The California Supreme Court heard oral argument in T.H. v. Novartis on Monday. That is the case where the California Court of Appeal held that a prescription drug manufacturer could be held liable for injuries allegedly caused by a product that it did not make and did not sell. This situation usually presents itself when
As we discussed at the time, the MDL-wide innovator liability appeals in In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 756 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2014), resulted in rulings under more than 20 states’ laws that branded drug manufacturers could not be liable for injuries suffered by plaintiffs who never used their…
We have two posts on innovator liability that we update on a consistent basis: our innovator liability scorecard, and our “Innovator Liability at 100” state-by-state collection of materials that we originally compiled when the one-hundredth judicial opinion on this topic was decided. Well, not too long ago the Fourth Circuit, in McNair …
May 10 is an important day in the history of the law. On this date, way back in 1893, the Supreme Court ruled that the tomato is a vegetable, not a fruit. The case was called Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). The issue concerned application of the Tariff Act of 1883, which …
We’re serious – we’re not planning to give a flip answer like “an extortion racket.” No, it’s more like law school, where a first-year contracts professor began with the question “What is Chicken?” (Hint – that’s discussed in Frigaliment Importing Co., Ltd. v. BNS International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). The…
This is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
Looking back at our posts on innovator liability, it’s becoming more and more difficult to title them. According to the DDL blog, innovator liability has been rejected, abolished, denied, refused, disallowed. You get the idea. With the news from earlier this summer that the California Supreme Court is going to consider the issue – which will hopefully spell the demise of Conte – we may be nearing the end of the chapter on innovator liability. In the meantime, we’ll keep bringing you the wins as they stack up.
Today’s case was actually decided right around the time the California Supreme Court decided to take on the issue. Gillette v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 2016 WL 4217758 (Mag. D. Minn. Jun. 16, 2016). The decision didn’t come to our attention, however, until the magistrate’s report and recommendation was adopted last week. See 2016 WL 4203422 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2016).
The Gillette decision comes out of the Mirapex MDL and involves the application of Indiana law. Indiana products liability claims are governed by the Indiana Products Liability Act (“IPLA”) which provides a single cause of action subsuming all common law strict liability and negligence claims, as well as tort based warranty claims. Gillette, 2016 WL 4217758 at *3-4, *6. So, plaintiff in this case had one cause of action based on her allegations that her use of Mirapex caused her to gamble compulsively.
But was it Mirapex that plaintiff was taking at the time she suffered her injuries? According to her pharmacy records, plaintiff was prescribed Mirapex from 2001 until 2015. Id. at *1-2. It appears that from 2001 until April 2010, plaintiff’s pharmacy filled her prescriptions with brand name Mirapex. In April 2010, when her prescribing physician increased plaintiff’s dosage, her pharmacy began filling her Mirapex prescriptions with its generic equivalent – pramipexole dihydrochloride. Id. at *1. From April 2010 until late 2015, plaintiff received the generic version of the drug manufactured by a succession of four different generic drug manufacturers. Id. at *1-2.
The recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2016 WL 3495191 (N.Y. June 28, 2016) (“NYCAL”), was not too good for asbestos defendants – as it permitted, under certain circumstances, non-manufacturers to be sued for failure to warn of a risk that the product they manufactured didn’t have (exposure to asbestos), where they “encourage[ed]” the use of products containing that risk with their products and thereby benefitted economically:
[A] manufacturer’s duty to warn of combined use of its product with another product depends in part on whether the manufacturer’s product can function without the other product, as it would be unfair to allow a manufacturer to avoid the minimal cost of including a warning about the perils of the joint use of the products when the manufacturer knows that the combined use is both necessary and dangerous. And, the justification for a duty to warn becomes particularly strong if the manufacturer intends that customers engage in the hazardous combined use of the products at issue.
* * * *
[W]here a manufacturer creates a product that cannot be used without another product as a result of the design of the product, the mechanics of the product or the absence of economically feasible alternative means of enabling the product to function as intended, the manufacturer has a substantial, albeit indirect, role in placing the third-party product in the stream of commerce. . . . Specifically, when the manufacturer produces a product that requires another product to function, the manufacturer naturally opens up a profitable market for that essential component, thereby encouraging the other company to make that related product and place it in the stream of commerce.
NYCAL, 2016 WL 3495191, at *__ (for some reason there is no Westlaw star paging at the moment). This opinion is very bad news for the affected companies, who are now sucked into the maw of interminable asbestos litigation on the basis of products they didn’t even make, but it should not open the door to innovator liability type claims against our medical product manufacturer clients, and it’s good on causation, too.
When we were young(er), we had a pretty good memory. It is not bad now, as far as we recall, particularly when it comes to pulling up bits of esoteric nonsense. For more important stuff, we find qualifiers like “vague” and “fuzzy” being applied more often to our own characterization of what we think we recall. (We can only imagine how different things will be should be advance to the current age of McConnell, Bexis, or Weil.) Buried somewhere between esoteric and important would be the question of whether we have seen a certain issue before in cases that have been the subject of past posts. With a caveat about our memory, supplemented by a less than exhaustive search of prior posts, we thought we could present a decision addressing an issue we have never talked about before—and we have talked about a boatload of issues through the years. (No, “boatload” was not our first choice, but we try to keep it clean here.)
The silly Conte case popularized the idea that a company that developed and brought a drug to the market could be liable for injuries allegedly caused by a generic version of the drug sold by a competitor. Conte was itself a reaction to the realization, even before Mensing and Bartlett, that most traditional product liability theories against the makers of generic drugs would be preempted. When plaintiffs have tried to sue both the manufacturers of the generic drug they took and the company that “innovated” the drug and a single decision rejected the claims against both sets of defendants, we have called that a one-two punch. Because plaintiff lawyers are stubborn in their pursuit of ways to pin liability on defendants with money—or get far enough along in the case to take some of that money to go away—we have described a number of varieties of these one-two punch cases. Just skimming our scoresheets on these issues should give some idea of that variety.
While off-label promotion allegations feature prominently in a range of cases involving prescription drugs, we have not seen them much in innovator liability or generic drug cases. That might be because NDA holders tend not to do much promotion at all on their drug once generic drugs have entered the market and ANDA holders tend not to promote their generic drugs much at all, especially when there are multiple generics available. This is not a matter of on-label or off-label promotion as much as it is of economics. So, when we saw that Perdue v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-208-FL, slip op. (E.D.N.C. July 20, 2016), delivered a one-two punch in a case where both the branded manufacturer and three generic manufacturers were alleged to have promoted off-label, we thought we might have a chance to talk about something novel. We were wrong. We wrote about another case last year. Twice. Involving the same drug as in Perdue. One post even talked about elephants, known not just for their girth but for their memories. Oh, the irony. But that will not stop us from talking about the good result in Perdue.
We’ve always hated Conte v. Wyeth, 85 Cal. Rptr.3d 299 (Cal. App. 2008), and the whole concept of innovator liability (imposing liability on the original innovator drug manufacturer for injuries allegedly caused by a generic drug equivalent). As amicus for PLAC, Bexis tried to strangle Conte in its cradle, as discussed here, but…
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
It’s been a bit of a slow news week in the drug and device litigation world. We are coming off a short work week and like the rest of us, judges may be looking to enjoy a few extra hours outdoors during these late spring days. We don’t blame them. While we prefer bringing you hot of the presses news or interesting new takes on old standards, sometimes all we have to report is that good law continues to be good law.
That’s today’s case – another blow to innovator liability. As you’ll see from our innovator liability scorecard, Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 2016 Mass. Super. Lexis 48 (Mass. Super. May 23, 2016) isn’t the first time a Massachusetts court has rejected this concept. But now that it has done so twice, we hope Massachusetts can be added to the list of states where innovator liability is now dead (we won’t say “and buried” since there is no state supreme court ruling yet). The case contains a thoughtful analysis of the issue and is certainly worthy of including if you are briefing this topic.
Plaintiff ingested finasteride, the generic version of Merck’s Proscar. After experiencing complications, plaintiff brought suit against his prescribing physician and Merck. Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that even though he didn’t ingest Merck’s product, as the brand manufacturer, Merck “had a duty to maintain the accuracy of the labels for those individuals who would rely on those labels,” including individuals who would ingest generic product. Id. at *8.
The court starts its analysis with the framework for how a generic drug gets FDA approval and following approval how the labeling requirements for brand and generic manufacturers differ. Id. at *3-6. This regulatory framework serves as the cornerstone for the Supreme Court’s Mensing and Bartlett decisions which largely insulate generic drug manufacturers from product liability lawsuits. The Rafferty court, like most others to have considered the issue, recognized the “unfortunate” result of barring generic users from recovery but also like most other courts, it was unwilling to bend or expand existing law to extend product liability to a company that did not manufacture the product at issue.