We are going to assume that Texans know a few things about horses, carts, barn doors, leading to water, and whatever other horse adages we can come up with. But when it comes to litigation, the Texas Court of Appeals took a firm line with a plaintiff who was looking to get deposition and document
Here are a couple of recent developments that we don’t want to let get stale.
Oglesby v. Medtronic, Inc., 2024 WL 1283341 (5th Cir. March 26, 2024), is an excellent, but unfortunately unpublished, affirmance of summary judgment under Texas law in medical device case. Plaintiff brought various claims, and appealed the dismissal of two
We have no inclination to mess with Texas. Heck, a state ornery enough to secede from two different countries in order to preserve slavery isn’t likely to care, anyway. So if Texas wants to run its own power grid, not connect to the rest of us, and freeze in the dark when that system fails, we’re certainly not going to stand in the way. Conversely, when Texas emphatically adopted the learned intermediary rule in Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012), we hailed it as the best decision of 2012.
But when Texas decides to mess with the rest of us…. Well, that’s different.
So we do have comments on the bizarre complaint that the Texas attorney general recently filed over COVID-19. The complaint, brought under the Texas consumer protection statute, sued a major manufacturer of COVID-19 vaccine that was used to control the recent pandemic. That Complaint alleges various antivax conspiracy theories concerning COVID-19 vaccines, the FDA, emergency use authorizations, and the media that have circulated since these vaccines first became available. The Texas Complaint also claims that, in various ways, the vaccine manufacturer violated certain mandatory FDCA provisions and FDA regulations (¶22), did not follow voluntary FDA guidance (¶¶25-31), supposedly committed fraud on the FDA by submitting misleading data (¶¶47, 117, 120-21), and mostly that it purportedly misled the public and/or the press (¶¶50, 55-91, 154-55, 157-59, 161-63, 165-66, 168-69).Continue Reading A Texas Mess
It’s a short week, so we are going to do a short post about a short decision on a product that lasted a long time.
An inferior vena cava (“IVC”) filter was implanted in plaintiff in 2004. Some years later she experienced a complication, not identified in the decision, which led her to file a
Lawyers and wannabe lawyers like to use Latin words and phrases without always understanding their original meaning. English, a Germanic language according to the family tree, is peppered with words that are derived from Latin. Being the conglomeration that it is, English includes some words—egregious comes to mind—that now mean the opposite of their Latin
A little less than three years ago we posted about a decision by a federal court in Pennsylvania that twisted Texas and Supreme Court precedent to find an independent claim for failure to test under Texas law. So, we could not resist blogging about a Texas court reaching the exact opposite conclusion.
Earlier this year
When last we wrote, we had just watched our gorgeous standard poodle puppy, Luca, compete in his first weekend of dog shows. He was still learning the ropes, and, though he looked beautiful, he did not win any points. (Dog shows are worth from one to five points for each breed, depending on the number
Today’s message is a reminder that specific personal jurisdiction is just that – both specific and personal. That means plaintiffs can’t group plead their way around personal jurisdiction lumping parents and subsidiaries together. Plaintiffs must identify each defendant’s individual role in causing the alleged harm. If plaintiffs seek to impute the jurisdictional contacts of one
Back in the antediluvian era of the Bone Screw Litigation some 25 years ago, Bexis was responsible for crafting (and sometimes outright inventing, see fraud on the FDA) defenses for that then-unusual medical device-related mass tort. One of the first post-MDL-remand Bone Screw cases involved a Louisiana statute, La. Stat. Rev. §9:2800.56, requiring that, for a product to be “unreasonably dangerous in design,” the plaintiff must establish that “[t]here existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage” based on the statute’s risk/utility test.Continue Reading A Primer on Alternative Design
As much as we liked those parts of In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, 888 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying Texas law), that overturned a half-billion dollar verdict caused by a combination of attorney misconduct and judicial lassitude, we also recognized the problematic effects of certain other Fifth Circuit rulings in that decision. While the good parts of Pinnacle Hip were good enough to win that decision a spot in our 2018 top ten cases, that decision’s adverse aspects were bad enough that it also landed on our list of 2018’s worst ten decisions. Specifically we observed:
The most serious error the court made was refusing to apply established Texas law that comment k precludes strict liability across the board. Pinnacle Hip ignored – really ignored − a half dozen prior decisions (including one of its own) on this issue. Even if there wasn’t any precedent (which there was), expanding state-law liability where the state courts have not is not the job of a federal court sitting in diversity.
Continue Reading Comment K, Presumptions, and Medical Device Design Defects Under Texas Law