Id. But that argument did not match the circumstances:
[T]his is not a situation where an expert deadline was not met. The deadline was met with inadequate evidence. This is also not a situation where the Plaintiff was not given a full and fair opportunity to present its case. Plaintiffs were given a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence. Plaintiffs decided what evidence to present with a well settled body of Delaware law on the topic, as well as a Federal MDL decision that pointed out the flaws of Plaintiffs experts. They chose to proceed ahead and they did and cannot now be heard to complain that they should get a mulligan.
Id. at *5.
The court ultimately held that the order excluding plaintiffs’ general causation experts applied to all cases filed before December 1, 2025 (the date the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to supplement their expert reports). Having addressed that issue, the court then turned to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs made two arguments to avoid a sweeping ruling: (1) they requested the court delay ruling until the Eleventh Circuit decides the pending appeal of the MDL court’s exclusion of plaintiffs’ general cause experts; and (2) they argued that not every state’s law requires a showing of general causation. The court rejected both arguments. The MDL court’s ruling did not play a sufficient enough role to delay ruling on the defendants’ motion and, contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, general causation “is part of Plaintiffs’ prima facie case in all states.” Id. at *6. Given that, the court granted summary judgment as to all complaints filed on or before December 1, 2025.
We’ve been posting regularly about the Zantac litigation since 2021, and there have been a lot of favorable opinions. The MDL is effectively shut down, the Delaware coordinated proceeding is hopefully on its last legs, and the defendants’ trial record in non-coordinated cases remains outstanding. We of course extend kudos to the defendants and their counsel for these excellent results. But at the same time, we’re disappointed at the fact that the defendants had to go through this litigation at all. The Zantac litigation began following a report from a questionable lab with data that the MDL and Delaware courts have now deemed unreliable in the context of general causation. It’s a shame it took so long to get here.