We’ve already discussed the peculiar decision in Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., 342 P.3d 847 (Ariz App. 2015), once, here. This time, we don’t care much about the peculiar facts, but rather we’re directing ourselves to the court’s odd reasoning that somehow there’s a conflict between the learned intermediary rule (adopted at some level now in every American jurisdiction – see our “headcount” post here − and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”). Among the cases following the learned intermediary rule are four prior Arizona appellate decisions. Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 893 P.2d 26, 38 (Ariz. App. 1994) (non-medical product), review denied (Ariz. April 25, 1995); Piper v. Bear Medical Systems, Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 415 (Ariz. App. 1993), review denied (Ariz. Nov. 1, 1994); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. App. 1978), review denied (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1978); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 577 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. App. 1978), review denied (Ariz. May 2, 1978). In all four of these cases, the Arizona Supreme Court had the opportunity to evaluate the learned intermediary rule; all four times it passed and denied review.
Don’t be fooled by the 2007 date on our “headcount” post. We’ve kept updating it. Since we originally wrote that post in mid-2007, prompted by the terrible decision in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007), two more state supreme courts have adopted the learned intermediary rule for the first time: Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 154-59 (Tex. 2012); Rohde v. Smiths Medical, 165 P.3d 433, 438 (Wyo. 2007). Two other state supreme courts have reaffirmed the learned intermediary rule since then, Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, ___ So.3d___, 2014 WL 4055813, at *19-20 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014) (the only good thing about an otherwise awful opinion); Klasch v. Walgreen Co., 264 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Nev. 2011), as have two state intermediate courts of appeal. O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1281-82 (Colo. App. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 WL 4851480 (Colo. Nov. 30, 2010); Silva v. SmithKlineBeecham Corp., 2013 WL 4516160, at *2-3 (N.M. App. Feb. 7, 2013). In addition, federal courts have predicted the rule’s adoption in Rhode Island, where there used to be no law. Greaves v. Eli Lilly & Co., 503 F. Appx. 70, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2012); Hogan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 2011 WL 1533467, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 2011), and in South Dakota, reconfirming earlier predictions. Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2010 WL 4024922 (D.S.D. Oct. 13, 2010). Finally, as we’ve blogged about before, West Virginia federal courts have recently cut back Karl to drug DTC advertising cases. See O’Bryan v. Synthes, Inc., 2015 WL 1220973, at *6-7 (S.D.W. Va. March 17, 2015); Wise v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2015 WL 502010, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 5, 2015); Tyree v. Boston Scientific Corp., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2014 WL 5431993, at *5-6 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 23, 2014).
So even since Karl, the learned intermediary rule has been doing quite well for itself.