Photo of Bexis

Back in the bad old days of the Bone Screw litigation, we had to fight our way through a thicket of scurrilous allegations about how our clients supposedly promoted off-label use through continuing medical education seminars that the Bone Screw plaintiffs claimed were used to reward surgeons who regularly used our clients’ products with excessive speaker fees.  Back then – in the mid 1990s – the plaintiffs’ preferred avenues for asserting such allegations were state-law based:  negligence per se, fraud on the FDA, and conspiracy.  By the time that the infamous Franklin False Claims Act (“FCA”) decisions came down (United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis,147 F. Supp.2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001), and United States  ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003)), we had won Buckman (and a lot of other things), so Bone Screw-related promotion allegations were never the subject of FCA litigation.

But the Bone Screw promotional allegations were close enough to what has been subsequently alleged ad nauseum in FCA litigation that we’ve followed similar FCA litigation ever since.  Today’s case, United States v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 2025 WL 2627686 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2025), does not involve off-label use, but does involve allegations of kickbacks – through speaker programs and donations to charitable organizations.  We’re happy to say that the entire action was dismissed – on both sets of facts.  We’re even happier to recommend the discussion in Gilead as providing useful guidance for how pharmaceutical companies can manage both types of programs in compliance with applicable law.Continue Reading FCA Dismissal Illustrates Pharmaceutical Promotion Done Right

Photo of Bexis

The billion-dollar-plus verdict in United States ex rel. Penelow v. Janssen Products, LP, 2025 WL 937504 (D.N.J. March 28, 2025), epitomizes everything that is wrong about the False Claims Act – and that’s just about everything.  A private plaintiff (“relator”), purporting to act as a self-appointed agent of the United States government, claimed that

Photo of Bexis

In a series of what we entitled “reports from the front,” we discussed how the federal government asserted, and eventually won, the right to intervene in ongoing False Claims Act suits to seek their dismissal notwithstanding the objections of the “relators” who were ostensibly pursuing these actions in the government’s name.  Basically, the relators claimed that, unless the government exercised its initial right to take over an FCA suit early on, the government lost all control over the relators, and they could essentially run wild using the government’s name.  The Supreme Court rightfully rejected that view.  United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 437-38 (2023) (government entitled to intervene and obtain dismissal of FCA action at any time on the basis of any “reasonable argument” regardless of the relator’s position).

However, three justices had more to add – they challenged that entire FCA private-attorney-general system as unconstitutional.  Justice Thomas stated in dissent:

The FCA’s qui tam provisions have long inhabited something of a constitutional twilight zone.  There are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation. . . .  [T]he Court has held that conducting civil litigation for vindicating public rights of the United States is an executive function that may be discharged only by persons who are Officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause.  A private relator under the FCA, however, is not appointed as an officer of the United States under Article II.  It thus appears to follow that Congress cannot authorize a private relator to wield executive authority to represent the United States’ interests in civil litigation.  The potential inconsistency of qui tam suits with Article II has been noticed for decades.

Polansky, 599 U.S. at 449-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Concurring Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett agreed.  “I add only that I agree with Justice Thomas that “[t]here are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation.”  Id. at 442 (concurring opinion).

Thus, we commented that “another front opens.”Continue Reading FCA Frontal Assault in Eleventh Circuit

Photo of Michelle Yeary

Sometime last year, one of our esteemed bloggers wrote: “The qui tam provision of the FCA, which permits private plaintiffs – sorry, relators – to steer FCA claims presents marvelous opportunities for mischief.” We couldn’t have said it any better, so we won’t try.  Moreover, mischief makes us think of the Marauder’s Map (Harry

Photo of Michelle Yeary

Do kids still do connect-the-dots?  Back before tablets, smart phones, laptops, and even computers, when you went on a long car trip you passed the time playing license plate bingo, punch buggy, annoying your parents, and maybe you had an “activity book.”  An actual paperback book filled with coloring pages, mazes, word scrambles, seek-a-word, and

Photo of Michelle Yeary

So learned plaintiff in United States ex rel. Plaintiff v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174825 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2024), when the court granted defendant’s two motions to compel obviously relevant documents and information.

Plaintiff relator and intervening plaintiff, the State of Washington, assert False Claims Act (“FCA”) claims against the

Photo of Eric Alexander

We are unabashedly pro-science.  In our cases, we are usually on the side of good science against bad or no science.  In discussing large-scale product liability litigation, we have said many times how bad science and the risk of attendant litigation can negatively impact the development of new products.  Even if we were so naïve