As many of the Blog’s authors and readers wake up today, they will be in New York for the ACI Drug and Medical Device Litigation Conference. Clearly, the choice of venue matters when it comes to a conference. It also matters to plaintiff lawyers and the medical product manufacturers that they sue. The infamous
An appellate court in Texas filed an opinion last week that very helpfully defines and applies the standard for specific personal jurisdiction under a factual scenario that is extremely common in our line of work—a plaintiff trying to sue a foreign company that sells products (medical devices) in the U.S. through a U.S.-based affiliate. The
Bexis knows that cases like Daughtry v. Silver Fern Chemical, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11431, 2025 WL 1364806 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), hit our sweet spot. It is a civil case, but it also emits a whiff of criminal law. It purports to be, among other things, a product liability case, but it turns
A month or so ago, we castigated some extremely poorly reasoned expert exclusion decisions in the Bulox v. Coopersurgical litigation. The end results weren’t horrible (p-side motions were denied), but th0se Rule 702 opinions completely ignored the changes wrought by the 2023 amendments to that Rule. It was so striking that we went on PACER to see whether defense counsel was to blame for any of that – they weren’t.
Well, today we’re cheering the latest decision(s) in the same litigation. Bulox v. Coopersurgical, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 56370 (Mag. S.D. Tex. March 6, 2005) (“Bulox I”), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54755 (S.D. Tex. March 25, 2025) (“Bulox II”), is as good a PMA medical device preemption decision as a defendant has a right to expect. This Bulox decision should go a long way towards defeating the other side’s latest campaign to deprive women of contraceptive choice.Continue Reading Clip, Clip Hooray
Did it seem to you in law school that sometimes the hardest part of reading cases was not deciphering some obscure legal principle — say, the difference between larceny by trick and taking under false pretenses, or the Rule in Shelley’s Case, or pretty much anything in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code —
Little more than a year ago, in our “Texas Mess” post, we critiqued what we called a “bizarre complaint” recently filed by the Texas attorney general (“TAG”) against a major COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer. We described that complaint as a mélange of “various antivax conspiracy theories concerning COVID-19 vaccines, the FDA, emergency
Bespoke makes us think of tailoring, which makes us think of London’s Savile Row, which makes us think of Annie’s You’re Never Fully Dressed Without a Smile (“who cares what they’re wearing on Main Street or Savile Row”). Which as it turns out is perfect for today’s case about a plaintiff who wanted the court
We are going to assume that Texans know a few things about horses, carts, barn doors, leading to water, and whatever other horse adages we can come up with. But when it comes to litigation, the Texas Court of Appeals took a firm line with a plaintiff who was looking to get deposition and document
Here are a couple of recent developments that we don’t want to let get stale.
Oglesby v. Medtronic, Inc., 2024 WL 1283341 (5th Cir. March 26, 2024), is an excellent, but unfortunately unpublished, affirmance of summary judgment under Texas law in medical device case. Plaintiff brought various claims, and appealed the dismissal of two
We have no inclination to mess with Texas. Heck, a state ornery enough to secede from two different countries in order to preserve slavery isn’t likely to care, anyway. So if Texas wants to run its own power grid, not connect to the rest of us, and freeze in the dark when that system fails, we’re certainly not going to stand in the way. Conversely, when Texas emphatically adopted the learned intermediary rule in Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012), we hailed it as the best decision of 2012.
But when Texas decides to mess with the rest of us…. Well, that’s different.
So we do have comments on the bizarre complaint that the Texas attorney general recently filed over COVID-19. The complaint, brought under the Texas consumer protection statute, sued a major manufacturer of COVID-19 vaccine that was used to control the recent pandemic. That Complaint alleges various antivax conspiracy theories concerning COVID-19 vaccines, the FDA, emergency use authorizations, and the media that have circulated since these vaccines first became available. The Texas Complaint also claims that, in various ways, the vaccine manufacturer violated certain mandatory FDCA provisions and FDA regulations (¶22), did not follow voluntary FDA guidance (¶¶25-31), supposedly committed fraud on the FDA by submitting misleading data (¶¶47, 117, 120-21), and mostly that it purportedly misled the public and/or the press (¶¶50, 55-91, 154-55, 157-59, 161-63, 165-66, 168-69).Continue Reading A Texas Mess