A federal court has asked the supreme court of Washington to address the scope of that state’s learned-intermediary doctrine. In particular, it has asked whether Washington recognizes a “direct-to-consumer” exception to the doctrine.
Under the learned-intermediary doctrine, which has been adopted by every state other than West Virginia, a manufacturer of a prescription medical product
To bring suit in federal court, a plaintiff must have “Article III standing.” That is to say, the plaintiff must have a personal stake in the suit’s outcome. This is true whether a plaintiff is suing individually or as a member of a class.
Late last week, in TransUnion v. Ramirez, — S. Ct.
Today we report on Black v. DJO Glob., Inc., — P.3d —-, 2021 WL 2346038 (Idaho 2021), a short and sweet decision rejecting yet another plaintiff’s attempt to maintain a product-liability claim without evidence of a defect in the medical device at issue. Holding that neither the “malfunction theory” nor the related res ipsa
Today we report on two cases involving the learned-intermediary doctrine. One holds that the doctrine applies in the context of clinical trials; the other holds that it applies even when no warning was given by the manufacturer. Both cases highlight the importance of causation in failure-to-warn claims.
Under the learned-intermediary doctrine, which has been adopted
Today’s post is a report on Jazmine Harris v. Topco Associates, LLC, 2021 WL 1885981 (N.D. Ill. 2021), which dismissed on preemption grounds a putative class action that challenged as fraudulent the marketing of acetaminophen for infants. The decision, whose result departs from earlier decisions in the area, highlights the importance of a provision
This blog has discussed Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019), and its progeny on multiple occasions. We provided a quick take when Albrecht was issued; discussed the decision’s possible ramifications here and here; expressed consternation at certain parts of the decision; reported here and here on how
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
This blog has repeatedly lamented the tendency of MDL courts to flout federal pleading standards when assessing the sufficiency of master complaints. All too often MDL courts disregard Rule 8(a), which—as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal—requires plaintiffs to
Today we report on a recent decision dismissing manufacturing-defect, warranty, and failure-to-warn claims arising from an allegedly defective breast implant. Although the decision, D’Addario v. Johnson & Johnson, 2021 WL 1214896 (D.N.J. 2021), does not stray far from the beaten path, it covers ground worth revisiting. The decision is a useful (if cursory) reminder
A Vaudeville act is supposed to leave the audience wanting more. Not so a judicial decision. But that is what we have today: a decision whose result—the dismissal of Lanham Act claims brought by a device manufacturer against a competitor—is underexplained.
The plaintiff in Impact Applications, Inc., v. Concussion Management, LLC, 2021 WL 978823
Today’s post discusses a recent implied-preemption decision that is relevant beyond the generic-drug context in which it arose.
A bit of background first.
In Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)—which declares that all actions to enforce the FDCA “shall be by