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The short answer is “no.”  We are just borrowing a line from one of the original gangster movies, “Little Caesar,” which readers other than McConnell would most likely know from references in “The Sopranos,” if they know it at all.  (Or from here.)  The titular character in that flick was known as “Rico.”  RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), on the other hand, was an anti-gangster law, enacted in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act.  In a number of posts (like here), we have decried the gangster tactics used by plaintiffs—particularly quasi-public plaintiffs—to use the threat of RICO’s treble damages and cost-shifting provisions to extort settlements from drug and device manufacturers.  Particularly for prescription medical products, RICO seems like an inappropriate vehicle for addressing alleged harms allegedly caused by such standard product liability allegations as inadequate disclosure of risks or off-label promotion.  A small blow to curtail the expansion of RICO was struck in Short v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1025, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61123 (W.D. Mich. May 11, 2015).

Short is yet another case stemming from pediatric use of Risperdal.  We have posted many times on various Risperdal cases with various theories of recovery, usually tied to the idea that the drug was improperly promoted for off-label use without disclosing the true risk of gynecomastia and other prolactin disorders, like hereherehere and here.  In Short, the plaintiff allegedly took Risperdal as a minor, developed gynecomastia, and sued in his own behalf under RICO and state consumer protection and product liability acts.  His problems were that he never paid a cent for the drug and that he was from Michigan.  We suspect the latter may be why RICO was at issue at all.Continue Reading Is This The End of RICO?

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This post discusses an Infuse case and therefore, is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog only.

“Mother of mercy, is this the end of Rico?”  Those are the last words uttered by the gangster in Little Caesar.  That villain was played by Edward G. Robinson, who became well-known for playing tough-talking hoodlums,

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The following post is exclusively the work of the Reed Smith side of the blog.

Sometimes the smallest, least significant type of lawsuit can illustrate cracks in the edifice of the largest, most consequential litigation.  So, in our opinion, it is with Neurontin.  In this version of the story, the role of “Mack” is played by Herricks v. Pickaway Correctional Institute, 2013 WL 4804983 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013).  That’s prisoner litigation − mostly convicts with nothing better to do with their time than try to sue their jailers.  The great majority of these cases get the back of the judicial hand.  There aren’t many litigation genres of less significance than that.

Playing the role of “Yertle” is the First Circuit’s circuit-splitting trilogy, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013), Aetna, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2013), and Harden Manufacturing Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2013) – all of which also travel under the heading, In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation.  Not so coincidentally, the defendants filed a petition for certiorari in the Neurontin trilogy the other day.  Big cases – high courts.

The Neurontin cert. petition didn’t cite Herricks, of course, but we think that what went on in Herricks is as good an illustration as any why the First Circuit got it spectacularly and loudly wrong when it allowed the plaintiffs in the Neurontin trilogy to proceed with what amounts to an aggregate trial by formula that deprives the defendants of contesting the individual merits of any of the thousands – heck, millions – of individual claims at issue.  Can you say “due process violation”?

First, Herricks.  Prisoner plaintiffs can’t sue prison doctors for ordinary malpractice, at least not in federal court, where most of these cases seem to end up.  Instead, they must meet a higher constitutional (Eighth Amendment) standard of “deliberate indifference.”  Needless to say, most prisoner cases can’t meet that standard.  But the inmate-plaintiff in Herricks did.  What did the court (actually, a magistrate) find could meet that standard?

The prison doctor’s refusal to treat the plaintiff-prisoner off-label with Neurontin.Continue Reading On Litigation, Great and Small

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Third party payer plaintiffs (mostly insurance companies and union welfare funds in unholy alliance with plaintiff lawyers), have not been doing very well with their economic loss claims against (mostly) pharmaceutical companies – at least outside the rogue First Circuit − as anyone following our TPP topic posts can attest. So they’ve tried something new,

You may have heard Einstein’s definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. Well, if that’s right, then squirrels must be looking for TPP plaintiffs, because they’re nuts at this point if they think they’re going to get a RICO class certified (in the Second Circuit, at least).
We’ve previously reported on the Second Circuit blowing out a putative class in Zyprexa; in fact, it came in number one on our 2010 Top Ten Opinions list. Now we have more good news to report: a Magistrate Judge Report & Recommendation finding class certification inappropriate in a RICO/consumer fraud class action involving Ketek. See Sergeants Benevolent Assn. Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP, Case No. 1:08-cv-00179-SLT-RER (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (we’re just going to call it Ketek). Hat-tip to Gary Spahn for sending along the opinion.
Ketek is a prescription antibiotic; plaintiffs were third-party payors (TPPs) who alleged the defendant fraudulently marketed Ketek by misrepresenting its safety and efficacy, and when the “truth” came out, prescriptions of Ketek plummeted. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a nationwide class of TPPs, alleging claims under RICO, the consumer protection laws of forty-four states, and “unjust enrichment.”
The magistrate’s report and recommendation addressed only the RICO claims and deferred the pendent state claims, as plaintiffs suggested. Slip op. at 8 and n.7. The magistrate, following Zyprexa, found that individual issues predominated and doomed class certification.Continue Reading Another TPP RICO Class Cert Denial

Last Friday, we promised you more on the Second Circuit’s reversal of Judge Weinstein’s Zyprexa class certification decision. Well, here’s more (and the Westlaw cite to boot).
First, the background: A bunch of third-party payors (“TPP”) sued Eli Lilly and Company, claiming that Lilly had misrepresented Zyprexa’s efficacy and side effects. UFCW Local 1776 and

We love being right. We especially love telling the plaintiffs’ bar that we told ya so. Now can we finally drive a stake through these off-label marketing RICO cases brought by third-party payors (TPP)? (probably not, but we can keep hoping).

The latest crash-and-burn RICO TPP class action comes courtesy of the Southern District of

We wrote yesterday about how common sense had gone missing from the Southern District of Illinois. But common sense is like the Dow Jones index – some days it is down 1,000 points in a few minutes, other days it is up 400 points. Today we’re bullish. Specifically, we are happy to report about a

Good luck bringing a class action in New Jersey federal court invoking the “off-label marketing” bugaboo. Last year, we had Schering-Plough Corp. v. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, a putative class action we’ve previously covered. In that case, the court dismissed a third-party payor (TPP) class action for failure to state a claim where