Today we have another guest post from friend-of-the-Blog, Dick Dean at Tucker Ellis. He’s familiar with the ongoing Pradaxa litigation and is pleased with the preemption pummeling Pradaxa plaintiffs have been receiving. Here’s his post about yet another favorable decision from the state-court Pradaxa proceedings in Connecticut. With decisions like this, who needs snap
A great woman once said “When they go low, we go high.” Apropos of nothing in particular these days, we have been thinking about the issue of tone recently. For instance, what is the exact line between a negative political advertisement and a positive one? Are there circumstances where a candidate might suspend negative ads
Not long ago, in our “Post-Albrecht Preemption Pummels Pradaxa Plaintiffs” post we discussed several recent favorable preemption decisions in product liability litigation involving that drug: Ridings v. Maurice, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2020 WL 1264178 (Mag. W.D. Mo. March 16, 2020), Adkins v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2020 WL 1704646 (Conn.
Various plaintiff-side consortia have taken it into their heads to sue every manufacturer of so-called “novel oral anticoagulants” because these products, gasp, can cause serious, and sometime fatal, bleeding incidents. Fortunately, on the whole the plaintiffs haven’t done so well with these cases – losing almost all the trials – because jurors can be taught
So said the Connecticut state appellate court last week. It’s a pretty simple equation. Like No shoes, no shirt, no service. No pain, no gain. No risk, no reward. In other words, you can’t get one without the other. In Ferrari v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., — A.3d —, 2019 WL 2167849
This weekend, we are traveling to Nashville, where, decades ago, we lived for a couple of years during a period of wanderlust. Nashville was to be a brief stop-off on a cross-country driving odyssey. But we never got any farther down the road, leaving Nashville only to reverse course and return to college (to our
Since Conte in 2008, we have not made a secret of our view that innovator liability is a bad idea, contrary to traditional tort law principles and to sound public policy. We, especially Bexis, may even be accused of being somewhat obsessed with chronicling the decisions, big and small, on this issue over close to
When we were on a jury last month we were warned not to consult any outside sources. And we didn’t. When we were in high school last century and studied the works of Eliot, Lawrence, Joyce, Waugh, and (another) Eliot, we were instructed not to consider extraneous issues, such as biography or social conditions. Our
When Congress enacted HIPAA and its Privacy Rule in the mid-1990s, it was a big deal. Healthcare providers surely protected patient privacy in the pre-HIPAA days, but the federal statute gave them a standard set of rules with which to comply and a uniform referent against which to gauge their privacy practices. All told, HIPAA’s
Today’s guest post is by Adam M. Masin, a partner at Shipman & Goodwin LLP. It’s about the most significant general Connecticut product liability decision in almost 20 years. It’s not a drug/device case, though. Instead it involves tobacco. But make no mistake about it, this case could affect our sandbox – particular design defect cases involving medical devices.
As always our guest posters deserve all the credit, and any blame, for the contents of their posts.
Finally – be sure to read the repeated IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT at the end of this post. DDLaw blog is getting ready to move, and that means you’ll have to resubscribe to continue getting our posts. But don’t worry, it’s easy.
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The Connecticut Supreme Court this month clarified how Connecticut distinguishes between the use of the “ordinary consumer expectation test” and the “modified consumer expectation test” in strict product liability design defect cases. Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., ___ A.3d ___, 321 Conn. 172 (2016). Not to confuse things from the start, but Court’s key holding was that the “modified consumer expectation test” is now the “primary strict liability test.” In other words, the prior ordinary test in Connecticut is no longer the ordinary test, and the primary test is the modified test. Just so we are clear. Wordplay aside, this is an unfortunate through probably unsurprising development in a state that still has a ways to go to firm up its product liability law (more on that below).
Some background helps to clarify how a “modified” test supplanted an “ordinary” test. As the Court noted, Connecticut was one of the first states to adopt § 402 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. (Connecticut was also the first state to adopt a speed limit restriction for cars − a blazing 12 MPH). [Editor’s note, both make about the same amount of sense these days.] Connecticut interpreted § 402 to require a plaintiff alleging a strict liability claim to prove, amongst other things, “the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user.” Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 234 (1980). Connecticut interpreted that element to mean, based on comment (i) to § 402, that “the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” That became known as the “ordinary consumer expectation test.”