Photo of Lisa Baird

We have been mulling over Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) and federal preemption. 

Yes, we need a life, but let’s put that aside for the moment.

In particular, we’ve been reviewing a rash of complaints where plaintiffs contend that the FDA’s decisions about whether to grant or deny premarket approval

Photo of Bexis

Have you ever heard of the “Presentment Clause” to the United States Constitution?  U.S. Const. Art. I §, cl. 2.  While we can’t say that we had never heard of it – we are aware of presidential vetoes, pocket vetoes, and such – we had never had occasion to consider it in the context of the legal work we do defending prescription medical product liability litigation.  That changed with In re Gardasil Products Liability Litigation, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2535105 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025), which we recently discussed, here.Continue Reading Presenting the Presentment Clause

Photo of Bexis

When a federal agency reverses course, the Supreme Court has a test to determine whether that agency action is impermissibly “arbitrary and capricious.”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), set the current APA standard for review of federal agency flipflops.  While no “heightened standard” exists under the APA for reversals

Photo of Stephen McConnell

These days there are two topics that dominate legal conferences, presentations, and CLEs: artificial intelligence (AI) and Loper Bright.  You will doubtless see us frequently bloviate about the former, but today’s case – American Clinical Laboratory Ass’n v. Food and Drug Administration, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59869, 2025 WL 964236 (E.D. Tex. March

Photo of Bexis

We were promised “radical transparency” by the incoming Secretary of HHS.  We recently received something that, while meeting the description of “radical,” doesn’t exactly fit the definition of “transparent.”  Since 1971, that is for over 50 years, HHS has had a policy called the “Richardson waiver” (after Elliot Richardson), whereby it expanded the “notice and comment” concept created by the Administrative Procedure Act, beyond the bare minimum required by the APA itself.  For one thing, as we mentioned most recently here, the FDA takes notice and comment on guidance documents, such as those it issues that concern off-label speech.  As we’ve pointed out many times, guidance documents are not regulations with force of law.Continue Reading “Radical” but Not “Transparent”

Photo of Steven Boranian

The federal government and the Fourth Circuit have ruled that a charitable patient assistant program conceived to increase access to cancer drugs for needy patients violated the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.  In an opinion long on canons of statutory interpretation and short on compassion for sick and dying patients, the Fourth Circuit upheld an HHS advisory

Photo of Bexis

In our two prior posts, Loper Bright Likely Lays Lohr Low, and Could Loper Bright Finally Do in FDA’s Rickety Off-Label Speech Ban?, we focused on ways that Supreme Court’s holding in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), that courts were not to defer to administrative agency views in evaluating such agencies’ interpretations of their organic statutes, could be used by our clients in a positive fashion in the defense of prescription medical product liability.

Today we’re addressing the flip side.  How do we defend against the other side’s attempts to use Loper Bright for nefarious purposes?

Understanding the limitations of Loper Bright is a good start.Continue Reading Limits to Loper Bright

Photo of Stephen McConnell

United States v. Cal. STEM Cell Treatment Cntr., Inc., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24525 (9th Cir. 2024), is not, strictly speaking, a product liability case at all.  But it hits several of our personal sweet spots.  For example, it is from the Ninth Circuit, where we clerked for Judge Norris.  It involves another