We’ve blogged about aspects of the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act before. Over 20 states have enacted versions of the model act in an effort to shift liability for harm caused by illegal drugs to the drug dealers and traffickers who sell and promote illegal drug use. Those are not normally the types of claims of interest to our readers. But, given that we’ve been blogging this week about fraudulent and harmful medical procedures and junk science in mass torts, maybe it’s no surprise that today’s decision deals with an attempt to use a version of the model act as a vehicle for finding liability against a major distributor of legitimate, FDA-approved drugs. McKesson Corp. v. Bolton, 2026 WL 394505 (Ga. App. Feb. 12, 2026).
McKesson involves Georgia’s Drug Dealer Liability Act (“DDLA”). Echoing the purpose of the model act, the DDLA contains a very explicit statement of purpose:
The purpose of this Code section is to provide a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community injured as a result of illegal drug use. . . . A further purpose of this Code section is to shift, to the extent possible, the cost of the damage caused by the existence of the illegal drug market in a community to those who illegally profit from that market.
Ga. Code Ann., § 51-1-46(b). The DDLA goes on to define various levels of participation in illegal drug use, including specifying how many grams of marijuana or number of marijuana plants it takes to trigger specific levels of participation in illegal drug activities under the statute. The Act also includes a provision stating that a person is not “participating in illegal marketing” of a controlled substance if the person is a “licensed practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional practice.” § 51-1-46(c)(9)(B).
Plaintiffs in McKesson were the adult children of an individual (“Bolton”) who “obtained prescriptions for opioids and other controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose.” Id. at *1. Bolton obtained opioid prescriptions from a specific doctor, and he filled his prescriptions at a local pharmacy. McKesson distributed opioids to the pharmacy. Bolton eventually overdosed and died. Bolton’s adult children alleged that the pharmacy where Bolton purchased the opioids was making “excessive purchases of controlled substances” and that McKesson failed to report the purchases as required by Georgia law. Id.
McKesson moved to dismiss based on (1) Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and (2) the exemption under the DDLA applicable to licensed practitioners. The trial court denied McKesson’s motion based on its conclusion that Georgia’s 20-year “catch all” statute of limitations applied to plaintiffs’ claims, and that the court was “incapable” of determining whether McKesson was immune from liability at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at *2. McKesson sought interlocutory appeal, and the Georgia Court of Appeals granted McKesson’s petition.
On appeal the court focused on Georgia’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. Georgia’s “two-year general statute of limitation for personal injury claims is broadly written and covers any claim that seeks to recover for personal injuries, regardless of what the underlying legal basis is that establishes liability.” Id. Based on that, the relevant question for the court was “not the statutory basis for the defendant’s liability, but whether the plaintiffs are seeking to recover for personal injuries.” Id. The court held that they were. Plaintiffs sought damages for their father’s death and the “physical, mental, emotional and economic harm” inflicted on them as a result of their father’s addictions. Those are personal injury claims, the two-year statute applied, and plaintiffs’ claims were time barred.
The court also addressed the trial court’s holding that Georgia’s 20-year “catch all” statute applied. That statute applies to claims enforcing rights based on “statutes, or acts of incorporation or by operation of law.” Id. at *2. But the 20-year limitations period applies only “in special cases not provided for by the general statute of limitations.” Id. It had no application here, since the plaintiff’s claims were squarely claims for personal injury that were covered by Georgia’s two-year limitations period.
Because it reversed the trial court and dismissed plaintiff’s claims against McKesson based on the statute of limitations, the court did not reach the question whether McKesson was immune from liability under the DDLA. The statute defense and the appellate court’s willingness to accept an interlocutory appeal prevented McKesson from having to defend against these claims, so we’ll take that.