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We’ve already written at some length about the appellate decision in Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204 (D.C. Cir. 2022), which we considered a wrong-headed application of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. §2333 – seeking recovery, not from any terrorist or terrorist affiliate, but rather against major pharmaceutical companies.  We won’t go into the allegations again, but in one sentence, the claim is:  that the Iraqi government’s health department was overrun by terrorists, and because the terrorists allegedly made money demanding prescription drugs as bribes and reselling the drugs for a profit, the various pharmaceutical defendants were liable “sponsoring” terrorism and for “aiding and abetting” simply because they transacted with the health department of government of Iraq (a United States ally at the time).

Anyway, a couple of months ago the United States Supreme Court decided Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 143 S. Ct. 1206 (2023) (“Taamneh”), and Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 143 S. Ct. 1191 (2023).  While these decisions didn’t turn into the expected §230 immunity showdown some had expected, see Gonzalez, 143 S. Ct. at 1192 (“plaintiffs’ complaint − independent of §230 − states little if any claim for relief”), Taamneh did address the concept of aiding and abetting in the ATA context.Continue Reading Here’s Hoping….

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When Congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), 18 U.S.C. §2333, back in 1992, it no doubt thought it was enlisting the plaintiffs’ bar to go after Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Daesh, and others of that ilk.  But good intentions do not a successful statute make.  The other side of the “v.” is is