We write today with an update on a case applying the defense of illegality (or “in pari delicto”) to cut off product liability claims under Kansas law. Messerli v. AW Distributing, Inc. is the sad case of someone who passed away, allegedly as a result of inhaling intoxicating fumes (or “huffing”) from computer
Kansas
In Pari Delicto Is Alive and Well in Kansas
We don’t see the defense of illegality much in the product liability space, but when a plaintiff’s claims arises from his or her own illegal behavior, the illegality defense can be a powerful tool. We mention this now because a district court in Kansas recently applied the illegality defense to dismiss a case based on…
Alternative Designs in Kansas Must be Feasible and Adequate and Effective – Oh My
Perhaps not as menacing as Lions and Tigers and Bears (Oh my) – but feasible, adequate, and effective proved to be too much for plaintiff in Davis v. Johnson & Johnson, 2022 WL 2115075 (Jun. 9, 2022).
It is a remanded pelvic mesh case. On defendant’s motion to exclude certain testimony by plaintiff’s expert, most…
Preemption Again Defeats Breast Implant Claims
We praised Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 2019 WL 4628264 (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 2019), when it was first decided, as “checking all the boxes.” Last week the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and believe us, it rechecked all those boxes.
In Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, ___ F.3d ___, 2021 WL 245246…
PMA Preemption Win That Checks All the Boxes
Did you ever read something and think – I couldn’t have said it better myself. Sometimes we read opinions that give us just that feeling. A decision that ticks all of the boxes and leaves us wondering why everybody doesn’t see how easy it is to reach the right conclusion. Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC…
Res Ipsa Loquitur, or Maybe Not
We haven’t written much about res ipsa loquitur on the blog, and today’s case doesn’t really qualify as a drug or device case per se, but it’s an interesting opinion and we thought it was worth sharing. The case is Hubbard v. Mellion, No. 108461, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 45 (May 17, 2013), and it’s an appellate decision reversing summary judgment in favor of a physician in a medical negligence case, on the basis of the appellate court’s finding that the lower court should have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case arose when plaintiff Hubbard underwent spinal surgery (involving various –otomies and –ectomies) to repair a herniated lumbar disc. During the procedure, the surgeon used a device known as a pituitary rongeur, which is a forceps-type instrument that’s used to remove part of the disc. Unfortunately, during Ms. Hubbard’s surgery, the tip broke off of one arm of the rongeur, and became lodged in her disc space. Hubbard, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS at * 6. The surgeon tried to retrieve the tip but was unable to. Id. Ms. Hubbard claimed that she experienced continual pain as a result of having the fragment in her spine, and eventually underwent another surgery to remove it. Id. She later filed a negligence action in which she named the surgeon and the hospital, as well as the manufacturer of the rongeur, alleging that the latter was negligent for supplying a device that was in a dangerous and defective condition. However, as we’ve seen plaintiffs do in other medical device cases, plaintiff later decided to pursue the surgeon alone, and backed away from her defect theory. Really far away. Did a 180, in fact. Not only did plaintiff dismiss the manufacturer, her expert metallurgist authored a report in which he “ruled out the possibility that the rongeur failed due to a manufacturer’s defect, ruled out the possibility that the rongeur failed because it had been improperly maintained, and ruled out the possibility that the rongeur had failed due to normal wear and tear.” Id. at *11. The plaintiff’s expert’s sole causation opinion was that the rongeur tip had broken off due to user error – specifically, because the surgeon had applied too much force when using the instrument. Id. at *12.
The surgeon moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s experts – a metallurgist, a neurosurgeon, and a quality management team leader from the rongeur manufacturer (id. at *11-12) – were not qualified to opine on the standard of care for a surgeon performing this type of procedure. Id. at * 14-15. The trial court agreed, and held that although these experts established that operator error had caused the rongeur to break, plaintiff had not shown that this error was outside the established standard of care. Id. at *15. On appeal, plaintiff argued that she was not required to present expert testimony on the standard of care because there were two exceptions to the requirement that applied in this case: the “common knowledge” exception and/or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at *20.Continue Reading Res Ipsa Loquitur, or Maybe Not