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We’re talking about the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §2, to be precise.  Being in Pennsylvania, for quite some time we’ve had more than a passing interest in this section  of the Third Restatement and its essentially negligence (“reasonableness”)-based theory of product liability.   For decades, Pennsylvania followed a “ne’er the twain shall meet” rule that strictly separated strict liability from “negligence concepts.”  That approach was exemplified by Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).  But in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2003), three justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined that a quarter century had proven wanting the “strict liability” of the Azzarello sort, and that Pennsylvania law should move to the negligence-based standard of §2. 841 A.2d at 1015-16.  Full disclosure – Bexis filed a brief for PLAC in Phillips on the Restatement Third issue.
While three justices aren’t a majority of Pennsylvania’s seven-member Supreme Court, in Phillips they outnumbered the court’s Azzarello supporters 3-2 (there was a vacancy and an obscure concurrence in the result).  In almost seven intervening years, the court has failed to address the issue squarely, although not for want of trying.  The court thought it was going to decide the issue in Straub v. Cherne Industries, 880 A.2d 561 (Pa. 2005), but instead found there had been a waiver.  The court tried again in Bugosh v. I.U. North America, Inc., 971 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2009), but dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted after it turned out that the defendant was an intermediate seller, not a true manufacturer (that makes a difference in the Third Restatement, but it’s not important here).
Finally, the Third Circuit got fed up with the issue remaining undecided, and after trying unsuccessfully to get the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to accept a certified question, took the metaphorical bull by the horns and predicted that the court would eventually adopt the Third Restatement in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, 563 F.3d 38, 57 (3d Cir. 2009).  As we discussed in an earlier post, that’s led to still more squabbling among the federal district courts.
Full disclosure – Bexis filed amicus briefs for PLAC in all of those other cases on the Third Restatement issue.
So the Third Restatement question has vexed Pennsylvania product liability law for quite a few years.  Well, not too long ago we (well, Bexis, obviously) was expressing his frustration with this indeterminate state of affairs with regular blog reader whom we ‘re not sure wants to be publicly identified, so we won’t, and said reader mentioned that his/her home state of Wisconsin was in somewhat of the same boat.Continue Reading What’s Up With The Third Restatement?

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It was noted all the alerts that went around yesterday, such as this one, but since we’ve been following the litigation intensively, here, here, here, and here, we thought we’d note it here for our readers.  Unfortunately, as part of Allergan’s Botox settlement yesterday with the federal government, the company

Last Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the second of the three defense verdicts in the test cases alleging that the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine causes autism. Cedillo v. Secretary, HHS, No. 2010-5004, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2010). Although the Cedillo decision turns on the specific facts of

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Last year the Ninth Circuit, in a case called Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), issued a really troubling decision, holding that reports of adverse product events – although not even the plaintiff claimed that they were statistically significant – were enough to get past a motion to dismiss in

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In the last month, we’ve seen two more appellate decisions definitively rejecting the idea of some sort of separate cause of action – apart from warning or design defect – for “failure to test,” whatever that might be.  In the drug area, as we reported before, the Pennsylvania Superior Court thoroughly killed the concept in Lance v. Wyeth:

[Plaintiff] also maintains that her alleged her causes of action, including her claims for “unreasonable marketing” and “negligent failure to withdraw,” are sustainable because they are akin to a failure to inspect and/or test claim.  Citing Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140-41 (3d. Cir.1973), [plaintiff] argues that a failure to test claim is valid cause of action. We disagree.
In Hoffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania law and concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the manufacturer failed to adequately test its drug to discover potentially harmful side-effects.  485 F.2d at 140-41.  Regardless of the Hoffman decision, which is not binding upon this Court, Pennsylvania law has not recognized an independent tort for negligent failure to test.  In fact, we have held that “the claim for ‘negligent failure to test’ is not a viable cause of action recognized by our courts[.]”  Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 541 (Pa. Super. 2003), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1262 (Pa. 2005).
If there is a duty to test and/or inspect in Pennsylvania, it does not exist as an independent cause of action, but rather, is subsumed within [plaintiff’s] other claims. . . . Therefore, even if there is a general duty to inspect and/or test under Pennsylvania law, it would be subsumed within [plaintiff’s] design defect claims and/or any potential failure to warn claim that [plaintiff] may have had. Because failure to test is not an independent cause of action in Pennsylvania, [plaintiff’s] arguments to the contrary fail.

4 A.3d 160, 168-69 (Pa. Super Aug. 2, 2010) (some citations omitted).  In Lance, plaintiffs did not pursue an independent testing-related claim in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and conceded that testing was “part and parcel of her negligent-marketing claim.”  Lance v. Wyeth, 85 A.3d 434, 460 (Pa. 2014).

Then along comes the South Carolina Supreme Court, and (as we also mentioned before) it does a number on the purported duty to test in Branham v. Ford Motor Co.:

In addition, [defendant] asserts there is no separate “failure to test claim” apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product that is not defective and unreasonably dangerous. We agree, for if a product is not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, an alleged failure to test cannot be the proximate cause of an injury. The failure to establish that the seatbelt sleeve was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user for purposes of the strict liability claim requires the dismissal of the companion negligence claim.

2010 WL 3219499, at *2 (S.C. Aug. 16, 2010).
Inspired by these two recent decisions – one in our pharma sandbox, and the other a more general product liability case – we’ve decided to make the non-existent duty to test the subject for our latest cheat sheet.  So that’s what the rest of this post is, a list of all the cases we could find where the misbegotten idea of some separate and independent duty to test has been rejected by a court.  No half-measures here.  To get on this list the court has to hold that there is no separate duty to test apart from well-established product liability claims for warning, design, or (maybe) manufacturing defect.Continue Reading Duty To Test Cheat Sheet

We told you last year about a district court’s favorable Daubert ruling in one of the cases alleging that a bupivacaine shoulder pain pump caused chondrolysis (a breakdown of the cartilage in the shoulder joint). The district court rejected a well-qualified doctor’s general causation opinion under Daubert and, for good measure, rejected his specific causation

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In putting together yesterday’s post on second-guessing the FDA, we took a look at the Bartlett litigation in New Hampshire.  Lo and behold, we discovered that, in the past couple of weeks the ever-thorough Judge Laplante has issued a slew of other opinions on in limine motions.

Scads of issues got decided (the trial’s probably

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Last week we put up a lengthy post addressing proposed new accounting disclosure rules that amount to yet another huge informational giveaway to the plaintiff’s bar.  In drafting that post, we looked around the web, and we were, frankly, surprised by the lack of comment on the revised (but still awful) FASB proposal by the