Product liability plaintiffs sometimes sue every entity in the distribution chain. But in many jurisdictions under many circumstances, there is an out for nonmanufacturing defendants. That was the case in Martinez v. Medical Depot et al., 434 F. Supp. 3d 537 (S.D. Texas 2020). The plaintiff was injured when an armrest on his unmotorized
There is no reasonable basis to remand Cazares v. Ortho El Paso, P.A., 2020 WL 4562231 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2020) because there is no reasonable basis for plaintiff’s strict liability claims against a hospital. And that is sufficient.
That, however, is not what the magistrate who first ruled on plaintiff’s motion to remand
When we last left our story, plaintiffs had lost their fight to have Pennsylvania law apply to residents of Texas ( Atkinson I) and lost a chunk of their claims as barred by the Texas statute prohibiting failure to warn claims where a drug’s label has been approved by FDA and comment k (
Back during the Orthopedic Bone Screw mass tort litigation, one of major avenues of attack on the plaintiffs’ novel claims was to pursue every state-law avenue for rejecting the assertion of negligence per se predicated on supposed violations of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). That approach originally led us to 21 U.S.C. §337(a),
Truly unique cases are, well, unique. Most cases involve variations or combinations of cases we have seen before. Sometimes you get different results between two decisions on basically the same case with a single fact different. In February, we posted on an Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision on a motion to dismiss in a case
Some states seem stronger on FDA preemption than SCOTUS was in the Wyeth v. Levine decision. For example, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas prevent or limit the ability of plaintiffs to sue over an FDA-approved drug, including attacks on the FDA-approved label. See, e.g., Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.007. Sometimes
We just saw a commercial with the tag line, “Life is messy. Clean it up.” It’s true – life is messy, sometimes gloriously so. Rules get broken, scripts get torn up, best-laid plans are tossed aside by the winds of fortune. That’s why we like statutes of repose. They are bulwarks in a system in
Gather round brothers and sisters, and hear the word of the Texas Court of Appeals. Today’s sermon addresses the intersection of religion and regulation. Take out your hymnal, and turn to Hawkins v. State, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7863 (Texas Ct. App., 14th Dist. Sept. 27, 2018). Consider the case of Mr. Hawkins, hereinafter
This guest post is by Reed Smith associate Lora Spencer, who (as you might suspect) calls Texas her home. In her first rodeo on the blog, she discusses a recent MDL decision that she thinks is a few pickles short of a barrel, and hopes it’s not a harbinger of things to come. Not
Sure, it was enjoyable to read In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Product Liability Litigation, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 1954759 (5th Cir. April 25, 2018) (“Pinnacle Hip”), to see plaintiffs’ counsel hoisted on their own petard of improper and prejudicial evidence and arguments. But there’s more to Pinnacle Hip