This is more of a think piece, we won’t be citing many cases (by our standards) today.
There are two preemption principles at work in the Supreme Court’s recent Bartlett decision. The first of these, which we’ll call “independence,” was articulated first in PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). “[W]hen a party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties for pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 2581. That was reiterated in Bartlett in the design defect context, holding that “redesign was not possible” in part because that would require intervening FDA action. Any redesign “would be a new drug that would require its own NDA to be marketed.” Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 2013 WL 3155230, at *8 (U.S. June 24, 2013). And, as in Mensing, to the extent that the “design” claim in Bartlett devolved into a warning claim (because redesign was impossible), FDA regulations “prevented [defendant] from independently changing” its label. Id. at *10 (quoting Mensing).
The Supreme Court has now enunciated and applied this “independence” principle twice. Nor has it limited that principle to the FDCA. See Id. at *10 n.3 (invoking Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (a non-FDA case involving agricultural pricing)). Moreover, since Bartlett (and Mensing) involved solely implied preemption, their principles apply regardless of the statutory scheme. E.g., Bartlett, 2013 WL 3155230, at *6 (impossibility preemption applies “in the absence of an express preemption provision”).
Continue Reading Ruminations on Independence and Inaction: Further Implications of Bartlett