Today we address two more cooked-up—literally—Valisure cases, Bodunde v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., No. 1:24-CV-00985-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 1411306 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2025), and Navarro v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., No. 1:24-CV-00290-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 1411406 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2025).
These two cases involve legally identical magistrate recommendations that Defendant’s motions to dismiss
A month or so ago, we castigated some extremely poorly reasoned expert exclusion decisions in the Bulox v. Coopersurgical litigation. The end results weren’t horrible (p-side motions were denied), but th0se Rule 702 opinions completely ignored the changes wrought by the 2023 amendments to that Rule. It was so striking that we went on PACER to see whether defense counsel was to blame for any of that – they weren’t.
Well, today we’re cheering the latest decision(s) in the same litigation. Bulox v. Coopersurgical, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 56370 (Mag. S.D. Tex. March 6, 2005) (“Bulox I”), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54755 (S.D. Tex. March 25, 2025) (“Bulox II”), is as good a PMA medical device preemption decision as a defendant has a right to expect. This Bulox decision should go a long way towards defeating the other side’s latest campaign to deprive women of contraceptive choice.Continue Reading Clip, Clip Hooray
Today we report on the court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss in Keim-Bacon v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:22-CV-00383-WPJ-MTS, 2024 WL 4886051, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2024). It is a straightforward application of Riegel preemption that gets it right on all fronts.
The Scandinavian Total Ankle Replacement System (“STAR”) is a Class
Today we discuss an excellent express preemption decision from the District of Arizona, Skinner v. Small Bone Innovations Inc., 2024 WL 3639296 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2024).
This decision involved the Scandinavian Total Ankle Replacement device (“STAR”). The STAR® Ankle is a Class III medical device subject to the Medical Device Amendments’ express preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). This was Plaintiff’s second bite at the apple: The Court had already granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss but with leave to amend to attempt to state a parallel claim. See Skinner v. Small Bone Innovations Inc., No. CV-23-01051-PHX-MTL, 2023 WL 6318014, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2023). After striking out in round one, Plaintiff fared no better in round two.Continue Reading Slam-Dunk Express Preemption Decision from the District of Arizona
We are celebrating an anniversary today: We wrote our first blogpost on July 26, 2013. Eleven years and hundreds of posts later, we have two observations. First, we seriously need to update our blog profile photo. Or maybe we will just ride out our blogging years promoting the fiction that we are younger and fitter
This post is from the non-Reed Smith, non-Dechert , and non-Holland & Knight side of the blog. Everyone else is involved.
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly is a classic Clint Eastwood spaghetti Western where even the Good may not be all good. In California state court, a demurrer sustained is a defense win, right? Although there are some bright spots, In re Ranitidine Cases is one of the ugliest defense wins we have seen in a while, providing leave to amend and a roadmap for further expansion of the Gilead duty-to-innovate.Continue Reading Post-Gilead Heartburn in the California Ranitidine Litigation
We have seen a number of consumer fraud class action cases brought over a range of fairly ticky tacky issues about OTC drugs and consumer products. California law and courts have been fairly favorable to these cases, which follow a pattern of a test plaintiff seeking to represent some large class because (s)he claims to
We do not often see state court opinions strongly endorsing federal preemption, or even weakly endorsing federal preemption. That is why we took notice last week when the California Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Medicare Act expressly preempted state common-law and statutory claims against a health maintenance organization and a healthcare plan administrator. Most
We made our annual pilgrimage to the Arizona Cactus League last week. As we’ve done for the past 20-plus years, we rendered homage to our favorite sport, baseball, and, more importantly, to our sisters, one of whom lives quite close to the San Diego Padres Spring Training field in Peoria, AZ, and the other of
Today we bring you another generally favorable Essure preemption decision. Plaintiff brought three causes of action against the manufacturer and the court dismissed two of them. So, in the immortal words of Jim Steinman as belted out by Marvin Lee Aday, we shouldn’t be sad because two out of three ain’t bad. And one of the two is actually quite good. So, we certainly aren’t crying icicles like Meat Loaf. More like when we went looking for a ruby in a mountain of rocks, we came up with a sapphire instead.
We’ve written about Essure cases over the years, like here and here. And in many ways Ortiz v. Bayer Corp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226472 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2022), is not much different. Plaintiff alleged injuries from a permanent contraceptive device and brought claims for failure to train, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty. The types of claims that sometimes skirt around the twin guards of PMA preemption—Riegel express preemption and Buckman implied preemption. The court dismissed the training and warranty claims but ruled plaintiff did enough at the pleadings stage to keep her manufacturing defect claim.
The failure to train warning took a double hit as both expressly and impliedly preempted. First, to the extent plaintiff demanded training beyond what the FDA requires, they were asking the state to impose an obligation on defendants that was “different from or in addition to” federal requirements and therefore was expressly preempted. Id. at *10. That left plaintiff’s argument that they were pursuing a “parallel” claim that defendants breached a purported duty to train under New York law. But the court ruled that a general negligent undertaking claim under state law falls short of any “clearly articulated state law duty or cause of action to parallel the federal training requirements.” Id. at *11. That’s a useful aspect of the preemption argument that negligent undertaking claims are too broad to be genuinely equivalent to a specific FDA physician training obligation. Continue Reading Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad