A couple of weeks ago, we walked around the Drug and Device Law Suburban Abode with a critical eye. The Abode was built the same year we were built, and we were struck by its similar cries for invasive cosmetic help. As a stopgap, we arranged to have the exterior painted, a finger in the
For several years, Bexis has served as an Advisor to the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Third Restatement of Torts, Intentional Torts to Persons project. These things, by their nature, take a long time, but this particular project is drawing to a close. Unfortunately, however, the last part of the last section of the last draft…
We typically steer clear of discussing any opioid cases for client reasons. But today we have a case that did not involve our client in any way and that involves a discrete and important issue. Accordingly, we hereby render a bare-bones report.
The case, Floyd v. Feygin, et al., No. 507458/17 (Kings County, N.Y.…
Way back in law school we learned that a plaintiff suing for negligence must satisfy four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) injury. Every one of these elements can be a battleground. Even what seems like the simplest inquiry – whether the plaintiff was injured – can be controversial. We have …
Back in 2013, inspired by a win of our own that we were actually allowed to blog about, we put up a post entitled “On Alternative Design.” Taking the alternative design requirement for strict liability as a given, we concentrated in that post on the proposition that an “alternative” design must really constitute a different design for the same product, and not a disguised “stop selling” or “never start selling” claim where the only “alternative” is a different product or, worse, a completely different medical procedure not utilizing that sort of product at all.
Today, we’re doing something a little different. We’re examining whether an alternative design is also an element of a design-related claim sounding in negligence. As the rest of this post demonstrates, the overwhelming weight of nationwide precedent established that negligent design claims require the plaintiff to establish the existence of a feasible alternative design the would have prevented the plaintiff’s injuries.
We touched upon the alternative design issue somewhat in our post excoriating the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s bizarre opinion in Lance v. Wyeth, 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014). Lance put the rabbit in the hat and held, for a product allegedly: (1) “too dangerous to be used by anyone,” and (2) that had been removed from the market by the FDA, a negligent design case could be stated even though the plaintiff didn’t even attempt to prove an alternative design. Id. at 458-60. What Lance adopted, of course, was a pure “stop selling” claim of the sort preempted under Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466 (2013). “[W]e are convinced that a manufacturer or supplier has a duty to cease further distribution of a product . . . [that] is too dangerous to be used by anyone.” Lance, 85 A.3d at 460.
Generally, in Pennsylvania, negligent design cases have required proof of alternative designs, except in the limited Lance recalled product situation. “The determination of whether a product was negligently designed turns on whether an alternative, feasible, safer design would have lessened or eliminated the injury plaintiff suffered.” Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 64 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis original). See, e.g., Kosmack v. Jones, 807 A.2d 927, 931 (Pa. Commw. 2002) (“a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that there is an alternative design” in negligent design defect cases); Smith v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 5 A.3d 314, 322-23 (Pa. Super. 2010) (requiring proof of alternative design for all-terrain vehicle).
Ponder the following: A man attends an exercise class at a facility run by a local religious institution. Assume that he belonged to this facility, wanted to attend an exercise class because his fitness was less than optimal, and was informed of the need to get medical advice before starting a new and potentially demanding exercise program. He had a heart attack and collapsed right after leaving the class. Assume that the heart attack was not a total surprise given his health, but that he had not had a heart attack before and had not informed the people running the class of any particular risk. The class instructor rushed to the man’s aid while others called 911. The instructor was certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) and did her best to help the man. When paramedics arrived, they assumed care of the man, but he died despite their best efforts.
Based on these facts and assumptions, answer this question:
Who should the man’s estate sue over his death?
A) Nobody. B) The class instructor. C) The religious institution. D) The entities that operate the 911/EMT system.
If you answered other than “A,” then you might need to examine your propensity to blame others.
Add in the following to the scenario presented above: The class instructor tending to the man did not utilize an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) that she knew was present and was certified in using. She brought the AED to the man’s side, but elected not to use it because, in her judgment, he was having a seizure and not a heart attack.
Based on these additional facts, answer these questions:
1. Who should the man’s estate sue over his death?
A) Nobody. B) The class instructor. C) The religious institution. D) The entities that operate the 911/EMT system. E) The company that sold the AED and offered training to purchasers.
2. If the man’s estate already sued the religious institution over his death, who should the defendant bring in via third-party complaint?
A) Nobody. B) The class instructor. C) The entities that operate the 911/EMT system. D) The company that sold the AED and offered training to purchasers.
In Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, No. E2015-01827-SC-R11-CV, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016), the estate sued the church that ran the gym and then both turned their attention to the seller of the medical device that was not used. It is often said that bad cases make bad law, but sometimes egregiously over-reaching cases can make good law. Ultimately, Wallis fits into the latter category. A contrary result, which would have allowed a negligence or contract claim against the seller of a device that was not used with the decedent, would have been bad, maybe bad enough to have been mentioned in our bottom ten post last week.