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If you’re a frequent visitor to the DDL blog, you’ll know all about products liability claims premised on defendants’ alleged failure to report adverse events to the FDA.  You’ll also be acutely aware of what we think of such claims—they are flat-out preempted. Much to our dismay, not every court agrees with us. But recently

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Recently, when putting together our “Staple Suit Cropped” blogpost about Kane v. Covidien LP, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25718 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025), we realized that, while we had a comprehensive 50-state survey on the questionable status of failure-to-report claims under state law, we did not have a similarly complete reference for preemption of the same reporting-based claims.

We’re rectifying that here.

Failure-to-report claims have been asserted against every product that has a preemption defense – branded drugs, generic drugs, and PMA medical devices.  Thus, there are different ways that failure-to-report claims end up preempted.

  • First, reporting-based claims against drugs or medical devices are impliedly preempted under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), and 21 U.S.C. §337(a), because they would not exist without the FDA reporting obligations that they claim were violated.  Therefore, “the existence of these federal enactments is a critical element” of the cause of action, and implied preemption applies.  531 U.S. at 353.
  • Second, and relatedly, in the majority of states where no state-law claim exists for failure to make mandatory reports to a governmental agency (see the 50-state survey), Buckman further precludes such claims as purely private attempts to enforce the FDCA/FDA regulations concerning adverse event reporting.
  • Third, in cases involving pre-market approved medical devices, the same absence of any state-law reporting-based claims leads to express, as well as implied, preemption because there is no recognized “parallel” state-law theory of liability that could support a “parallel claim” exception to express preemption under 21 U.S.C. §360k(a).
  • Fourth, generic drugs enjoy their own implied preemption defenses under PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011), and can take similar advantage of Buckman-based preemption precedent.

Obviously, there can be overlap between these three categories, and not all courts keep them separate.

Since the issue is preemption, a federal issue, our primary division of cases is by federal circuit rather than by state.  Of the circuits, the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh all have precedential decisions holding failure-to-report claims preempted, although the Second has only dealt with express preemption.  The Second, Fifth and Ninth allow “parallel” failure to warn claims to escape preemption if state common law allows them, with the Second being stricter than the others.  The Seventh Circuit has been hostile generally to FDCA-based preemption, but hasn’t decided a reporting-based case.  The First, Fourth, and District of Columbia circuits have yet to decide the question.  We note that no precedential decision from any federal court of appeals has flatly denied preemption in a failure-to-report case since 2013, the 2013 decision was repudiated by the highest court of the state in question (see Ninth Circuit, below), and the United States Supreme Court abolished any “presumption against preemption” in express preemption cases in 2016.  See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Trust, 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016).  Thus, defendants have good grounds to seek reconsideration of what adverse appellate authority exists.

Finally, we don’t do the other side’s research for them, so be advised, that while we try to be comprehensive in collecting favorable cases, we aren’t including all adverse decisions. Continue Reading Preemption Round Up – Failure to Report

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A month or so ago, we castigated some extremely poorly reasoned expert exclusion decisions in the Bulox v. Coopersurgical litigation.  The end results weren’t horrible (p-side motions were denied), but th0se Rule 702 opinions completely ignored the changes wrought by the 2023 amendments to that Rule.  It was so striking that we went on PACER to see whether defense counsel was to blame for any of that – they weren’t.

Well, today we’re cheering the latest decision(s) in the same litigation.  Bulox v. Coopersurgical, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 56370 (Mag. S.D. Tex. March 6, 2005) (“Bulox I”), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54755 (S.D. Tex. March 25, 2025) (“Bulox II”), is as good a PMA medical device preemption decision as a defendant has a right to expect.  This Bulox decision should go a long way towards defeating the other side’s latest campaign to deprive women of contraceptive choice.Continue Reading Clip, Clip Hooray

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The plaintiff in Kane v. Covidien LP, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25718 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025), lost the bulk of her case recently, on a motion to dismiss no less.  In this case involving surgical staples, strict liability and negligence claims (which, in New York, are “functionally synonymous,” id. at *18) for design and

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In an earlier post, we discussed how the FDA, for over twenty years, from mid-1997 through mid-2019, created and operated an “alternative summary reporting (“ASR”) system for many (but not all) medical device-related adverse events.  In June 2019 the FDA “formally ended” the ASR program, “revoked all . . . exemptions,” and opened “all” ASR reporting data to the public through “legacy files.”

One quirk of ASR reports is that they could not be included on the FDA’s public “MAUDE” (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) database of medical device adverse events, because the FDA required an incompatible format for ASR submissions.  Predictably, plaintiffs in any litigation where the defendant’s participation in the FDA ASR program was relevant started screaming about “coverups” despite the FDA itself receiving all the adverse report data that it wanted, in a form that made it easier for the Agency to use.  Plaintiffs doubled down on already suspect “failure to report” claims.  They’ve been claiming that, under state tort law, device manufacturers had a “duty” not only to comply with FDA reporting requirements, but to do so in the most public manner possible, even when the FDA preferred streamlined ASR reporting.Continue Reading Cutting Through the FDA Alternative Summary Reporting Fog

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Sometimes there’s a little something for everyone.  Today’s case has personal jurisdiction, corporate veil piercing, PMA preemption, statute of limitations, and learned intermediary.  Not every decision on these issues goes the way we think it should, and perhaps the thorns outnumber the roses, but it caught our attention nonetheless.

The case is Franks v. Coopersurgical

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Back in 2008, the United States Supreme Court held, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), that essentially all product liability claims against manufacturers of FDA pre-market approved (“PMA”) medical devices were preempted.  After all, PMA “is in no sense an exemption from federal safety review − it is federal safety review.”  Id. at 323.  Thus, by a 7-2 margin the Court held, per Justice Scalia, that all state-law liability claims before it – “strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence in the [product’s] design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale,” id. at 320 – were expressly preempted:Continue Reading PMA Preemption Decision Slides to the Bottom of the “Parallel Claim” Slippery Slope