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Today’s post is our second installment about a case in the District of Massachusetts alleging injury from a Class III medical device. We blogged about it this spring when the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim that an implanted defibrillator and associated leads caused her numerous, unnecessary shocks. The court dismissed that complaint based on straightforward, premarket approval preemption. But the court granted plaintiff leave to amend, and she moved to file an amended complaint.  Today’s decision, Summers v. Medtronic, Inc., 2025 WL 2201110 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2025), denied plaintiff’s motion for leave based on the learned intermediary rule in Massachusetts. It’s a helpful decision because it applies the learned intermediary rule at the 12(b)(6) stage in the context of a device recall.

Continue Reading Summers Round 2: Learned Intermediary Rule Applies to Claim Based on Device Recall

Sometimes opinions go entirely in favor of the defense, analyzing numerous, independent bases for the dismissal of a complaint.  Today’s decision, Doyle v. Bayer Corp., 2025 WL 1666261 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2025), is definitely one of those. It is a perfect example of what should happen when a plaintiff files a generic, bare-bones complaint in a prescription medical product case.

Plaintiff had an intrauterine device (IUD) implanted, and after about two years was informed that the IUD had likely been expelled from her body.  More than ten years after that, plaintiff obtained an x-ray for a persistent cough.  Doctors suspected that a shadow shown on the x-ray in the plaintiff’s abdomen was the IUD.  Plaintiff subsequently had surgery to remove the IUD, and she and her husband then filed suit against the manufacturer. Plaintiffs asserted five common law product liability claims and a sixth for unfair business practices.

Continue Reading Belt and Suspenders – Dismissal in the Western District of Washington

Snap removal is one of the few ways that defendants can counter plaintiffs’ efforts at forum shopping. When a case analyzes snap removal and expressly adopts fraudulent misjoinder in the Third Circuit, you know it gets our attention.

Today’s decision, Paddock v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2025 WL 1908806 (D. Del. July 11, 2025), is a report and recommendation denying remand following the defendant’s snap removal.  The case involves claims by multiple plaintiffs that the defendant wrongfully promoted the off-label use of terbutaline (an asthma drug) to treat pre-term labor in pregnant women, and that the plaintiffs’ children developed autism as a result of their ingestion of the drug during pregnancy.

Continue Reading Snap! Sometimes the Third Time Isn’t a Charm

Today, the summer solstice, is one of our favorite days of the year.  It’s the first official day of summer, and readers in the U.S. will have anywhere from 14-16 hours of daylight (the farther north, the more daylight). We hope you get to enjoy some of the summer sunshine today—or at least this weekend.  As the late, great, Brian Wilson put it, “Sunshine, can’t get enough sunshine, I’m following the sunshine, everywhere I go.”

Continue Reading Eighth Circuit Affirms Rule 702 Exclusion of Plaintiff Design Defect Expert

We’ve written a lot about the recent amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  As noted here, the amendment (1) mandates that the court must determine the admissibility of evidence before presenting it to the jury, (2) integrates the preponderance of evidence standard—requiring the proponent of expert testimony to prove that it is more likely than not that all of Rule 702’s requirements are met, and (3) reinforces that each expert opinion must reliably apply the expert’s principles and methods to the facts of the case. These changes were driven by the fact that “many courts have held that the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert’s basis, and the application of the expert’s methodology, are questions of weight and not admissibility.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2023 Amendment.  The changes to Rule 702 are intended to prevent such erroneous “weight vs. admissibility” findings.  We’re also fans of the Don’t Say Daubert movement that reminds lawyers that Rule 702 itself – not the Daubert decision – defines the applicable standard for the admission of expert testimony. 

Continue Reading Rule 702 Gatekeeping by En Banc Panel of the Federal Circuit

Today’s post is a little different, in that it involves not an order, but a Motion for Relief from Judgment and to File an Amended Complaint (the “Motion”) filed by Pecos River Talc (“Plaintiff”) against Dr. Jacqueline Miriam Moline (“Dr. Moline”). Pecos River Talc LLC v. Moline, 3:23-cv-02990, Doc. No. 47-1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2025).  Dr. Moline is a serial expert on behalf of plaintiffs in the cosmetic talcum powder litigation, and she was the lead author on a paper entitled “Mesothelioma Associated with the Use of Cosmetic Talc” (the “Article”).  The article was faked, as we originally discussed, here, in our “Stupid Expert Tricks Redux” post. That’s even clearer now, as the Motion we discuss here identifies bombshell, newly discovered evidence that undercuts the foundation of the Article and Dr. Moline’s opinions. This is a true “smoking gun.”

Continue Reading The Perils of Moline, Part II – Persistence Prevails in Re-Identifying Plaintiffs in Cosmetic Talc Article

Bad fact patterns sometimes make bad law. And sympathetic plaintiffs who experience unfortunate outcomes can lead to decisions that stray from established precedent. Today’s decision from the Northern District of Oklahoma addresses a sad fact pattern, but the court conducted a rigorous Erie analysis and concluded that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would not recognize a duty that pharmacies must fill prescriptions.  Scholl v. Walgreens Specialty Pharm., LLC, 2025 WL 950866 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2025). 

Continue Reading Federal Court’s Erie Analysis Concludes That Pharmacies Do Not Have a Duty to Fill Prescriptions in Oklahoma

We blogged a lot about the Taxotere MDL.  From Lone Pine orders to denials of motions to amend in remand cases, we reported on some pretty good decisions.  The MDL court also dismissed a number of plaintiffs who failed to make timely service on the defendants, which we blogged about here and here. Today’s decision addresses a plaintiff who appealed her dismissal for failing to make timely service. Reeder v. Hospira, Inc. (In re Taxotere Docetaxel Prods. Liab. Litig.), 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4735 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2025).

Continue Reading Fifth Circuit Affirms Taxotere Dismissal for Failure to Serve

Happy Valentine’s Day. Today’s decision is about a rather un-romantic topic—holding companies.  But that got us thinking about a lesser-known band out of San Francisco called Big Brother and the Holding Company. One of America’s most iconic vocalists got her start with the band. Big Brother and the Holding Company’s second album, Cheap Thrills, reached

We write a lot about the learned intermediary rule. There are 50 state surveys and  summaries of helpful decisions, as well as numerous posts on state-specific decisions. We tracked the development of the rule in jurisdictions like West Virginia and Arizona, and we’ve generally been pleased to report positive developments. At the end of 2024, though, we flagged the Himes case from California as one of the ten worst decisions of the year based on its novel approach to warnings causation.  Given our criticisms of Himes, we found it both bizarre and troubling to see the case cited recently by an MDL court in Massachusetts applying Pennsylvania law. Our colleagues in the plaintiffs’ bar are clearly advocating to expand Himes into other jurisdictions, and the defense bar should be ready to counter those efforts.

Continue Reading Himes Makes a Sneak Appearance on the East Coast