Certainly not us.  We had never heard of the UJNFLA before today and would likely have thought it was a reference to United Joggers of Northern Florida as much as to a Uniform Act promulgated in 1936 which, based on some quick research, was adopted by at least twenty-eight states, including Indiana where it is still on the books.  The status of the UJNFLA in the other twenty-seven states would need to be the subject of further investigation.  For example, we learned that in New Jersey it was once codified at N.J.S.A. § 2A:82-33 et seq., but was superseded by N.J. Rule of Evidence 201(a), which does not contain all of the same provisions.  Notably missing from that rule of evidence but present in the UJNFLA is a requirement that before any party can offer evidence of another state’s laws or ask for judicial notice of same, “reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties, either in the pleadings or otherwise.”  Ind. Code § 34-38-4-4.  What does that mean?  In Indiana it means that if a plaintiff, for example, wants to try to avoid that state’s statute of repose by arguing his home state’s law should apply – he better make that argument before summary judgment briefing. So said the Indiana Court of Appeals in Shaling v. Biomet, Inc., 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 68 (Mar. 11, 2025).

Plaintiff, a resident of Alabama, underwent hip replacement surgery in 2001 with a medical device manufactured by defendant, a resident of Indiana.  Approximately fourteen years later, in early 2015, testing revealed elevated metal ion levels in plaintiff’s blood.  After additional testing, the metal hip implant was explanted in 2017.  Plaintiff filed suit in Indiana in 2019—eighteen years after the device was implanted.  The case progressed and was set for trial in June 2024.  In October 2023, defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by Indiana’s ten-year statute of repose.  In opposition, plaintiff argued for the first time that the court should apply Alabama law which does not have an applicable statute of repose.  The trial court, relying on the UJNFLA, concluded that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice of his request to apply Alabama law and granted defendant summary judgment.

On appeal, the trial court’s application of the UJNFLA was reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  The Indiana Supreme Court has previously held that the “purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the other party time to prepare by studying the applicable law.”  Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. 1999).  In that case, like in Shaling, plaintiffs waited until summary judgment to argue that Kentucky law should apply and claimed that reasonable notice was given because a sister action was pending in Kentucky state court.  The Indiana Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that just because an injury occurred in another state is not “reasonable notice that a party will seek to use the other state’s laws.  Id. at 146.  Further, raising the issue at the summary judgment stage was not reasonable because “plaintiffs asserted a potentially strategy-altering issues without allowing [the defense] any opportunity to prepare.”  Id. at 147. 

Shaling is the same.  Plaintiff did not raise his choice of Alabama law until four years after the complaint had been filed, after defendant filed its summary judgement motion, and six months before trial—all after defendant had conducted discovery and developed its trial strategy based on Indiana law.  The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of the UJNFLA.

Since plaintiff was stuck with Indiana law, he tried to argue that he should be exempt from the statute of repose because his injuries are the result of a “protracted exposure to an inherently dangerous foreign substance” – like asbestos.  Shaling, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 68, at *12.  But the Indiana Product Liability Act is clear, a product liability action must be commenced with ten years after the delivery of the product to the consumer. I.C. § 34-20-3-1.  There is only one judicially created exception—for allegations of latent harm from asbestos exposure.  But there is no case law to support plaintiff’s theory that Indiana has adopted a “general latent disease exception.”  Id. at *15.  Any such exception has to be enacted by the legislature, not the courts.  Plaintiff’s claims, filed eighteen years after the device was implanted, were barred by the stature of repose.  Summary judgment was affirmed.

Wonder what we’ll learn tomorrow?