The Third Circuit has just affirmed summary judgment on grounds of express preemption under the Vaccine Act in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 07-3794, slip op. (3d Cir. March 27, 2009). Interpreting the statute’s legislative history as demonstrating congressional intent to preempt sufficient to overcome any presumption against preemption, the court creates a split of
This, that, and the other thing.
Potpourri.
Odds and sods.
Whatever. This post is about stuff that we learned about recently that relate to our prior posts. Other than that, they have nothing in common with each other.
Together, they add up to enough material for a decent post.
It certainly didn’t take long.
Back in late July we posted about the extraordinarily restrictive view of Vaccine Act (and indeed of all) preemption taken in Ferrari v. American Home Products Corp., 2007 WL1933129 (Ga. App. July 5, 2007).
In our view Ferrari had taken the presumption against preemption to an “unprecedented” extreme –
How many times have we heard that, in deciding preemption issues the “purpose” or “intent” of congress is the “ultimate touchstone” that the courts must respect? Lots. We can start with Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), the express preemption case involving medical devices and the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA:
Judge Stengel did some nice work on Wednesday, March 28. In 65 nicely reasoned pages, he came out in favor of both Vaccine Act and FDA prescription drug preemption. If that doesn’t make your spine tingle . . . well, why are you reading this blog, anyway?
In Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, et al., No.