Plaintiffs often like to sue in New Jersey, but that does not mean they always get what they want.  The California plaintiffs in Serrano v. Campbell Soup Co. sued a beverage company in New Jersey, but the court rejected their New Jersey law claims and left them with only one California claim—and even then, only barely.  No. 24-cv-4660, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57128 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2025).  Along the way, the court held that plaintiffs who were harmed in California had no standing to sue under other states’ laws, and most of the California claims went away because the product labeling was not the least bit deceptive.

In Serrano, the plaintiffs alleged that they purchased a beverage called “V8 Splash” at stores in California.  These plaintiffs, however, wanted drinks with only natural ingredients, so they claimed that they would not have purchased the drinks had they known the product had artificial flavors.  Here’s the rub:  The product label did not say “all natural,” “100% natural,” “no artificial flavor,” or anything of the sort.  Instead, the front of the container somewhat clinically described the berry-flavored version as “A Berry Flavored Juice Beverage with a 5% Juice Blend From Concentrate and Other Natural Flavors.”  Id. at *3. 

Does that sound like “all natural” to you?  We did not think so.  And for consumers for whom it was not entirely clear, they could just turn the bottle and read the ingredients, which were listed on the back in black and white. 

The court held first that these California-resident plaintiffs had standing to sue, but only under California law.  They alleged a cognizable injury:  They claimed that they would not have purchased the product or would have paid less had they known it contained artificial flavoring—a so-called “price premium” theory.  That might seem imprecise, but the plaintiffs were not required to allege the exact value of their economic injury.  The needed to allege only “some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.”  Id. at *22. 

The plaintiffs did not, however, have standing to assert state-law claims from states where they did not reside and in which they did not suffer an injury.  Article III requires an “injury in fact,” and these plaintiffs did not allege the impairment of any interest protected under the relevant states’ laws.  Importantly, the court also did not see any point in waiting until the class certification stage to determine standing.  The plaintiffs argued that whether a plaintiff can bring a class action under multiple states’ laws was a question of predominance under Rule 23, but the court saw “no practical benefit to waiting.”  Id. at *29.  That’s big, since all too many class action decisions fall for the other side’s blandishments to kick the can down the road,

Even if the plaintiffs did have standing to sue under New Jersey law, that state’s choice-of-law rules cut them off.  The plaintiffs allegedly received and relied on the supposed misrepresentations in California, where they bought V8 Splash, but they alleged that the defendant made its labeling and marketing decisions in New Jersey.  Under the circumstances, California had the most significant relationship with the dispute, mainly because that is where the plaintiffs allegedly experienced financial losses. 

So California law applies, which leads to our favorite part of the order.  The court ruled that these plaintiff did not allege that the V8 Splash label was likely to deceive reasonable consumers.  A claimed labeling violation without more does not equal deception.  Moreover, we have commented before that a “reasonable consumer” is neither “any conceivable consumer” nor the “most gullible consumer.”  The standard is reasonableness.  The court in Serrano explained it this way: 

[A] mere possibility that the label “might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner” is not enough.  A reasonable consumer “is neither the most vigilant and suspicious of advertising claims nor the most unwary and unsophisticated, but instead is the ordinary consumer within the target population.” 

Id. at *54 (citations omitted).  The label here lacked any representation—express or implied—that V8 Splash contained no artificial flavors.  Thus, neither the label’s text nor its pretty pictures of fruits and vegetables would dupe a reasonable consumer into believing that the beverage contained nothing but natural ingredients.  “The reasonable consumer does not leave his or her common sense at the grocery aisle.”  Id. at *64. 

In the end, these plaintiffs held onto one claim—that the defendant allegedly had engaged in an “unlawful” business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law because they alleged that the product label did not disclose artificial malic acid as an ingredient.  Under federal and California law, if a drink contains an artificial flavor that “simulates, resembles, or reinforces the characterizing flavor” of the drink, the product has to be labeled “artificial” or “artificially flavored.”  Because the plaintiffs alleged that defendant added malic acid as an artificial flavor, their claim survived.  The label, by the way, did disclose malic acid as an ingredient, but did not say whether it was artificial or why it was added.  The court therefore ordered expedited discovery on (1) whether the malic acid was artificial (malic acid can be natural, too) and (2) whether it provided flavor.  Cut to the chase.  We are on board for that.