Today’s guest post from Justin Kadoura, a Holland & Knight product liability and toxic tort litigator, concerns a Supreme Court decision on an issue that might seem unrelated to the sort of case we cover at the DDL Blog.  However, federal officer removal does come up in our cases and we have covered it before.  As always, all credit and blame for a guest post goes to the guest poster.

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Before 2011, the federal officer removal statute allowed removal to federal court of any action that is (1) against “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity” and (2) “for any act under color of such office or on account of any right.”  28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a)(1) (1996).  In 2011, Congress amended the statute, expanding the second element to include suits “for or relating to any act under color of such office.”  Unlike most removal statutes, the federal officer removal statute is interpreted broadly in favor of removal.  Last month, in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 608 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 1052 (2026), the Supreme Court held the “ordinary meaning” of Congress’s 2011 amendments continued that tradition of expansive federal officer jurisdiction.  Although the ultimate reach of the Court’s decision is unclear, it will likely open new doors to removal in environmental and toxic tort actions.

The Supreme Court’s decision is preceded by a long procedural history.  In 2013, several Louisiana parishes filed forty-two actions in state court against various oil and gas companies, including Chevron, for alleged violations of Louisiana’s 1978 State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act (the “Act”).  The Act created permitting requirements for use of Louisiana’s coastal zones, with exceptions for “individual specific uses legally commenced or established prior to” 1980.  La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.34(C)(2).  The parishes alleged that the defendants used the coastal zones for oil drilling and exploration without meeting the permit requirements.  The defendants initially removed the actions to federal court in 2013, but the cases were remanded to state court for lack of jurisdiction.  Plaquemines Parish v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 103 F.4th 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2024).  In 2018, following remand, the parishes produced an expert report opining that the defendants’ pre-1980 uses of the coastal zones included, among other things, defendants’ crude oil production in during World War II, and that those uses were not “legally commenced or established” for purposes of the Act’s permitting exception because of defendants use of “vertical drilling,” earthen pits instead of steel tanks, and canals instead of roads.  Relying on the report, the defendants again removed the cases to federal court, asserting federal officer jurisdiction, which set off additional remand orders and two Fifth Circuit appeals.  Id. at 330–31.

In 2023, Plaquemines Parish moved to remand one of the other actions that had been stayed pending the second Fifth Circuit appeal.   Chevron argued that the Texas Company’s (Chevron’s predecessor) crude oil production in the coastal zones during WWII was connected with its refinement of crude oil to create “avgas” (aviation fuel used in the war effort) for the government at its refineries in Texas, and the challenged conduct was thus “in relation to” actions taken under color of federal law.  The district court and Fifth Circuit rejected Chevron’s argument, holding that although Chevron was a “person acting under [a federal] officer” vis-à-vis is oil its refining efforts during WWII, the parishes’ claims did not “relate to” those refining efforts.  Relying on Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that under the 2011 amendments to the statute, an action can “relate to” actions of a federal officer so long as the suit “is connected or associated with an act under color of federal office,” rejecting the pre-2011 requirement that there be a “causal nexus” between the two.  Id. at 335–36.  But the Fifth Circuit held that because the Texas Company’s federal contacts did not specify how it had to obtain the crude oil for use in its refinery operations, the Texas Company’s oil production did not “relate to” its avgas refining for the government.  “Although Defendants need not show that a federal officer directed the specific oil production activities being challenged, they still must show these activities had a sufficient connection with directives in their federal refinery contracts.”  Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).  The Fifth Circuit also found that the government had allocated crude oil to specific refineries, severing any relation between the crude oil production and the government contracts.

The Supreme Court disagreed.  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that “[t]he phrase ‘relating to’ sweeps broadly. It means ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.’”  Chevron, 146 S. Ct. at 1060.  (Six other justices joined Justice Thomas’s opinion, with Justice Alito recusing himself, and Justice Jackson concurring.)  A suit can be sufficiently connected to the act taken under color of federal law even if it is “not specifically designed to affect” it, there is not a “strict causal relationship,” and the connection is “indirect.”  Id.  In the context of the “all-hands-on-deck” approach that the government took to avgas production, the Court held that “Chevron’s case fits comfortably within” this definition.  Id. at 1061.

This suit implicates Chevron’s wartime efforts to produce and supply avgas’ essential feedstock, so it is closely connected to Chevron’s wartime avgas refining for the military. Much of the crude oil that Chevron produced in the Delta Duck Club field was ultimately used for its own avgas refining. [T]his suit will challenge Chevron’s actions that allowed it to increase its production of crude oil in the Delta Duck Club field during wartime. . . . The parish’s report alleged that Chevron’s use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced because of its reliance on vertical-drilling methods, canals, and earthen pits. . . . But, using vertical-drilling methods “maximize[d] production” of crude oil. . . . Using canals instead of building roads saved “time, materials, and manpower,” resulting in more “timely oil production.” . . . And, using earthen pits complied with the P.A.W.’s directive to preserve steel. . . . If Chevron had refrained from these actions and produced less crude oil as a result, its avgas refining for the military may have suffered.

Id.  “Moreover, the Government emphasized the importance of increasing Chevron’s crude-oil production to support avgas refining as part of the war effort,” including by (1) designating the particular coastal zone at issue as “essential” to the war effort because it produced better oil for avgas; (2) paying more for avgas when the price of obtaining crude oil increased; (3) developing plans to produce as much avgas as possible “in the shortest possible time”; and (4) requiring “the vertical-drilling methods challenged by the parish.”  Id. at 1061–62.  And the Court held that the government’s failure to specify how to obtain the crude oil and its allocation of crude oil to specific refineries were irrelevant:  A defendant need not “show that his federal duties specifically invited his challenged conduct” and “an act can relate to its consequences even when the causal chain includes actions by intermediaries” such as the government.  Id. at 1062.

Although it is unclear the degree to which WWII played some special role in the Court’s decision, the Court’s interpretation of the second prong of the federal removal statute appears to be very broad.  In context, the plaintiffs included the State of Louisiana and parishes located in that state, alleging claims relating to decades of oil production activity in that state, under a state statute that applies only to conduct in and relating to that state’s coastal zones.  Yet, the Chevron Court held that the claims did not belong in state court because a state statutory defense implicated Chevron’s contracts with the government relating to avgas refining for a four-or-five-year period out of the decades of alleged conduct—contracts that did not reference oil production at all, did not require any specific methods for producing oil, and in fact allowed Chevron to obtain crude oil from others to meet its refining commitments.  In doing so, the Court affirmed that the statute means what it says:  the challenged conduct need only “relate to” actions taken under color of federal law in some amorphous way.  Indeed, despite the Court cautioning that the “ordinary meaning of ‘relating to’ . . . is not ‘so broad that it is meaningless,” it is unclear what degree of connection would be beyond the reach of the Court’s test.  The Court merely hinted that some cases involving federal contracts might not satisfy this broad test, pointing to a D.C. Circuit decision holding that “a false-advertising suit targeting an oil company’s statements to consumers about the future effects of fossil fuels on climate change did not relate to its decades-earlier production for the Government.”  Chrevon, 146 S. Ct. at 1061.

Despite this breadth, it is important to remember that Chevron specifically dealt with the second prong of the federal officer removal statute, and a defendant must still show that it is a person acting under color of federal law under the first prong.  The Texas Company satisfied both prongs of the test in part because it was vertically integrated—i.e., it both sourced the crude oil and refined it to fabricate avgas.  If it was not involved in the fabrication side of the equation, the Texas Company might not have had relevant government contracts that related to its challenged sourcing activities.  In other industries where vertical integration is rarer and government contracts tend to focus on the industry’s fabrication activities, we will have to see the degree to which Chevron will open the door to removal of suits that challenge sourcing activities alone.

Nonetheless, courts have already begun applying Chevron to cases involving other industries, and that trend is likely to continue.  See Griffin v. OptumRx, Inc., No. 25-1165, 2026 WL 1239289 (9th Cir. May 6, 2026) (involving pharmacy benefits managers).  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision appears to expand the decision in Latiolais, an asbestos case to which the Fifth Circuit compared Chevron’s arguments in the third appeal.  In Latiolais, the plaintiff brought tort claims based on asbestos exposure while refurbishing a naval vessel for Avondale.  The Fifth Circuit held that the claims were removable because Avondale’s ship-refurbishment contracts with the Navy specifically required the use of asbestos for thermal insulation, even though they did not say anything about safety practices or warnings.  In Plaquemines Parish, the Fifth Circuit held that “[t]he lack of any contractual provision pertaining to oil production or directing Defendants to use only oil they produced is what distinguishes these cases from Latiolais.”  Plaquemines Parish, 103 F.4th at 341.  Following Chevron, this distinction appears to be irrelevant, and some asbestos liability cases thus might satisfy the second prong of the removal statute regardless of whether a federal contract specifically required the use of asbestos.  

The Chevron case also creates interesting implications for the role that federal regulations could play in federal officer removal going forward.  Some courts have held that compliance with federal regulations generally does not satisfy the first prong of the federal officer removal statute.  See Attorney General of N.J. v. Dow Chem. Co., 140 F.4th 115, 120 (3d Cir. 2025); Schleider v. GVDB Ops., LLC, 121 F.4th 149, 159 (11th Cir. 2024). But the Chevron Court’s reliance on federal regulations relating to vertical drilling suggests that even in jurisdictions where compliance with federal regulations alone usually does not satisfy the first prong, it can be significant under the second prong. 

Finally, the Chevron case should encourage defendants in all industries to think carefully and creatively throughout the case about their contractual arrangements with the government and how those may “relate to” the plaintiff’s claims.  The Chevron action had been pending for five years before Chevron first asserted federal officer removal in response to the parishes’ 2018 expert report, and for over a decade before the Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of removability.  When the basis for removal is not clear on the face of a complaint, we can expect to see defendants trying to drive discovery and motions practice in a direction that might reveal a sufficient connection to the government.