Every state has a motto. New Hampshire’s is a threat (“Live Free or Die”). Kansas’s is a pep talk (“Ad astra per aspera”). Connecticut’s is Latin and, until recently, a little obscure: “Qui Transtulit Sustinet,” or “He who transplanted still sustains.” It sits on the state seal under three grapevines, a nod to the colonists who uprooted themselves, replanted in the Connecticut River valley, and took root.
Nearly four centuries later, the motto has picked up a new meaning. Connecticut is now where transplanted product liability claims go to take root. Connecticut is one of the very few states that lets plaintiffs plead a warning claim based on a manufacturer’s failure to report adverse events to the FDA, and one of the main Filshie Clip defendants is at home there. Put those two things together and, to borrow from the Gilmore Girls theme song (set, fittingly, in Connecticut), where the plaintiffs’ bar leads, plaintiffs from all over the country will follow. If you heard through the grapevine that Waterbury is the place to file a Filshie Clip case, well, Marvin Gaye would tell you that you heard right.
The latest vintage is In re Walsh Group Filshie Clip Litigation, 2026 WL 3407631 (Conn. Super. Nov. 2, 2026). We wrote about the first Connecticut Filshie Clip ruling back in August here. That decision let the failure-to-report claims survive a motion to strike. The culprit was Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 343 Conn. 513 (2022), which we criticized at the time. That was the pleading stage. This one is summary judgment on a bellwether record, and the defense went 0 for 4: preemption, causation, joint venture, and product identification for one of the bellwether plaintiffs. Id. at *2.
The quick background. The Filshie Clip is a Class III, PMA-approved device used for tubal ligation. Id. at *1, *3. The defendant imported and distributed the clips from 2003 until 2019. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs claim the clips migrate more often than the rate reported to the FDA, and that the defendant should have reported more migration events as adverse events. Id. The only claims left are Connecticut Product Liability Act failure-to-warn claims. Id. at *1.
Preemption first, and briefly, because Glover is the law in Connecticut and we aren’t going to pretend otherwise. Thanks to Glover, Connecticut plaintiffs get around express preemption for their reporting claims, and there is not much anyone can do about that at the trial court level. The court said as much, holding that the preemption motion “is, and must be, denied.” Id. at *4. Fine. But how the court got rid of implied preemption deserves some attention.
Defendant argued, correctly, that this is Buckman territory. The court disagreed, saying the claims here were “clearly vastly different” from Buckman because the Buckman claims “related to the defendant’s actions prior to approval of the medical device,” while these involve conduct after approval. Id. at *7. Pre-approval, post-approval. Potato, potahto. Buckman did not turn on the calendar. It turned on the fact that the relationship between the FDA and the companies it regulates is “inherently federal in character,” and that letting state juries decide whether a company told the FDA enough would wreck the FDA’s ability to police that relationship itself. Private second-guessing of how complete a company’s submissions to the FDA were is the problem Buckman addressed, whether those submissions arrive before approval or after.
And make no mistake, that is exactly what this jury will be asked to do. As the court framed the dispute, the defendant says most of the complaints did not involve a “serious injury” and so were not reportable, and the plaintiffs say there is a fact question whether not reporting them “was in violation of the federal regulations.” Id. at *6. A Connecticut jury will decide whether a federal regulation was violated. That sounds an awful lot like private enforcement of the FDCA. Better yet, the court itself quoted Glover’s acknowledgment that there would be no duty to report adverse events to the FDA “in the absence of federal law requiring such reports.” Id. at *6. The court then recited the implied preemption test — a state claim is preempted “when the state claim would not exist if the FDCA did not exist.” Id. at *7. We will let readers put those two sentences side by side. Apparently, as long as a claim is labeled an independent state-law “duty,” none of the rest of Buckman’s analysis matters.
Unfortunately, none of that is too surprising given Glover. What is truly disturbing is the causation ruling.
Defendant argued that plaintiffs had no evidence that, had more adverse events been reported, the FDA would have required different or additional warnings, or that any such warnings would have changed anything. Id. at *1-2. You would think that is precisely the kind of argument summary judgment exists to test. The court disagreed, announcing that proximate causation “is not a determination to be made at summary judgment but instead goes to the trier of fact.” Id. at *8. The plaintiffs had argued both that the record supported causation and that causation is always for the jury, and the court went with door number two. In other words, on a motion for summary judgment, the court decided it did not need to look at the record. Then came this gem:
This court will not ignore binding Connecticut Supreme Court precedent because the plaintiffs lack evidence of what the FDA would have done in response to the reporting of adverse events.
Id. at *10. Read that one again. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs lack evidence of what the FDA would have done and denied summary judgment anyway.
The plaintiff need only show that the substance of the reports “would have been made available in some form to the plaintiff’s healthcare providers.” Id. at *10. “In some form.” Through the grapevine, presumably. That goes well beyond even Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and the Ninth Circuit is no one’s idea of a defense paradise. Stengel at least recognized that a failure-to-report claim necessarily runs through the FDA — plaintiffs “will ultimately have to prove that if Medtronic had properly reported the adverse events to the FDA as required under federal law, that information would have reached [the plaintiff’s] doctors in time to prevent his injuries.” Id. at 1234 (Watford, J., concurring). The FDA is a necessary link in the causal chain. Here, the court wrote the FDA out of the picture entirely. What the FDA would have done is simply a “question for the jury,” with nothing in the opinion indicating there is any evidence for the jury to weigh.
And there is solid evidence pointing the other way. The FDA is surely aware of the Filshie Clip litigation. Migration allegations have been the subject of lawsuits and published decisions across the country for years. The FDA knows exactly what the plaintiffs are alleging, and the labeling has not changed. If the FDA is not acting on this information now, with the plaintiffs’ allegations right in front of it, there is no reason to think it would have done anything different then. The court never grappled with that, because it chose not to grapple with the record at all.
So what did the plaintiffs offer? The court identified two pieces of testimony. One bellwether plaintiff, a lay witness and not even an expert, testified at her deposition “that doctors have a duty to make their patients aware” and that she “would have made an alternative decision” about sterilization. Walsh Group, 2026 WL 3407631, at *10. One physician testified that she was unaware of the migration risk and, had she known, “would have changed her practice in terms of the information she would have provided to patients.” Id. That’s it. Notice what is missing — the entire middle of the causal chain. Nothing about whether the FDA would have done anything, and nothing about how a report sent to the FDA would have reached that doctor. The plaintiff’s chain goes from “defendant should have filed reports” straight to “my doctor would have told me,” and skips everything in between.
Putting aside that a plaintiff, or even an expert, is not competent to opine on duty, which is a question of law (as the court itself acknowledged when reciting the summary judgment standard, id. at *2), what exactly is the duty being described? Do doctors now have a duty to scour the FDA’s adverse event databases? Do manufacturers have some duty, beyond the labeling, to broadcast adverse events to the medical community at large? The out-of-state Filshie Clip decisions the court found so unpersuasive pointed out that no federal law requires reporting adverse events to patients or the medical community, so a state-law duty to do that would be preempted. Id. at *8 n.9. The court’s causation theory quietly assumes that duty into existence.
It gets worse. The court refused to require an FDA causation expert “without the defendants providing binding authority for such an argument,” and called the defense’s argument “circular.” Id. at *10. It then adopted the plaintiffs’ point that, by not reporting, the defendant “itself foreclosed any possibility that the FDA could have acted upon such information.” Id. at *10 n.11. That is not causation. That is assuming the breach proves causation. The court even quoted the rule that a plaintiff must prove “an unbroken sequence of events” connecting the injury to the defendant’s conduct, and that the connection “must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise.” Id. at *9. Conjecture and surmise is all this record appears to hold on the FDA’s role. Still, the court declared that “[i]t is simple” that causation belongs to the jury, and said it “refuses” to reach a different conclusion without binding authority. Id. at *10. Causation in a failure-to-report case is anything but simple. Calling it simple is a way of not analyzing it, and refusing to analyze it is exactly what the court did.
Then there is joint venture. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant distributor and the manufacturer were joint venturers. Connecticut looks to five factors: (1) a specific agreement to carry on an enterprise for profit; (2) intent to be joint venturers; (3) contributions by each; (4) some degree of joint control; and (5) a provision for sharing both profits and losses. Id. at *11. The court then noted that Connecticut courts have “never settled upon a fixed definition of a joint venture,” id., which turned out to be the real holding. The evidence that created a jury question? The distribution agreement obligated the defendant to add the manufacturer as an additional insured on its product liability policy (if requested) and to pay a 10% royalty on sales of the disposable applicator. Id. at *3, *12. That’s it. The court conceded in a footnote that the plaintiffs did not even highlight these provisions, so the court found them on its own. Id. at *12 n.13. Additional-insured clauses and royalty payments show up in practically every distribution and licensing agreement ever signed. Neither shows joint control. Neither shows an intent to be joint venturers. And a royalty is the opposite of sharing losses, since the licensor gets paid whether the licensee makes money or not. By this logic, every licensor is in a joint venture with every licensee. The ruling is litigation-specific, but the reasoning is about as broad as it gets.
Last, and maybe most remarkable, is product identification for one bellwether plaintiff. The defendant stopped distributing Filshie Clips in the United States as of February 1, 2019. Id. at *12. It is undisputed that this plaintiff’s tubal ligation took place in July 2020. Id. at *3. The court excluded the defendant’s supporting affidavit and a sales record as hearsay, id. at *13, and then held that “[s]ince the defendant has failed to provide any admissible evidence that [defendant] did not distribute the Filshie Clips used in [the plaintiff’s] tubal ligation, it is not entitled to judgment on this issue.” Id. Product identification is the plaintiff’s burden. The opinion does not mention any affirmative evidence from the plaintiff that the defendant’s clips were used in her surgery. Connecticut’s summary judgment standard is tougher on movants than Celotex, and the court made sure everyone knew that a non-movant “has no obligation to submit documents” when the movant falls short. Id. But a ruling that a defendant must prove it did not make the product, when the plaintiff has not shown that it did, flips the burden of proof on its head.
Qui transtulit sustinet. Plaintiffs transplant their cases to Connecticut, and Connecticut sustains them — through preemption, through causation, through a joint venture made of an insurance clause and a royalty, and through a product identification ruling that puts the burden on the wrong party. For plaintiffs who are not from Connecticut, the choice-of-law questions we flagged in August still deserve a hard look. For everyone else, here is the takeaway. Advise your clients that under no circumstances should they incorporate in Connecticut. And you didn’t hear that through the grapevine. You read it here.
